Re: [homenet] securing zone transfer

Ray Bellis <ray@bellis.me.uk> Fri, 07 June 2019 21:32 UTC

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From: Ray Bellis <ray@bellis.me.uk>
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Subject: Re: [homenet] securing zone transfer
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On 07/06/2019 21:03, Daniel Migault wrote:
> Hi,
> 
> The front end naming architecture uses a primary and a secondary dns 
> server to synchronize a zone. The expected exchanges are (SOA, NOTIFY, 
> IXFR, AXFR. We would like to get feed backs from the working group on 
> what are the most appropriated way to secure this channel.
> 
> Options we have considered are TSIG, IPsec, TLS, DTLS. TSIG does not 
> provide confidentiality, and we would rather go for user space 
> security.  Are there any recommendation for using TLS or DTLS in that 
> case ?

Please don't invent something new.  DNS over TLS should be fine for 
channel security, with TSIG embedded inside that if additional 
authorisation is required.

Ray