[HOKEY] Fw: [IPsec] New I-D: draft-nir-ipsecme-erx-00

FYI.
----- Original Message ----- 
From: "Qin Wu" <sunseawq@huawei.com>
To: "Yoav Nir" <ynir@checkpoint.com>om>; "Yaron Sheffer" <yaronf.ietf@gmail.com>
Cc: <ipsec@ietf.org>
Sent: Wednesday, May 04, 2011 9:50 AM
Subject: Re: [IPsec] New I-D: draft-nir-ipsecme-erx-00


>>> - I am missing the "authenticated peer identity", which I would assume 
>>> should arrive from the AAA server. This should be the basis of RFC4301 
>>> policy decisions on the IKE gateway. Does ERP provide this identity?
>> 
>> The EAP-Initiate/Re-auth packet carries a keyName-NAI TLV, but that is sent from the client (or "peer") to the authentication server through the gateway. (section 5.3.2 of the bis document)
>> The EAP-Finish/Re-auth packet also carries a keyName-NAI TLV, and that is sent from the authentication server through the gateway to the client.
>> But these don't really help, because the username part of NAI is the 64-bit EMSKname, which is not directly related to user name.
>> However, these messages come within an Access-Accept packet from the RADIUS server, and those include a proper user name.
> 
> [Qin]: If you are talking about the second identity specified in section 6.4 of RFC5998, I think, unlike EAP, ERP does not provide such identity.
> ERP only define two types: one is Re-auth-Start, the other is Re-Auth.
> 
> KeyName-NAI TLV defined in RFC5296 and RFC5296bis more looks like the first idenity described in section 6.4 of RFC5998.
> As decribed in section 5.1 of RFC5296,
> "
>     When an ERP-capable authenticator receives the EAP-Initiate/
>      Re-auth message from a peer, it copies the contents of the
>                                                       ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
>      keyName-NAI into the User-Name attribute of RADIUS [13]. 
>     ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
> "
> 
>> 
>>> - Does this draft coexist with certificate-less mutual EAP 
>>> authentication, as per RFC5998?
>> 
>> I think the handed-over keying material is cryptographic proof enough and that certificates will usually be unnecessary, so I think yes.
> 
> [Qin]: Correct.
> 
>>> 
>>> Thanks,
>>>     Yaron
>> 
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