Re: [GROW] Kathleen Moriarty's No Objection on draft-ietf-grow-filtering-threats-07: (with COMMENT)

[Kathleen Moriarty <[e-mail]>]

On Tue, Sep 1, 2015 at 12:11 PM, joel jaeggli <[e-mail]> wrote:
> On 9/1/15 8:16 AM, Peter Schoenmaker wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Now if the unexpected path through A is under-provisioned,
>>>>> traffic will be lost. But that would be a bit strange for the
>>>>> owner of P to do the documented trick to trigger a DoS of its
>>>>> own prefix P, wouldn¹t it?
>>>>>
>>>>> So can I really talk about a DoS vector here? If someone else
>>>>> than the owner of P plays games with P to trigger the
>>>>> unexpected path for P through A, then it definitely becomes
>>>>> one, but there we fall in the classic cases of prefix
>>>>> hi-jacking.
>>>>
>>>> I don't see a pointer in the security considerations to other
>>>> work describing this threat as a consideration, should this be
>>>> included? It sounds as if it should be.
>>>
>>>
>>> Well, I have the feeling that it is quite out of the scope of this
>>> document, which is about playing with more specific prefixes
>>> injection bound with restricted propagation. I am not sure I should
>>> mention prefix hi-jacking here, as it¹s quite a different,
>>> well-document approach; I inject a more specific prefix that
>>> belongs to someone else and I drop the traffic.
>>>
>>> I don¹t know what others think about this.
>>
>> I would agree this is out of scope for the document.  The traffic
>> makes it to the intended and correct destination.  There are no rogue
>> players involved (at least more than normal which is covered
>> extensively in other documents as pierre points out.)  The main point
>> is how traffic is routed through different networks.
>
> We worked pretty hard to keep both the attack terminology out of the
> document and to keep the focus on the non-malicious action of ordinary
> actors. I think it's better that we don't lump that in with malicious
> action of varying varieties.

My comments were just comments and not a discuss, so I appreciate the
discussion and you can decide what to do or not do with it.  It
basically was a set of questions I wound up with in reading the draft
to make sure security considerations were included.

Thanks,
Kathleen

>
>> peter
>>
>>
>>>
>>> Cheers,
>>>
>>> Pierre.
>>>
>>>
>>>>
>>>> Thanks, Kathleen
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Cheers,
>>>>>
>>>>> Pierre.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> The importance of mentioning this int he security
>>>>> considerations section is to more explicitly call this out as
>>>>> a potential DoS attack method.  The time for BGP to repropagate
>>>>> might be short(ish), but that could be a critical amount of
>>>>> time during an event and maybe the more specific AS is a web
>>>>> server farm or some other critical resource.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> --
>>>>
>>>> Best regards, Kathleen
>>>
>>
>>
>
>



-- 

Best regards,
Kathleen