Re: [HOKEY] Fw: [IPsec] New I-D: draft-nir-ipsecme-erx-00

[Glen Zorn <[e-mail]>]

On 5/4/2011 8:52 AM, Qin Wu wrote:
> FYI.

Instead of just forwarding selected messages, how about adding the hokey
list to this conversation?

> ----- Original Message ----- 
> From: "Qin Wu" <[e-mail]>
> To: "Yoav Nir" <[e-mail]>om>; "Yaron Sheffer" <[e-mail]>
> Cc: <[e-mail]>
> Sent: Wednesday, May 04, 2011 9:50 AM
> Subject: Re: [IPsec] New I-D: draft-nir-ipsecme-erx-00
> 
> 
>>>> - I am missing the "authenticated peer identity", which I would assume 
>>>> should arrive from the AAA server. This should be the basis of RFC4301 
>>>> policy decisions on the IKE gateway. Does ERP provide this identity?
>>>
>>> The EAP-Initiate/Re-auth packet carries a keyName-NAI TLV, but that is sent from the client (or "peer") to the authentication server through the gateway. (section 5.3.2 of the bis document)
>>> The EAP-Finish/Re-auth packet also carries a keyName-NAI TLV, and that is sent from the authentication server through the gateway to the client.
>>> But these don't really help, because the username part of NAI is the 64-bit EMSKname, which is not directly related to user name.
>>> However, these messages come within an Access-Accept packet from the RADIUS server, and those include a proper user name.
>>
>> [Qin]: If you are talking about the second identity specified in section 6.4 of RFC5998, I think, unlike EAP, ERP does not provide such identity.
>> ERP only define two types: one is Re-auth-Start, the other is Re-Auth.
>>
>> KeyName-NAI TLV defined in RFC5296 and RFC5296bis more looks like the first idenity described in section 6.4 of RFC5998.
>> As decribed in section 5.1 of RFC5296,
>> "
>>     When an ERP-capable authenticator receives the EAP-Initiate/
>>      Re-auth message from a peer, it copies the contents of the
>>                                                       ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
>>      keyName-NAI into the User-Name attribute of RADIUS [13]. 
>>     ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
>> "
>>
>>>
>>>> - Does this draft coexist with certificate-less mutual EAP 
>>>> authentication, as per RFC5998?
>>>
>>> I think the handed-over keying material is cryptographic proof enough and that certificates will usually be unnecessary, so I think yes.
>>
>> [Qin]: Correct.
>>
>>>>
>>>> Thanks,
>>>>     Yaron
>>>
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