Re: [homenet] Introduction to draft-ietf-homenet-simple-naming

[Brian E Carpenter <[e-mail]>]

Well, let me invent something. I throw together my network and it names
the printers as printer1 and printer2. Being a stickler, I decide to
rename them as Printer 1 and Printer 2. I mess around and find a config file
somewhere and manually edit it. My printers no longer work.

All I'm saying is that the design needs to assume that such things will
happen. In the real world, this can't be out of scope.

   Brian

On 31/05/2018 01:17, Michael Richardson wrote:
> 
> Brian E Carpenter <[e-mail]> wrote:
>     >>>> 1.  Introduction
>     >>>> 
>     >>>> This document is a homenet architecture document.  The term 'homenet'
>     >>>> refers to a set of technologies that allow home network users to have
>     >>>> a local-area network (LAN) with more than one physical link and,
>     >>>> optionally, more than one internet service provider.  Home network
>     >>>> users are assumed not to be knowledgable in network operations, so
>     >>>> homenets automatically configure themselves, providing connectivity
>     >>>> and service discovery within the home with no operator intervention.
>     >>> 
>     >>> I would just say, "Homenets are intended for use with minimal or no
>     >>> administration, so homenets automatically configure …."  Then we don't
>     >>> need to have a boring discussion about what capabilities the user has.
>     >>> 
>     >> 
>     >> I agree. I also believe that not expecting intervention helps in keeping
>     >> description deterministic and simple. I like your text.
> 
>     > Out of, say, one million homenets, how many do you think *will*
>     > experience human intervention (either helpful, harmful, or
>     > malicious)? I'm guessing several thousand at least. I really think
>     > that not expecting intervention is a basic error.
> 
> I think you are using the wrong metric to count :-)
> Every single homenet will experience human intervention: a human will plug it
> together...
> 
> The question you want to ask is how many times will a human be required to
> configure something which is a normal, every-day activity.  Our goal is zero,
> but 0.1% errors on 1,000,000 is 1,000, which is inline with your number
> above.  0.1% is only "three" nines.
> 
> Then how often will the network need to be interogated for harmful or
> malicious activity. At this point, we are not proposing any mechanisms to
> deal with attacks, or collect information about current attacks, so let's
> make that out of scope for now.
> 
> It's that 0.1% situation that we need some kind of accessible audit
> information available.
>