Re: [Gen-art] Gen-art LC review of draft-ietf-nfsv4-rpcsec-gssv3-13

"Adamson, Andy" <> Thu, 10 December 2015 21:55 UTC

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From: "Adamson, Andy" <>
To: Elwyn Davies <>
Thread-Topic: Gen-art LC review of draft-ietf-nfsv4-rpcsec-gssv3-13
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Subject: Re: [Gen-art] Gen-art LC review of draft-ietf-nfsv4-rpcsec-gssv3-13
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Hi Elwyn

Thanks for the review. I submitted the IANA request (IANA #884160) today. I will address the rest of the issues asap.


> On Dec 10, 2015, at 2:48 PM, Elwyn Davies <> wrote:
> I am the assigned Gen-ART reviewer for this draft. The General Area
> Review Team (Gen-ART) reviews all IETF documents being processed
> by the IESG for the IETF Chair.  Please treat these comments just
> like any other last call comments.
> For more information, please see the FAQ at
> <>.
> Document: draft-ietf-nfsv4-rpcsec-gssv3-13.txt
> Reviewer: Elwyn Davies
> Review Date: 2015-12-09
> IETF LC End Date: 2015-12-09
> IESG Telechat date: (if known) -
> Summary: Almost Ready.  There are a couple of minor issues that just poke above the editorial/nits level.  The downref issue probably needs to be solved by incorporating the relevant descriptions from the requirements doc (RFC 7204) into the NFS v4.2 draft and using that as the reference - the relevant information is indeed needed by implementers to understand what is going on in this protocol and in NFSv4.2 and referring back to the requirements RFC is probably not a good way to go as the requirements may be neither complete nor fully implemented, making the reference potentially unreliable.
> Major issues:
> None
> Minor issues:
> s1, para 5 and s6.2:  idnits points out that RFC 2401 has been obsoleted by RFC 4301.  I suspect that RFC 4301 could be referenced instead.
> s1.1, first bullet and last para:   ... both refer to RFC 7204 which is given as a normative reference.  This is a downref to an informational document.  I observe that (probably) the same material is referred to in [NFSv4.2] although there it is given as informational.  My personal view is that it would be better to extract the relevant info from RFC 7204 and add it into [NFSv4.2] which is already referenced normatively in this draft.    Requiring implementers to plough through the requirements (no section pointers are given) that may or may not have been executed in the standards seems undesirable.
> s2.1 and s2.5: s2.5 states that 'RPCSEC_GSS_BIND_CHANNEL MUST NOT be used on RPCSEC_GSS version 3 handles'.  This is rather more constraining than the term 'deprecated' used in s2.1.  It would seem that:
> - s2.1 ought to say that RPCSEC_GSS_BIND_CHANNEL is *not supported* when version 3 is in use.
> - s2.5 ought to specify how the target should respond if a client requests a RPCSEC_GSS_BIND_CHANNEL operation on a v3  handle.
> s2.6/s5: New auth_stat values are managed by IANA (on a first come first served basis) [Better get your request in now if you want these numbers!]  See and RFC 5531.  The request should be documented in s5.
> Nits/editorial comments:
> Abstract: s/to server/to a server/
> s1, para 3: s/A major motivation for RPCSEC_GSSv3/A major motivation for version 3 of RPCSEC_GSS (RPCSEC_GSSv3)/ (This expansion is currently done later on in s1.1).
> s1, para 3: s/i.e. /i.e.,  /
> s1, para 5: s/ Labeled NFS (see Section 8 of [NFSv4.2])/ Labeled NFS (see Section 9 of [NFSv4.2]) (referring to -39)  It might be worth noting explicitly that 'full-mode' is defined in s9.6.1 of [NFSv4.2]
> s1, para 5: MAC needs to be expanded (at least on account of the multiple possible expansions!)  Presumably this should be 'Mandatory Access Control (MAC) systems (as defined in [RFC4949])' (quoting RFC7204, section 1).
> s1, para 6: s/server-side copy (see Section 3.4.1 of [NFSv4.2])/server-side copy (see Section 4 of [NFSv4.2])/
> s1, para 7: It might be worth explicitly mentioning s9 of [AFS-RXGK] that introduces cache poisoning issues.
> s1.1: According to s2.7.1.2, the channel binding feature is OPTIONAL to implement for servers.  It would be useful to note this in s1.1. Similarly labeling is OPTIONAL according to s2.7.1.3.   Presumably the other features MUST be supported by a RPSEC_GSSv3 implementation - this could also be noted.
> s2, 2nd bullet: s/that uses the child handle./that use the child handle./
> s2.3, para 1: Need to expand MIC on first occurrence (Message Integrity Code, I assume)
> s2.3, code fragment: s/* This code was derived from [RFC2203]./* This code was derived from RFC 2203, RFC 5403 and RFC-to-be./ (presumably)
> s2.3, para 2: s/except for the mtype/except that the mtype/
> s2.4:  To be absolutely clear, it would be worth adding something like:
>   The following code fragment replaces the corresponding preliminary code shown in Figure 1 of [RFC5403].
>   The values in the code fragment in s2.6 are additions to the auth_stat enumeration.
>   Subsequent code fragments are additions to the code for version 2 that support the new procedures
>   defined in version 3.
> --- inserted at the head of the section.
> s2.7, last para but two:  s/SHOULD associate/need to associate/ - this isn't something that is on the wire or can be verified by the protocol.
> s2.7.1.1, para after code fragment: s/e.g. /e.g., /
> s2.7.1.1, para 3 after the code fragment:
> I think that the following change is needed, firstly to make the text comprehensible and secondly, there is no current alternative allowed for the SHOULD and the following text indicates that an updated protocol would be needed for other alternatives.
> OLD:
> The inner context handle it SHOULD use a context handle to authenticate a user.
> NEW:
> For the inner context handle with RPSEC_GSSv3 it MUST use a context handle to authenticate a user.
> s2.7.1.1, para 5 after the code fragment: s/is placed in/and is placed in the/
> s2.7.1.3, para 3 after the code fragment: s/Section 12.2.2 of [NFSv4.2]./Section 12.2.4 of [NFSv4.2]./
> s2.7.1.3, para 6 after the code fragment: s/to different subject label/to a different subject label/
> s2.7.1.3, last para:
> OLD:
> Section  "Inter-Server Copy with RPCSEC_GSSv3" of [NFSv4.2]
> NEW:
> Section "Inter-Server Copy via ONC RPC with RPCSEC_GSSv3" of [NFSv4.2]
> s2.7.2, para 1 after code fragment: s/what assertions to be listed/what assertions are to be listed/
> s2.8:
>>  Other assertion types are described
>>    elsewhere...
> Where?  An example or reference would help.
> s5: There are IANA considerations... see minor issues above.
> s6.1: RFC 7204 is a downref ... see minor issues above.
> s6.2:  The Bell-LaPadula technical report is one of those much cited but almost unobtainable papers.  After some ferreting I found a 'reconstruction' via Wikipedia's article on the report at [Aside: In the process of tracking down this text I came across 'A Comment on the "Basic Security Theorem" of Bell and LaPadula' by John McLean ( which has some negative things to say about the Bell-LaPadula model.]