[hiprg] blind design alternative

Miika Komu <mkomu@cs.hut.fi> Wed, 24 March 2010 16:38 UTC

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Date: Wed, 24 Mar 2010 18:38:53 +0200
From: Miika Komu <mkomu@cs.hut.fi>
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Subject: [hiprg] blind design alternative
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we discussed an alternative for blind during our presentation. I would 
like to ask for the research group feedback also here in the mailing list.

The idea in the alternative is to use disposable host identities for the 
base exchange. The I2 and R2 packets in the base exchange would carry 
encrypted parameters with long-term public keys. The ownership for the 
long-term public keys could be proved e.g. with some extra signatures 
and certificates. This alternative can also be protected against polling 
attacks similarly as blind.

Quick and dirty qualitative analysis for blind below. The proposed 
alternative has the opposite benefits and drawbacks of blind.

+ Requires less computation
+ Smaller packet size
+ Amount of preshared information is smaller (HITs and not complete HIs)
+ HITs can be rescrambled after handovers (?)
- Middleboxes cannot verify signatures

Summing up the pros and cons blindly would make blind more a more 
attractable alternative. However, the last two points carry possibly a 
lot of more weight than the others and therefore it is a bit unclear to 
me which is the winner.