Re: [Hipsec] IPCOMP support in HIP

Derek Fawcus <dfawcus+lists-hipsec@employees.org> Thu, 10 March 2016 19:10 UTC

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Date: Thu, 10 Mar 2016 19:10:41 +0000
From: Derek Fawcus <dfawcus+lists-hipsec@employees.org>
To: Robert Moskowitz <rgm@htt-consult.com>
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Subject: Re: [Hipsec] IPCOMP support in HIP
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On Thu, Mar 10, 2016 at 08:29:15AM -0500, Robert Moskowitz wrote:
> I have found comp in TLS, RFC 3749, so HIP's ESP is the only one missing 
> compression.  How did I miss that?  It should have been included in 7402 
> as an option within ESP.

Hasn't use of compression with TLS largely been abandoned now?
Simply because one or more of the recently published exploits depended upon
it,  such that now one is recommended to disable compression?

So if TLS is avoiding compression,  why is normal IPsec still using it?
It is because the compositions of compression and encryption used in IPsec
are safe,  or has no simply tried (or not published) such attacks for IPsec?

DF