Re: [Gen-art] [lamps] Genart last call review of draft-ietf-lamps-hash-of-root-key-cert-extn-03

Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com> Sat, 05 January 2019 02:41 UTC

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From: Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>
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Date: Fri, 4 Jan 2019 21:41:15 -0500
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Cc: Joel Halpern <jmh@joelhalpern.com>, LAMPS WG <spasm@ietf.org>, IETF Gen-ART <gen-art@ietf.org>, draft-ietf-lamps-hash-of-root-key-cert-extn.all@ietf.org, IETF <ietf@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [Gen-art] [lamps] Genart last call review of draft-ietf-lamps-hash-of-root-key-cert-extn-03
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Joel:

If access to the key is lost, the commitment is broken, so the Root CA must make a fresh start using a completely unrelated key.  Maybe the word "remedy" is creating the wrong impression for you.

Russ


> On Jan 4, 2019, at 6:42 PM, jmh.direct@joelhalpern.com wrote:
> 
> If the new self-signed cert uses a new key, wouldn't that be rejected as violating the promise in the current cert?  I am missing something.
> 
> Thanks,
> Joel
> 
> 
> 
> Sent via the Samsung Galaxy S7, an AT&T 4G LTE smartphone
> 
> -------- Original message --------
> From: Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>;
> Date: 1/4/19 17:57 (GMT-05:00)
> To: Joel Halpern <jmh@joelhalpern.com>;
> Cc: IETF Gen-ART <gen-art@ietf.org>;, spasm@ietf.org, draft-ietf-lamps-hash-of-root-key-cert-extn.all@ietf.org, IETF <ietf@ietf.org>;
> Subject: Re: Genart last call review of   draft-ietf-lamps-hash-of-root-key-cert-extn-03
> 
> Joel:
> 
> Thanks for the review.
> 
> > Document: draft-ietf-lamps-hash-of-root-key-cert-extn-03
> > Reviewer: Joel Halpern
> > Review Date: 2019-01-04
> > IETF LC End Date: 2019-01-10
> > IESG Telechat date: Not scheduled for a telechat
> > 
> > Summary: This draft is nearly ready for publication as an Informational RFC.
> > 
> > Major issues: N/A
> > 
> > Minor issues:
> >    The explanation at the end of section 5 about the remedy for losing access
> >    to the new root key left me confused.
> > It looks like the situation is that there is a certificate out there, with the
> > hash of root key extensions. The certificate owner loses access to the new key
> > pair underlying the hash. The certificate owner clearly has to issue a new key
> > pair.  So far, so good.
> > 
> > What the text seems to say is to simply issue a new self-signed certificate. 
> > There are two possibilities for what is intended. I think the idea is that the
> > new certificate will use the existing key pair (not the promised one, nor
> > another new one) for its own signature, and include a new hash of root key for
> > the newly generated pair.  If the certificate owner can do that (I have not
> > dived into the rest of the certificate operations to figure out if that is
> > legal) then it works.  Please add some words explaining that better. If the
> > certificate owner can not simply issue a new self-signed certificate with the
> > existing key pair, then I am lost.  It appears that the text says that the
> > certificate owner issues a new self-signed certificate using a new key pair. 
> > But that will fail the check against the previous certificate hash of root key.
> > I am hoping that it is the first of these alternatives, and all that is needed
> > is clearer explanatory text stating that the new cert uses the existing key
> > pair, and includes a new hash of root key promise.
> 
> Joel, the Root CA want to start using a different key par, but they have lost access to the one that was previously generated for that purpose.  So, the remedy is to create a new self-signed certificate with a newly generated key.
> 
> Does that help?  If so, what would make the paragraph more clear?
> 
> Russ
> 
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