Re: [homenet] Comments requested for draft CER-ID

David R Oran <daveoran@orandom.net> Mon, 27 October 2014 18:30 UTC

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From: David R Oran <daveoran@orandom.net>
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Date: Mon, 27 Oct 2014 11:27:58 -0700
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To: Michael Kloberdans <M.Kloberdans@cablelabs.com>
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Cc: "homenet@ietf.org" <homenet@ietf.org>, Ola Thoresen <olat@powertech.no>
Subject: Re: [homenet] Comments requested for draft CER-ID
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Silly question:

Isn’t the border defined by a link and not a router? What if you have uplinks to two different ISPs on the same router?
This seems to assume there’s only one border link on a router, and that router connects to only one external entity.

On Oct 27, 2014, at 8:59 AM, Michael Kloberdans <M.Kloberdans@cablelabs.com> wrote:

> Ola,
> I¹d like to better understand your comment about a misconfigured router
> being a security issue.
> 
> In the eRouter implementation, the CER is automatically determined.  The
> only way a router would be misconfigured is if the home owner or someone
> else with local access manually changes the CER.  Perhaps I¹m missing
> something. Please expound - I¹m grateful for all comments.
> 
> Regards,
> 
> 
> Michael Kloberdans
> Lead Architect / Home Networking     CableLabs®
> 
> 858 Coal Creek Circle.  Louisville, CO. 80027
> 303-661-3813 (v)
> 
> 
> 
> 
> On 10/27/14, 9:00 AM, "Ola Thoresen" <olat@powertech.no> wrote:
> 
>>> On 27.10.2014, at 16.17, Michael Kloberdans <m.kloberdans@cablelabs.com>
>>> wrote:
>>>> All home routers should know their role; CER or IR.  The status of CER
>>>> places the burden of providing the firewall and NAPT as it was
>>> determined
>>>> to be the edge router.  The interior routers need to understand their
>>> role
>>>> and disable their firewall and NAPT abilities.  This is why the
>>> CER-ID is
>>>> a numeric value (indicating CER status) or a double colon (indicating
>>> IR
>>>> status).
>>> 
>>> I agree with that. However, I disagree with how you are doing it.
>>> 
>>>> In the case of the eRouter (combined cable modem and
>>>> router/switch/wireless), it performs a /48 check between the IA_NA
>>> and the
>>>> IA_PD ranges.  If the ISP sends a double colon or null in the CER-ID
>>> ORO,
>>>> AND if the IA_NA is in a different /48 than the given IA_PD, the
>>> eRouter
>>>> becomes the CER.  It must now declare to the IRs that it is the CER.
>>> A
>>>> directly connected IR will see the CER value in the ORO and, in the
>>>> absence of another controlling protocol, disable its firewall and NAPT
>>>> functions.
>>> 
>>> Why cannot it determine it is CER by bits coming from particular type of
>>> plug? Cable modem plug looks different from ethernet/wireless? It would
>>> be
>>> much more secure that way.
>>> 
>> 
>> 
>> But that would not work if the router only has ethernet-ports - which is
>> probably the case if the customer has various kinds of FTTH (many of
>> these will use Fast/Gig-ethernet over copper for the last meters in to
>> the CPE).
>> 
>> However I do agree that the suggested solution seems sub optimal.  It is
>> way to easy for a misconfigured router to disable all local security (IE.
>> turning off firewalling) without the network owners knowledge.
>> 
>> /Ola (T)
>> 
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