Re: [Gen-art] [tram] Genart telechat review of draft-ietf-tram-stunbis-16

[Marc Petit-Huguenin <[e-mail]>]

Thanks again for the review.  Comments inline.

On 03/30/2018 04:45 AM, Dale Worley wrote:
> Reviewer: Dale Worley
> Review result: Ready with Nits
> 
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> 
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> 
> Document:  draft-ietf-tram-stunbis-16
> Reviewer:  Dale R. Worley
> Review Date:  2018-03-29
> IETF LC End Date:  2018-02-20
> IESG Telechat date:  2018-04-19
> 
> Summary:
> 
>        This draft is basically ready for publication, but has nits
>        that should be fixed before publication.
> 
> The only interesting item concerns section 17.1, where the assignment
> of meanings to bits in the "security feature set" value is different
> from the assignment in -16.  This is either non-upward-compatible with
> -16, or there is an error in either -16 or -17.
> 
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
> 
> There is an issue that shows up in several places:  The NAT may
> forward the request using an IP family that is different from the IP
> family that it received the request using.  This means that the
> "source IP family of the request" may depend on whether one is
> speaking of the client or the server.  The draft is cognizant of this,
> and mentions its consequences in sections 6.3.3 and 12.  But this also
> has consequences for ALTERNATE-SERVER:  Section 14.15 says "The IP
> address family MUST be identical to that of the source IP address of
> the request." even though that family might not be usable by the
> client.  The draft doesn't seem to explicitly say that this comes from
> address-switching by the NAT.  It would help if there was a
> higher-level discussion of this matter, pointing to the various
> consequences.

I still do not have text about that but, as this is blocking this response since 2 weeks now, I am releasing it as is and will come back to that after I process the other reviews that accumulated during my time traveling around Europe.

> 
> 3.  Terminology
> 
> This section needs to be updated to reference RFC 8174, including
> updating the paragraph (especially the final two lines) to read as
> specified in RFC 8174:
> 
>       The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL
>       NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED",
>       "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as
>       described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they
>       appear in all capitals, as shown here.

Updated.

> 
> 6.2.2.  Sending over TCP or TLS-over-TCP
> 
>    o  if multiplexing other application protocols over that port, has
>       finished using that other protocol, and
> 
> The two clauses don't match in grammatical number.  This should be
> either
> 
>    o  if multiplexing other application protocols over that port, has
>       finished using those other protocols, and
> 
> or
> 
>    o  if multiplexing another application protocol over that port, has
>       finished using that other protocol, and

Updated using the former.

> 
> 9.2.4.  Receiving a Request
> 
>       *  If the request contains neither PASSWORD-ALGORITHMS nor
>          PASSWORD- ALGORITHM, then the request is processed as though
>          PASSWORD- ALGORITHM were MD5 (Note that if the original
>          PASSWORD-ALGORITHMS attribute did not contain MD5, this will
>          result in a 400 Bad Request in a later step below).
> 
> There are two places where s/PASSWORD- ALGORITHM/PASSWORD-ALGORITHM/.

Already fixed following a previous review.

> 
> 14.3.  USERNAME
> 
>    The value of USERNAME is a variable-length value containing the
>    authentication username.  It MUST contain a UTF-8 [RFC3629] encoded
>    sequence of less than 509 bytes, and MUST have been processed using
>    the OpaqueString profile [RFC8265].  A compliant implementation MUST
>    be able to parse UTF-8 encoded sequence of less than 763.
> 
> The final "763" is grammatically incorrect.  I think you intend
> s/763/763 bytes/, to parallel other items.

Fixed.

> 
> 14.4.  USERHASH
> 
>    userhash = SHA-256(Opaque(username) ":" Opaque(realm))
> 
> I believe that this should be
> 
>    userhash = SHA-256(OpaqueString(username) ":" OpaqueString(realm))

Fixed.

> 
> 14.5.  MESSAGE-INTEGRITY
> 
>    Petit-Huguenin, et al.  Expires September 6, 2018 [Page 40]
> 
>    Internet-Draft Session Traversal Utilities for NAT (STUN) March 2018
> 
> This bit of text appears as body text in the middle of page 40.

Already fixed following a previous review.

> 
> 14.6.  MESSAGE-INTEGRITY-SHA256
> 
>    The MESSAGE-INTEGRITY-SHA256 attribute contains an HMAC-SHA256
>    [RFC2104] of the STUN message.  The MESSAGE-INTEGRITY-SHA256
>    attribute can be present in any STUN message type.  The MESSAGE-
>    INTEGRITY-SHA256 attribute contains an initial portion of the HMAC-
>    SHA-256 [RFC2104] of the STUN message.  The value will be at most 32
>    bytes and MUST be a positive multiple of 4 bytes.  The HMAC MUST NOT
>    be truncated below a minimum size of 16 bytes.  The value must be the
>    full 32 bytes unless the STUN Usage explicitly specifies that
>    truncation is allowed.  STUN Usages may specify a minimum length
>    longer than 4 bytes.
> 
> This seems to be less clear than it could be.  (And my apologies, some
> of the redundancy was my suggestion!)  Perhaps this is an improvement:
> 
>    The value will be at most 32 bytes, MUST be at least 16 bytes, and
>    MUST be a multiple of 4 bytes.  The value must be the full 32 bytes
>    unless the STUN Usage explicitly specifies that truncation is
>    allowed.  STUN Usages may specify a minimum length longer than 16
>    bytes.

Applied.

> 
> 17.1.  STUN Security Features Registry
> 
>    A STUN Security Feature set defines 24 bit as flags.
> 
>    IANA is requested to create a new registry containing the STUN
>    Security Features that are protected by the bid down attack
>    prevention mechanism described in section Section 9.2.1.
> 
>    The initial STUN Security Features are:
> 
>    Bit 0: Password algorithms
>    Bit 1: Username anonymity
>    Bit 2-23: Unassigned
> 
> Beware that the assignment of features to bits in the security feature
> value has changed!  Bit numbers are assigned from the left/high-order
> end -- see figure 2 in the draft.  So the *values* for these bits are:
> 
> 0x400000   Bit 0: Password algorithms
> 0x200000   Bit 1: Username anonymity
> 
> But the values assigned in -15 were:
> 
>    0x000001: Password algorithms
>    0x000002: Username anonymity

Hmm, that was not the intent, and not how I read the text. Even in Figure 2 less significant bits are on the right.  So the intent is real tat bit0=0x001, bit1 =
0x002, and so on.  All we do is about interoperability, so I added some text that makes that less ambiguous.


-- 
Marc Petit-Huguenin
Email: [e-mail]
Blog: https://marc.petit-huguenin.org
Profile: https://www.linkedin.com/in/petithug