Re: [Hipsec] HIP-based anycast

Miika Komu <mkomu@cs.hut.fi> Sat, 30 March 2013 19:57 UTC

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Date: Sat, 30 Mar 2013 21:57:08 +0200
From: Miika Komu <mkomu@cs.hut.fi>
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Cc: hip WG <hipsec@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [Hipsec] HIP-based anycast
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Hi Julien,

I'll have to the check the reference in more detail. Surely, shared 
private keys at the server side are certainly one possibility, but the 
compromise of a single host would then compromise the entire group?

I was originally thinking that the IP address of rendezvous server would 
identify the group, but admit this can be somewhat limiting. For 
instance, an additional parameter in the I1 could identify the group. 
Clearly, multicast is outside of the scope of this WG, but I was 
considering if the specifications are future proof with such an approach 
since now the opportunistic base exchange is always terminated at the 
rendezvous server.

P.S. I'll automatically assume this discussion shouldn't affect the 
specs at all if this topic doesn't gather too much discussion (and it's 
quite a late in process, anyway).

On 03/29/2013 01:36 AM, Julien Laganier wrote:
> Hi,
>
> HIP anycast would need a HIT to identify the members of the anycast
> group, wouldn't it?
>
> So why not have a key pair generated for the group, and the HIT
> derived from the public key be the anycast HIT. One could then use the
> group anycast key pair to sign authorization certificates granting
> membership into the group. Similar concept has been explored for IPv6
> multicast and anycast group in:
>
> CASTELLUCCIA, C. AND MONTENEGRO, G. 2003. Securing group management in
> ipv6 with cryptographically
> generated addresses. In The Eighth IEEE Symposium on Computers and
> Communications
> (ISCC’2003).
>
> --julien
>
>
> On Tue, Nov 27, 2012 at 1:38 AM, Miika Komu <mkomu@cs.hut.fi> wrote:
>> Hi,
>>
>> opportunistic mode with the help of a rendezvous server could be used for
>> implementing HIP-based anycast. The current RVS specification does not allow
>> this:
>>
>> http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-hip-rfc5204-bis-02
>>
>> 4.3.1. Processing Outgoing I1 Packets
>>
>>     An initiator SHOULD NOT send an opportunistic I1 with a NULL
>>     destination HIT to an IP address that is known to be a rendezvous
>>     server address, unless it wants to establish a HIP association with
>>     the rendezvous server itself and does not know its HIT.
>>
>> I think we could specify either a flag in the base exchange or alternatively
>> a special HIT encoding for the "NULL" destination HIT in the I1. What do you
>> think?
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>