Re: [Gen-art] Gen-ART review of draft-ietf-i2rs-architecture-07

"Susan Hares" <> Thu, 17 December 2015 02:16 UTC

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From: "Susan Hares" <>
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Subject: Re: [Gen-art] Gen-ART review of draft-ietf-i2rs-architecture-07
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I am following up on your GEN-ART review Last January.  It has taken us a
year to make sure we handled the security issues raised by the sec-dir
review.  We created two new requirements documents focused on security:


In addition to our security requirements, we defined requirements for the
protocol regarding publication of notification streams, ephemeral state, and


Please review this with the following I2RS requirement documents, and this
improved architecture document.  All documents except the I2RS protocol
security environment and the draft-ietf-i2rs-ephemeral state have passed WG
LC.  The ephemeral state simply needs to indicate what NETCONF minimum
features need to be implemented.  


These minimum NETCONF features for I2RS will be described in detail in a
protocol-strawman (which is still to be published). 


See my answer to your specific the comments inline below.   Thank you for
your patience, but we wanted to provide the security documents.  




-----Original Message-----
From: Russ Housley [] 
Sent: Monday, December 15, 2014 7:02 PM
Subject: Gen-ART review of draft-ietf-i2rs-architecture-07


I am the assigned Gen-ART reviewer for this draft. For background on
Gen-ART, please see the FAQ at <


This review is in response to a request for early Gen-ART review.


Document: draft-ietf-i2rs-architecture-07

Reviewer: Russ Housley

Review Date: 2014-12-15

IETF LC End Date: unknown

IESG Telechat date: unknown


Summary: Almost Ready.


Major Concerns:


The different between an identity and a role is not clear to me.

Does each identity have exactly one role?  It would help for this to be
covered in section 2, and it may need to be expanded upon in section 4.


Section 4.2 talks about "groups or roles."  Groups needs to be defined, even
if it is just a list of identities.


Sue: Version-11 No mention of groups is made outside of the section 2.  The
only mention of groups is in this text: 


   Groups:   NETCONF Network Access [RFC6536] refers uses the term group

      in terms of an Administrative group which supports support the

      well-established distinction between a root account and other

      types of less-privileged conceptual user accounts.  Group still

      refers to a single identity (e.g. root) which is shared by a group

      of users.


Section 6.4 include a sentence that begins, "When a full implementation is
not mandatory, an I2RS Service should ..."  What determines if an
implementation must be "full"?  I think you can make this point without
having to delve into this question.  I suggest: "When a implementation does
offer all of the capabilities specified for an I2RS Service, the
implementation should include a capability model so that peers can determine
which parts of the service are supported."


The updated text in version 11 has the following text: 


Sue:   A routing element need not implement all routing components
described nor provide the associated I2RS services.  I2RS Services  should
include a capability model so  that peers can determine which parts of the
service are supported.


Section 7.4 says: "Each I2RS Client will have a unique identity; it can also
have secondary identities to be used for troubleshooting."  The definition
in in section 2 offer a proxy-related reason for secondary identities.
Perhaps all of the discussion of identities can be placed in one section.
Right now it is split into sections 4 and 7.4.


Sue: All identity work is in section 4. 


Minor Concerns:


The document seems to use "confidentiality" and "privacy" to mean the same
thing.  They are different.  See RFC 2828 for definitions.  I think that
this document should use confidentiality throughout.


Version 11: Only confidentiality is used 


The last paragraph in section 1.2 says that the "detection and avoidance of
such interactions is outside the scope of the I2RS work," and that seems
fine, except for one point.  I assume that when there are two overlapping
write operations, one of them will get an error.  The previous paragraph
says that "errors should produce predictable behaviors."  So, the write
operation that fails needs to get an error that will allow the application
to take appropriate action.


Sue: The following is the sentence in version-11


   In addition it must be noted that there may be indirect interactions

   between write operations.  A basic example of this is when two

   different but overlapping prefixes are written with different

   forwarding behavior.  Detection and avoidance of such interactions is

   outside the scope of the I2RS work and is left to agent design and



Is this sufficient? 


In section 4.1, is the reference to "accounting" also a call for audit
trail?  If so, please be explicit.  The need for audit log comes up later in
section 6.2.


Sue:  "accounting" has been removed.  Section 6.2 now states the following: 

Meaningful logging of  the application and removal of changes is recommended


The I2RS has a "traceability requirements" draft that provides the details
on logging of things that change in the I2RS Agent.  Please let me know if
you feel the current version of I2RS architecture has a valid section 6.2 


Section 7.1 begins: "As agreed by the I2RS working group, this I2RS
architecture assumes ..."  I am sure this was important at one time to say
this, but it seems odd in the final RFC.  I suggest: "The I2RS architecture
assumes ..."



This I2RS architecture assumes that there is a single I2RS protocol for 

control and data exchange comprised of IETF protocols or expansions of IETF
existing protocols to support the I2RS architecture. Two the protocols to be
expanded to support the I2RS protocol are NETCONF [RFC6241] and RESTCONF

This helps meet the goal of simplicity and thereby enhances deployability.  


Other Comments:


In the abstract, please spell out I2RS.


Several places starting in the Abstract: s/internet/Internet/


In section 1, it says: "... for registering for and requesting ..."; it
should say: "... for registering and for requesting ...".

Sue: Change made in version 8 


In section 1, is says: "... in domain other than routing, ...".


Change made in 

Sue: Change made in version 8 



Typo: s/E.g./e.g./

Change made in version 8