IETF Logo Mail Archive

Re: [homenet] webauthn for routers (was: securing zone transfer)

Michael Richardson <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca> Wed, 12 June 2019 19:13 UTC

Return-Path: <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca>
X-Original-To: homenet@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: homenet@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 82C1312012C for <homenet@ietfa.amsl.com>; Wed, 12 Jun 2019 12:13:07 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -4.2
X-Spam-Level:
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-4.2 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED=-2.3, SPF_HELO_NONE=0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id RzB6dq0d0ACS for <homenet@ietfa.amsl.com>; Wed, 12 Jun 2019 12:13:05 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from tuna.sandelman.ca (tuna.sandelman.ca [209.87.249.19]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher AECDH-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 3C374120075 for <homenet@ietf.org>; Wed, 12 Jun 2019 12:13:04 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from sandelman.ca (obiwan.sandelman.ca [209.87.249.21]) by tuna.sandelman.ca (Postfix) with ESMTP id 3C81D380BE; Wed, 12 Jun 2019 15:11:39 -0400 (EDT)
Received: by sandelman.ca (Postfix, from userid 179) id 0A99D107F; Wed, 12 Jun 2019 15:13:03 -0400 (EDT)
Received: from sandelman.ca (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by sandelman.ca (Postfix) with ESMTP id 0933A91F; Wed, 12 Jun 2019 15:13:03 -0400 (EDT)
From: Michael Richardson <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca>
To: MIchael Thomas <mike@fresheez.com>
cc: homenet@ietf.org
In-Reply-To: <ff7f2700-3862-59bd-abfb-22589562bddb@mtcc.com>
References: <CADZyTkkgd8f49V+yoZvPZXx3b-_YRzpgUY1-obroq9QMLnFWNw@mail.gmail.com> <878su8fj24.wl-jch@irif.fr> <2348.1560261275@localhost> <87ftofwqut.wl-jch@irif.fr> <27503.1560302791@localhost> <87ef3zwoew.wl-jch@irif.fr> <4109.1560349340@localhost> <EC7FDA4F-1859-4B35-A8AC-D33E1A96F979@fugue.com> <ff7f2700-3862-59bd-abfb-22589562bddb@mtcc.com>
X-Mailer: MH-E 8.6; nmh 1.7+dev; GNU Emacs 24.5.1
X-Face: $\n1pF)h^`}$H>Hk{L"x@)JS7<%Az}5RyS@k9X%29-lHB$Ti.V>2bi.~ehC0; <'$9xN5Ub# z!G,p`nR&p7Fz@^UXIn156S8.~^@MJ*mMsD7=QFeq%AL4m<nPbLgmtKK-5dC@#:k
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/signed; boundary="=-=-="; micalg="pgp-sha256"; protocol="application/pgp-signature"
Date: Wed, 12 Jun 2019 15:13:03 -0400
Message-ID: <20218.1560366783@localhost>
Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/homenet/XeNkAz1fp0QB3b1ih8iFyMm_86I>
Subject: Re: [homenet] webauthn for routers (was: securing zone transfer)
X-BeenThere: homenet@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29
Precedence: list
List-Id: IETF Homenet WG mailing list <homenet.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/homenet>, <mailto:homenet-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/homenet/>
List-Post: <mailto:homenet@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:homenet-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/homenet>, <mailto:homenet-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Wed, 12 Jun 2019 19:13:08 -0000

MIchael Thomas <mike@fresheez.com> wrote:
    >>> There are no passwords.

    >> Yes please.

    > Speaking of which, should we be encouraging router vendors to implement
    > webauthn? Considering that probably half of home routers have the default
    > password, that seems like it would be a Good Thing.

We have done an enrollment system which based upon BRSKI.
It is described in draft-richardson-ietf-anima-smarkaklink.
We have running code with a desktop acting as the client, with
the mobile app being built now.  I am making a screencast today, actually.
There are similarities to some profiles of EAP-NOOB, but we do
rely on the manufacturer as the root of trust.

I guess we could/should have considered enhancing webauthn instead; I have to
think a bit about whether it would have work as well.  I will need to see.

At the end of the day, we wind up with a mobile phone with a certificate
enrolled into a private CA on the router.  The router itself has a
LetsEncrypt certificate acting as it's IDevID, although this could
be a private CA instead.  There are issues in both directions.

Secondary admins are encouraged to guard against loss/destruction of mobile
phone, and it is also possible to enroll a second time, provided the
manufacturer agrees (this is both a feature and a bug)

The code is at https://github.com/CIRALabs/


--
Michael Richardson <mcr+IETF@sandelman.ca>, Sandelman Software Works
 -= IPv6 IoT consulting =-

v2.23.0 | Report a Bug | By Email