Re: [Hipsec] Need to close all draft-ietf-hip-dex-21 pending issues... before 2021-Jan-13...

[Robert Moskowitz <[e-mail]>]

X25519 (and x448) is the only curve remaining in HIP DEX.

In checking on this, I see I do need to remove text from 9.3 which is 
the only remaining reference.

Of course there is the valid question of why x448 is still there. 
Probably should remove it as well.

So looking into p384:

If you follow this link:

https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=2ahUKEwi0_P_ZlKjuAhVGHc0KHSyyDdgQFjAEegQIBRAC&url=https%3A%2F%2Fcryptobook.nakov.com%2Fasymmetric-key-ciphers%2Felliptic-curve-cryptography-ecc&usg=AOvVaw3i71pEYmIH0HT9pwbTca4j

you get a very recent paper on P-256 and it is slower than X25519.

Then there is this:

https://cockrum.net/Implementation_of_ECC_on_an_8-bit_microcontroller.pdf

https://arxiv.org/pdf/1902.10313.pdf

If you want to roll your own test:

https://github.com/kmackay/micro-ecc

But again, on your recommendation (and a good one!), I removed the NIST 
curves due to their poorer performance over x25519.



On 1/19/21 8:51 AM, Eric Rescorla wrote:
> Thanks for the link. However, this paper appears only to cover X25519. 
> We'd need a comparison of this to P384, etc. in order to assess the 
> relative performance of SIGMA-style protocols with NIST curves with 
> HIP-DEX with X25519
>
> On Mon, Jan 18, 2021 at 8:35 AM Robert Moskowitz <[e-mail] 
> <mailto:[e-mail]>> wrote:
>
>     Ah, found the paper 'free' from:
>
>     https://www.researchgate.net/publication/300253314_Efficient_and_Secure_Elliptic_Curve_Cryptography_for_8-bit_AVR_Microcontrollers
>     <https://www.researchgate.net/publication/300253314_Efficient_and_Secure_Elliptic_Curve_Cryptography_for_8-bit_AVR_Microcontrollers>
>
>     pg 13 is the table I am using.  Please check that you can access
>     this URL.
>
>     On 1/18/21 11:13 AM, Robert Moskowitz wrote:
>>     Oops hold it on that paywall URL issue.  I responded with a
>>     different paper.  All else is still ok, but let me dig a big more
>>     on that paper for non-IACR members.
>>
>>     On 1/18/21 11:06 AM, Robert Moskowitz wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>     On 1/18/21 9:12 AM, Eric Vyncke (evyncke) wrote:
>>>>
>>>>     TD ;LR : more work to be done, deadline this Thursday 21st
>>>>
>>>>     Bob,
>>>>
>>>>     Thank you for the -23 (and Adam W for the footwork)and I
>>>>     understand that you are quite busy.
>>>>
>>>>     Here is the link to the diff between -21 and -23:
>>>>     https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-ietf-hip-dex-23&url1=draft-ietf-hip-dex-21
>>>>     <https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-ietf-hip-dex-23&url1=draft-ietf-hip-dex-21>
>>>>     (i.e., the one used by July 2020 IESG evaluation and the latest
>>>>     one)
>>>>
>>>>     After the July 2020 IESG evaluation based on -21, there were a
>>>>     couple of points to be addressed(with some comments of mine as
>>>>     EVY>):
>>>>
>>>>       * Roman: “Section 6.3.  Per the definition of IKM, when
>>>>         should these two different derivations be used? "
>>>>           o EVY> indeed, IKMm and IKMp are both defined but nothing
>>>>             is said which one to use in which case.
>>>>
>>>
>>>            IKM       IKMm for Master Key SA Input keying material
>>>                      or
>>>                      IKMp for Pair-wise Key SA Input keying material
>>>
>>>            IKMm      Kij | I_NONCE
>>>            IKMp      Kij | I_NONCE | (concatenated random values of the
>>>                          ENCRYPTED_KEY parameters in the same order as
>>>                          the HITs with sort(HIT-I | HIT-R))
>>>
>>>     Seems clear that IKMm is for the Master Key SA and IKMp is for
>>>     the Pair-wise Key SA.
>>>
>>>>       * Roman "discuss-discuss" (read this as request for reply and
>>>>         non-blocking) about "further implementation experience
>>>>         provides better guidance" in sections 6 and 9.
>>>>           o EVY> this really pleads for experimental status
>>>>
>>>
>>>     The only place this text exists anymore is in Appendix C:  iESG
>>>     Considerations
>>>
>>>     Perhaps I should delete it from there.
>>>
>>>>          o
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>       * Benjamin on FOLD collisions
>>>>           o EVY> IMHO addressed in the new section 3.2.1
>>>>
>>>
>>>     I believe I have this covered.  We have the Python scripts for
>>>     tests, but this is a lot of code to put into the document. 
>>>     Right now it is privately held by Adam and I.  If called on, we
>>>     can find some permanent home for it.
>>>
>>>>          o
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>       * Benjamin on ACL to counter FOLD collisions in section 3.2.1
>>>>           o EVY> still light on the ACL but the above should clear it
>>>>
>>>
>>>     Sec 7.1 is referenced.
>>>
>>>>          o
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>       * Benjamin "how is it known that the peer should be using DEX
>>>>         vs. BEX"
>>>>           o EVY> partially addressed in section 1.2 but should be
>>>>             repeated in the security section
>>>>
>>>
>>>     I can create a sec 9.1 (pushing down the current 9.1):
>>>
>>>     9.1 Caution on using HIP DEX rather than HIP BEX
>>>
>>>        Due to the substantially reduced security guarantees of HIP DEX
>>>        compared to HIP BEX, HIP DEX MUST only be used when at least
>>>     one of
>>>        the two endpoints is a class 0 or 1 constrained device defined in
>>>        Section 3 of [RFC7228]).  HIP DEX MUST NOT be used when both
>>>        endpoints are class 2 devices or unconstrained.
>>>
>>>
>>>     Will this work?
>>>
>>>>          o
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>       * Benjamin lack of discussion on the security consequences of
>>>>         inadvertent counter reuse in AES-CTR
>>>>
>>>
>>>     See sec 9.1
>>>
>>>>      *
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>       * Benjamin "presence of a CSPRNG in order to obtain secure
>>>>         session keys"
>>>>
>>>
>>>     9.  Security Considerations
>>>
>>>     ....
>>>
>>>        *  The strength of the keys for both the Master and Pair-wise
>>>     Key SAs
>>>           is based on the quality of the random keying material
>>>     generated by
>>>           the Initiator and the Responder.  As either peer may be a
>>>     sensor
>>>           or an actuator device, there is a natural concern about the
>>>           quality of its random number generator.  Thus at least a
>>>     CSPRNG
>>>           SHOULD be used.
>>>
>>>
>>>>      *
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>       * Benjamin "usage of CMAC instead of HMAC" about KEYMAT algorithm
>>>>           o EVY> new reference to NIST papers seems to address this
>>>>             concern
>>>>
>>>
>>>     Ben did agree in an email that the SP800-56C and 108 addressed
>>>     the concern.  I did not need to go further.
>>>
>>>>          o
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>       * Ekr’s one about why forfeiting FS when some algorithm could
>>>>         do it in a reasonable time. In an email to authors and ADs,
>>>>         Eric R. wrote “it defines a set of parameters (the NIST
>>>>         curves) which are slower w/o FS than other parameters
>>>>         (X25519) are w/ FS. This fact calls into question the need
>>>>         to dispense with FS.”
>>>>           o EVY> the additional section 1.2.1 and the reference to
>>>>             a paywall EfficientECC reference do not offer a
>>>>             conclusive motivation for an IETF standards w/o FS.
>>>>
>>>
>>>     Paywall?  Hmm.  I got it free.  I will have to check into this. 
>>>     It may be to some cookie I have on this system.  Or the DOI has
>>>     the wrong URL.
>>>
>>>     Ah, that URL works for me because I am an IACR member. For all else:
>>>
>>>     https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10623-015-0087-1
>>>     <https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10623-015-0087-1>
>>>
>>>     So I will change the reference.  But please check this out.  I
>>>     tried it on another machine that should not have my IACR
>>>     cookies, but...
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>>          o
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>     ***Bottom line, the document is not yet ready to be
>>>>     approved.*** (even if big progress has been made)
>>>>
>>>>     As written in November (see below), the situation has lingered
>>>>     for too long and is blocking the HIP-NAT and rfc4423-bis
>>>>     documents.
>>>>
>>>>     *** Therefore, I request the authors for a revised I-D
>>>>     addressing the above (and noting again that a change to
>>>>     ‘experimental’ – as there are no deployed implementations –
>>>>     could probably fix all of them) before Thursday 21st of January
>>>>     midnight UTC else I will ask the HIPSEC WG to agree removing
>>>>     the HIP-DEX section from the architecture document. ***
>>>>
>>>
>>>     Does the above address the open items?
>>>
>>>>     All in all, there have been a couple of significant changes
>>>>     (I_NONCE, some deleted ciphers) since the IETF last call (see
>>>>     https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-ietf-hip-dex-23&url1=draft-ietf-hip-dex-21
>>>>     <https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-ietf-hip-dex-23&url1=draft-ietf-hip-dex-21>
>>>>     ), so, another IETF Last Call is required but should not be a
>>>>     real problem.
>>>>
>>>>     -éric
>>>>
>>>>     From: Robert Moskowitz <[e-mail]>
>>>>     <mailto:[e-mail]>
>>>>
>>>>     Date: Thursday, 14 January 2021 at 16:08
>>>>
>>>>     To: Eric Vyncke <[e-mail]> <mailto:[e-mail]>,
>>>>     "Eric Vyncke (evyncke)" <evyncke=[e-mail]>
>>>>     <mailto:evyncke=[e-mail]>, "[e-mail]"
>>>>     <mailto:[e-mail]> <[e-mail]>
>>>>     <mailto:[e-mail]>, "[e-mail]"
>>>>     <mailto:[e-mail]>
>>>>     <[e-mail]>
>>>>     <mailto:[e-mail]>, Miika Komu
>>>>     <[e-mail]> <mailto:[e-mail]>
>>>>
>>>>     Cc: Roman Danyliw <[e-mail]> <mailto:[e-mail]>, Eric
>>>>     Rescorla <[e-mail]> <mailto:[e-mail]>, Gonzalo
>>>>     Camarillo <[e-mail]>
>>>>     <mailto:[e-mail]>,
>>>>     "[e-mail]" <mailto:[e-mail]>
>>>>     <[e-mail]> <mailto:[e-mail]>,
>>>>     Benjamin Kaduk <[e-mail]> <mailto:[e-mail]>, Erik
>>>>     Kline <[e-mail]> <mailto:[e-mail]>
>>>>
>>>>     Subject: Re: [Hipsec] Need to close all draft-ietf-hip-dex-21
>>>>     pending issues... before 2021-Jan-13...
>>>>
>>>>     I had hoped to get -23 out end of last week, and missed my
>>>>     cutoff.  I am now in IACR's Real World Crypto, where I have
>>>>     gotten a couple pointers for DRIP work.
>>>>
>>>>     I was waiting for two analyzes that I got Jan 4, and
>>>>     incorporating them in.  I believe these SHOULD address much of
>>>>     EKR's questions.
>>>>
>>>>     I will have a run of 1M DEX random HIs to HITs generated with
>>>>     no duplicates that I add in an Appendix along with the Python code.
>>>>
>>>>     I am adding a BEX/DEX crypto cost into 1.2, probably 1.2.1:
>>>>
>>>>     For an Initiator, BEX is:
>>>>
>>>>     2 PK sig varifications.
>>>>
>>>>     1 PK sig generation.
>>>>
>>>>     1 DH keypair generation.
>>>>
>>>>     1 DH secret derivation.
>>>>
>>>>     DEX is:
>>>>
>>>>     1 DH secret derivation.
>>>>
>>>>     I have cycles for these and a paper to reference, except ECDH
>>>>     keypair generation, on an 8 bit process and the numbers are
>>>>     big.  But I think that part belongs in an Appendix.
>>>>
>>>>     So unlikely Friday.  But early the following week.
>>>>
>>>>     On 1/12/21 6:19 AM, Eric Vyncke (evyncke) wrote:
>>>>
>>>>     Two months after the email below, I sending a kind reminder to
>>>>     authors and WG.
>>>>
>>>>     With the -22, a lot of (if not all ) SEC ADs’ DISCUSS points
>>>>     should have been addressed.
>>>>
>>>>     As far as I can tell, the other remaining issue was Ekr’s one
>>>>     about why forfeiting FS when some algorithm could do it in a
>>>>     reasonable time. In an email to authors and ADs, Eric R. wrote
>>>>     “it defines a set of parameters (the NIST curves) which are
>>>>     slower w/o FS than other parameters (X25519) are w/ FS. This
>>>>     fact calls into question the need to dispense with FS.”
>>>>
>>>>     While 2 months ago I put a deadline for tomorrow, I (as the
>>>>     responsible AD) am flexible of course but we cannot linger
>>>>     anymore. I know that a -23 is in the work for weeks => let’s
>>>>     publish it in the coming days.
>>>>
>>>>     Else, next week we will need to either change the intended
>>>>     status to experimental or declare the document dead by lack of
>>>>     energy. The latter does not have my preference obviously.
>>>>
>>>>     Regards
>>>>
>>>>     -éric
>>>>
>>>>     From: Hipsec mailto:[e-mail]
>>>>     <mailto:[e-mail]> on behalf of "Eric Vyncke
>>>>     (evyncke)" mailto:evyncke=[e-mail]
>>>>     <mailto:evyncke=[e-mail]>
>>>>
>>>>     Date: Friday, 13 November 2020 at 15:32
>>>>
>>>>     To: mailto:[e-mail] <mailto:[e-mail]>
>>>>     mailto:[e-mail] <mailto:[e-mail]>,
>>>>     mailto:[e-mail]
>>>>     <mailto:[e-mail]>
>>>>     mailto:[e-mail]
>>>>     <mailto:[e-mail]>, Robert Moskowitz
>>>>     mailto:[e-mail]
>>>>     <mailto:[e-mail]>, Miika Komu
>>>>     mailto:[e-mail] <mailto:[e-mail]>
>>>>
>>>>     Cc: Roman Danyliw mailto:[e-mail] <mailto:[e-mail]>,
>>>>     Eric Rescorla mailto:[e-mail] <mailto:[e-mail]>,
>>>>     Gonzalo Camarillo mailto:[e-mail]
>>>>     <mailto:[e-mail]>,
>>>>     mailto:[e-mail] <mailto:[e-mail]>
>>>>     mailto:[e-mail] <mailto:[e-mail]>,
>>>>     Benjamin Kaduk mailto:[e-mail] <mailto:[e-mail]>,
>>>>     Erik Kline mailto:[e-mail] <mailto:[e-mail]>
>>>>
>>>>     Subject: [Hipsec] Need to close all draft-ietf-hip-dex-21
>>>>     pending issues... before 2021-Jan-13...
>>>>
>>>>     Dear HIP, dear authors,
>>>>
>>>>     This document was requested for publication [1] in February
>>>>     2018 (2.5 years ago), then its IESG evaluation has been
>>>>     deferred, then I took over this document from Terry Manderson
>>>>     in March 2019, then it went again through IESG evaluation in
>>>>     July 2020 and there are still DISCUSS points to be addressed
>>>>     even after a couple of revised I-D...
>>>>
>>>>     Difficult not to observe that this document does not progress
>>>>     very fast.
>>>>
>>>>     Moreover, this document is a normative reference for
>>>>     rfc4423-bis waiting in the RFC editor queue since March 2019...
>>>>     So, also blocking the HIP-NAT document [2].
>>>>
>>>>     After discussion with the HIP chair, Gonzalo in cc, we have
>>>>     taken the following decision: if a revised I-D addressing
>>>>     remaining DISCUSS points + Ekr’s ones is not uploaded within 2
>>>>     months (13th of January 2021), then I will request the HIP WG
>>>>     to accept the complete removal of section A.3.3 of the
>>>>     rfc4423-bis document (1 page about HIP-DEX in the appendix) +
>>>>     the reference to the HIP-DEX document [3]. This will allow the
>>>>     immediate publication of the rfc4423-bis and HIP-NAT documents.
>>>>
>>>>     The HIP DEX authors may also select to change the intended
>>>>     status of the document to ‘experimental’ (if the HIP WG agrees)
>>>>     as this may reduce the security requirements by the SEC AD and Ekr.
>>>>
>>>>     Gonzalo and I are still hoping to get a revised HIP-DEX shortly,
>>>>
>>>>     Regards
>>>>
>>>>     -éric
>>>>
>>>>     [1]
>>>>     https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-hip-dex/history/
>>>>     <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-hip-dex/history/>
>>>>
>>>>     [2] https://www.rfc-editor.org/cluster_info.php?cid=C386
>>>>     <https://www.rfc-editor.org/cluster_info.php?cid=C386>
>>>>
>>>>     [3] and possibly I will set the state of HIP-DEX as ‘dead’ on
>>>>     the datatracker
>>>>
>>>>     -- 
>>>>
>>>>     Robert Moskowitz
>>>>
>>>>     Owner
>>>>
>>>>     HTT Consulting
>>>>
>>>>     C:      248-219-2059
>>>>
>>>>     F:      248-968-2824
>>>>
>>>>     E: mailto:[e-mail]
>>>>     <mailto:[e-mail]>
>>>>
>>>>     There's no limit to what can be accomplished if it doesn't
>>>>     matter who gets the credit
>>>>
>>>
>>
>