Re: [Hipsec] HIT security analysis -- Follow-up on 4843bis / ORCHIDv2

Hi Bob, 

sorry for the late reply - I have been traveling / was on holiday, too.

Am 07.04.2010 um 19:42 schrieb Robert Moskowitz:

> I am back (kind of) from Passover holidays.
> 
> Given some of the content of the 4843bis thread, I went looking to see if we had any writeup on the security threats for HITs, and really did not find a consistant writeup.  Of course we want to minimize collisions, but what are the threats?
> 
> 4423 has always 'allowed' for HITs from a source other than a Public Key, but does not go through the threats, even if there is a PK Host Identity, but something other than a Cryptographic Hash is used to derive the HIT from it.
> 
I am not aware of such document but from my understanding, having a non-cryptographic HIT still requires some cryptographic binding to a public key so that you have a signature algorithm that you can use in the BEX. Such binding could be a certificate that binds the non-cryptographic identity to a public key. However, I do not know any direct source of information. I would certainly be interested if there is some work on this already.

Tobias

> Or maybe it is all there (the threat analysis) and I am not seeing the tree in the forest.
> 
> 
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--  

Dipl.-Inform. Tobias Heer, Ph.D. Student
Distributed Systems Group 
RWTH Aachen University, Germany
tel: +49 241 80 207 76
web: http://ds.cs.rwth-aachen.de/members/heer