[HASMAT] strict transport security
"Thomson, Martin" <Martin.Thomson@andrew.com> Tue, 27 July 2010 11:40 UTC
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From: "Thomson, Martin" <Martin.Thomson@andrew.com>
To: "hasmat@ietf.org" <hasmat@ietf.org>
Date: Tue, 27 Jul 2010 19:43:13 +0800
Thread-Topic: strict transport security
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Subject: [HASMAT] strict transport security
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Just sitting here in the meeting reading this document and a few things leap out. * This document is MASSIVE. All it does is describe a simple header, but it's surprisingly large. It's minor, but this needs a tough edit. * Scope: it appears that the header applies to the entire host. It might be nice to have policies that apply to parts of a header (probably more specifically - individual resources). * The biggest attack here - the Bootstrap MITM vulnerability - is dealt with really superficially. The suggested mitigation - configure hosts for this - is a bit lame. * A user might specify a policy that requires secure checking of the server policy. I assume that you can (if you like) get this header over TLS? If you are describing how a UA does things, how might it check - securely - whether a site has a policy. * DNS tree walking is bad: the DNS "tree" does not correlate perfectly with administrative domains. Is there a good reason for this to use this rather than simply relying on origin. --Martin
- [HASMAT] strict transport security Thomson, Martin
- Re: [HASMAT] strict transport security Adam Barth