Re: [hiprg] blind design alternative

On 03/24/2010 06:38 PM, Miika Komu wrote:

Hi,

Jan actually commented that middleboxes can verify the signatures if 
they know the public key beforehand. So I guess it seems blind is the 
winner at the moment.

> Hi,
>
> we discussed an alternative for blind during our presentation. I would
> like to ask for the research group feedback also here in the mailing list.
>
> The idea in the alternative is to use disposable host identities for the
> base exchange. The I2 and R2 packets in the base exchange would carry
> encrypted parameters with long-term public keys. The ownership for the
> long-term public keys could be proved e.g. with some extra signatures
> and certificates. This alternative can also be protected against polling
> attacks similarly as blind.
>
> Quick and dirty qualitative analysis for blind below. The proposed
> alternative has the opposite benefits and drawbacks of blind.
>
> Blind:
> + Requires less computation
> + Smaller packet size
> + Amount of preshared information is smaller (HITs and not complete HIs)
> + HITs can be rescrambled after handovers (?)
> - Middleboxes cannot verify signatures
>
> Summing up the pros and cons blindly would make blind more a more
> attractable alternative. However, the last two points carry possibly a
> lot of more weight than the others and therefore it is a bit unclear to
> me which is the winner.
>
> Comments?
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