Re: [hiprg] clarification of identity privacy properties of HIPbase exchange

"Henderson, Thomas R" <thomas.r.henderson@boeing.com> Fri, 18 February 2011 02:20 UTC

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From: "Henderson, Thomas R" <thomas.r.henderson@boeing.com>
To: "'Tobias Heer'" <heer@cs.rwth-aachen.de>, "hiprg@irtf.org" <hiprg@irtf.org>
Date: Thu, 17 Feb 2011 18:20:18 -0800
Thread-Topic: [hiprg] clarification of identity privacy properties of HIPbase exchange
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Subject: Re: [hiprg] clarification of identity privacy properties of HIPbase exchange
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Thanks for the attempted clarifications, but I am not sure that these types of attacks (binding between a host name and HI, as Andrei suggested, or different concepts of identity) are what is being referred to in this paragraph.  Does anyone have a reference to substantiate this statement?:
>
>    All two-round-trip variations of the Diffie Hellman key exchange
>    using public keys for authentication are vulnerable to identity
>    theft.  

If I understood more clearly the general attacks being referred to here, I could try to relate that to the existing base exchange and better describe the vulnerabilities.  

- Tom