Re: [hrpc] [DNSOP] [Fwd: New Version Notification for draft-peetterr-dnsop-parent-side-auth-types-00.txt]

[Ben Schwartz <[e-mail]>]

Paul,

I would certainly be concerned about such a scenario, but I don't
understand how it's relevant to Peter's proposal.  Couldn't this already be
done today, by simply including such a hypothetical "parent opinion" record
in the glue?

For the scenario you're describing, the present lack of DNSSEC
authentication would not seem to be an obstacle.

--Ben

On Thu, Sep 24, 2020 at 10:53 PM Paul Wouters <[e-mail]> wrote:

>
> [added hrpc to CC: list]
>
> On Thu, 24 Sep 2020, Peter van Dijk wrote:
>
> > When talking to Petr Spacek about this, he came up with the following:
> > -if-, long enough ago, besides DS, a range of RRtype numbers would have
> > been reserved with the same processing rules, i.e. these types live in
> > the -parent- and not on the -child-, then both DSPKI and NS2T could
> > become parent side records through the simple act of requesting an
> > IANA allocation from that special range.
>
> That is an incredibly dangerous idea. It is basically a wildcard from
> the parent to make claims about the child, that the child cannot
> control. You can imagine many kind of RRTYPEs that be be used, eg:
>
> ADULT_CONTENT
> POLITICAL_SPEECH
> GOVERNMENT_BLOCKED
> MONITOR_USERS
> GEOGRAPHIC_CONSTRAINT
>
> Of course, governments can already dictate that ISPs do any of these
> things, but with this proposal you are giving them an awesome censorship
> tool. And anyone not complying to the RFCs implementing these, could be
> in clear violation of the working of the internet and should be punished.
>
> Letting the parent make arbitrary statements about the DNS child is too
> dangerous a tool to roll out.
>
> Partially this can be mitigated by making the registry Internet Standard
> Required, but that would put a lot of pressure on IETF and DNSOP later
> on - pressure that is not technical in nature, but political.
>
> I understand the desire for "if we need the parent to say something
> about the child in the future, we would already have the infrastructure
> running". Indeed, it is a neat idea. But too dangerous.
>
> Paul
>
> > Name:           draft-peetterr-dnsop-parent-side-auth-types
> > Revision:       00
> > Title:          Parent-side authoritative DNS records for enhanced
> delegation
> > Document date:  2020-09-24
> > Group:          Individual Submission
> > Pages:          5
> > URL:
> https://www.ietf.org/id/draft-peetterr-dnsop-parent-side-auth-types-00.txt
> > Status:
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-peetterr-dnsop-parent-side-auth-types/
> > Html:
> https://www.ietf.org/id/draft-peetterr-dnsop-parent-side-auth-types-00.html
> > Htmlized:
> https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-peetterr-dnsop-parent-side-auth-types-00
>
> _______________________________________________
> DNSOP mailing list
> [e-mail]
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsop
>