Re: [hrpc] Censorship

[Desiree Miloshevic <[e-mail]>]

> On 21 Mar 2022, at 14:59, Alexandre Petrescu <[e-mail]> wrote:
> 
Hi Alex
> 
> Le 19/03/2022 à 13:18, Desiree Miloshevic a écrit :
>> Hi all
>> 
>> Fwiw - there’s a panel next Tuesday on the topic of Internet sanctions and connectivity, organised by the RIPE Coop WG.
>> It does clash with some parts of the IETF program, but it maybe a good place to continue the discussion thread.
>> 
>> https://www.ripe.net/participate/ripe/wg/active-wg/coop/remote-sessions/remote-session-22-march-2022 <https://www.ripe.net/participate/ripe/wg/active-wg/coop/remote-sessions/remote-session-22-march-2022>
> Thanks, I registered.
> 
> The URL provides a list of 4 other URLs with interesting text, some of which were already mentioned. (
> 
> Keep The Internet Open <https://keepitopen.net/>
> Multistakeholder Imposition of Internet Sanctions  <https://www2.computable.nl/uploads/pdf/multistakeholder-imposition-of-internet-sanctions.pdf>
> Civil Society letter to Biden Administration re. Sanctions  <https://cdt.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/Civil-society-letter-to-Biden-Admin-re-Russia-sanctions-and-internet-access-10-March-2022-1.pdf>
> RIPE NCC Response to Request from Ukrainian Government  <https://www.ripe.net/publications/news/announcements/ripe-ncc-response-to-request-from-ukrainian-government>)
> All 4 references point to long letters speaking official words for 'err.. not sure... better wait'.
> 
> There are other references that say otherwise - why aren't they cited?  I mean, all these reports of internet cuts and restores, the DDoSes, the invisible sites, the 'unkillable internet' statements, the oneweb cancelled launches (Internet in space), the social media cancellations or almost-cancellation, the reports of desires of self-cut, the 6G project plans avoiding Russian partners, the .su abnormality, the internet coverage of bomb shelters, the temporary lack of communication to sensor networks in sensible areas…
> 
The list is long indeed. 
The above documents were cited because some of their signatories participate at the discussion and may argue one way or the other.
> What will be the take-aways, the next steps, the actionable items after the session?
> 
It is for the RIPE community and the participants to decide.

Desiree
--
> Alex
> 
> 
> 
>> 
>> Desiree
>> —
>> 
>> 
>>> On 18 Mar 2022, at 13:48, farzaneh badii <[e-mail] <mailto:[e-mail]>> wrote:
>>> On Wed, Mar 16, 2022 at 12:47 PM Niels ten Oever <[e-mail] <mailto:[e-mail]>> wrote:
>>> Dear Farzaneh,
>>> 
>>> Thank you very much for your email, please allow me to respond in-line:
>>> 
>>> On 15-03-2022 17:40, farzaneh badii wrote:
>>> > Hello,
>>> > Just to provide you with a little bit of context, it is true that there has not been a collective action about this, but certainly we have raised the issue of sanctions at ICANN, some did about participation at the IETF, we have focussed on RIR's and sanctions. I provided a proposal about RIRs defense pact against sanctions applied to Internet infrastructure after the unfortunate events in Afghanistan (didn't get anywhere). Many of us have been working on these issues for years because well because we are either from those regions and/or understand the implications in real time or because some operators actually believe in interconnectedness and non-discriminatory treatment at infrastructure level.
>>> 
>>> I believe in that as well, that is why I think that institutions that limit the interconnectedness of others should not get away with it.
>>> 
>>> How? By gathering some people to take collective action against networks that you will decide whether they are military or propaganda?  I even saw in these debates that some called interconnectivity Internet exceptionalism. The initial discussions we had, the intention was not even providing sanction relief, that was not even what some people had in mind or even knew about the effects. Some were upset that RIPE had declared that it is neutral (I interpret in favor of interconnectivity). So we were discussing what can be done. We were in the middle of the debate about how and if we can go about demilitarization without harming connectivity and what are the best remedies during war and conflict that we saw your initiative emerged. Which in my opinion included some people that thought sanctions should be imposed and some believed that sanctions should not be imposed or if imposed should be imposed in a certain way so they came up with this tortured document that can be contradictory even. All with good intentions. No doubt. 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> > Anyhow let me tell you what has been done so far, I am sure I am missing the great work of many others about these issues.
>>> > ccTLDs and IP addresses were threatened by sanctions and jurisdictions for many years, one interesting case was request to attach .IR .SY etc to terrorist victims in the US, read about it here, ICANN in that instance sent its lawyers to argue against the attachment: https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/calderon-cardona-motion-to-quash-writs-29jul14-en.pdf <https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/calderon-cardona-motion-to-quash-writs-29jul14-en.pdf> <https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/calderon-cardona-motion-to-quash-writs-29jul14-en.pdf <https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/calderon-cardona-motion-to-quash-writs-29jul14-en.pdf>>
>>> > Sanctions and ICANN: (2017, a multistakeholder! recommendation to receive a general OFAC license https://www.internetgovernance.org/2017/01/13/icanns-jurisdiction-sanctions-and-domain-names/ <https://www.internetgovernance.org/2017/01/13/icanns-jurisdiction-sanctions-and-domain-names/> <https://www.internetgovernance.org/2017/01/13/icanns-jurisdiction-sanctions-and-domain-names/ <https://www.internetgovernance.org/2017/01/13/icanns-jurisdiction-sanctions-and-domain-names/>>
>>> > A bit of background about domain names being hampered by sanctions: https://www.internetgovernance.org/2017/04/08/icann-jurisdiction-and-domain-name-issues-report-your-problems/ <https://www.internetgovernance.org/2017/04/08/icann-jurisdiction-and-domain-name-issues-report-your-problems/> <https://www.internetgovernance.org/2017/04/08/icann-jurisdiction-and-domain-name-issues-report-your-problems/ <https://www.internetgovernance.org/2017/04/08/icann-jurisdiction-and-domain-name-issues-report-your-problems/>>
>>> > More background on how sanctions affect domain name registrants: https://www.internetgovernance.org/2017/01/13/icanns-jurisdiction-sanctions-and-domain-names/ <https://www.internetgovernance.org/2017/01/13/icanns-jurisdiction-sanctions-and-domain-names/> <https://www.internetgovernance.org/2017/01/13/icanns-jurisdiction-sanctions-and-domain-names/ <https://www.internetgovernance.org/2017/01/13/icanns-jurisdiction-sanctions-and-domain-names/>>
>>> > New gTLD and sanctions: https://circleid.com/posts/20220217-oneworld-.someinternet-new-gtld-registries-and-sanctioned-countries <https://circleid.com/posts/20220217-oneworld-.someinternet-new-gtld-registries-and-sanctioned-countries><https://circleid.com/posts/20220217-oneworld-.someinternet-new-gtld-registries-and-sanctioned-countries <https://circleid.com/posts/20220217-oneworld-.someinternet-new-gtld-registries-and-sanctioned-countries>>
>>> > Sanctions and Afghanistan: https://labs.ripe.net/author/farzaneh-badiei/the-tragedy-of-internet-infrastructure-in-afghanistan/ <https://labs.ripe.net/author/farzaneh-badiei/the-tragedy-of-internet-infrastructure-in-afghanistan/> <https://labs.ripe.net/author/farzaneh-badiei/the-tragedy-of-internet-infrastructure-in-afghanistan/ <https://labs.ripe.net/author/farzaneh-badiei/the-tragedy-of-internet-infrastructure-in-afghanistan/>>
>>> > Sanctions and CDNs: (by Ensafi and other) https://ensa.fi/papers/403forbidden_imc18.pdf <https://ensa.fi/papers/403forbidden_imc18.pdf> <https://ensa.fi/papers/403forbidden_imc18.pdf <https://ensa.fi/papers/403forbidden_imc18.pdf>>, https://digitalmedusa.org/sanctions-global-internet-connectivity-and-content-delivery-networks/ <https://digitalmedusa.org/sanctions-global-internet-connectivity-and-content-delivery-networks/> <https://digitalmedusa.org/sanctions-global-internet-connectivity-and-content-delivery-networks/ <https://digitalmedusa.org/sanctions-global-internet-connectivity-and-content-delivery-networks/>> Where can this be discussed? League of Internet networks?
>>> > 
>>> > 
>>> > The thing that makes me super uncomfortable with this initiative is that I believe it was born out ofa revenge fantasy <https://digitalmedusa.org/internet-governance-revenge-fantasy-or-helping-ukraine/ <https://digitalmedusa.org/internet-governance-revenge-fantasy-or-helping-ukraine/>> that will do no good for Ukraine but it will affect connectivity, despite all the good intentions and nice principles they set out.
>>> > 
>>> > I am not sorry about the shameless publicity of the materials, 
>>> 
>>> Could you elaborate what you mean with this?
>>> 
>>> In conferences, sometimes when people want to promote their own papers and writings, they make a joke that they are sorry for shameless self-promotion or shameless publicity. But I am not sorry for promoting these materials. Because obviously some even think we have not been focussing and discussing sanctions until now! Hope that is enough elaboration .
>>> 
>>> > we have been shouting about this and knocking on many doors for at least a decade. Many have focussed on these issues and can tell you exactly what the problems are when you act at the infrastructure level and introduce discrimination. I am in favor of demilitarization of the Internet. I have spoken against cruel dictatorships, I will be the first to sign up for any private collective that would come out effectively against the atrocities of these regimes to their people and others on the Internet and provide relief for sanctions and dream to demilitarize the Internet. But this initiative unfortunately has way too many pitfalls to endorse it.
>>> > 
>>> > 
>>> > 
>>> 
>>> In the resources above you describe there are two major problems:
>>> 
>>> 1. Civilians are more impacted by sanctions than institutions
>>> 2. Companies over-comply, resulting in more harm and less precise sanctions.
>>> 
>>> I think point 2. is relatively easily addressed if the implementation 100% operationalizable as it was intended (through BGP and RPZ). Point 1. depends on the design of the sanctions, which can be even better designed if that is done in collaboration with the implementers, correct?
>>> 
>>> Well, reducing years of work to two points and then providing some ambiguous technical solution is not my favorite approach to things. Could you tell me how your implementation through BGP and RPZ would work that could address civilians being impacted. And I suppose you mean military organizations, not just "institutions".  From the outside looking in, your list is going to be more about who has the AS than what the network behavior is. Which will have devastating effects for the Internet. But I would be happy to hear more. 
>>> As for sanctions to be done in collaboration with the implementers (you mean those who have to comply with sanctions), you won't be able to do that because "sanctions" are laws and regulatory approaches and the governments will not share that power with others. Sanction regimes have been in place for years, you can't tell the govs to ditch their regime and come participate in your multistakeholder circle, it is already the law of land. If you wanted to tell how companies should comply with sanctions, then that would have been a nice initiative (I won't comment on effectiveness, I don't think the legal counsels would have allowed their companies to join!). But this initiative wants to impose sanctions in a nice way. It's like coming up with a jail system and say mine is nicer cause it's private, voluntary and multistakeholder. 
>>> This initiative has nothing new but the word "multistakeholder" in it. It's even debatable whether that's new because we actually practiced "multistakeholder" compliance with sanctions at ICANN. 
>>> Governments have taken the list-based approach for years. Governments have even tried to bring due process to the unfair decisions, both by issuing general licenses and waivers as well as providing a judicial system! The unintended consequences of sanction regimes are plenty which this group cannot address with its current design, and boycott at the infrastructure level can lead to discrimination and harming connectivity and not necessarily to demilitarization of the Internet. 
>>> 
>>>  
>>> 
>>> 
>>> Especially since multistakeholder sanctions (or boycott if you will) could be designed with those who implement it, and there they could also be relatively easy reversed or adapted.
>>> 
>>> Best,
>>> 
>>> Niels
>>> > 
>>> > 
>>> > On Tue, Mar 15, 2022 at 11:54 AM Mallory Knodel <[e-mail] <mailto:[e-mail]> <mailto:[e-mail] <mailto:[e-mail]>>> wrote:
>>> > 
>>> >     On Monday, March 14, 2022, S Moonesamy <[e-mail] <mailto:[e-mail]> <mailto:[e-mail] <mailto:[e-mail]>>> wrote:
>>> > 
>>> >         Hi Mallory,
>>> > 
>>> >             As for my view, I'm with Stephen in that I don't think it's a
>>> >             particularly effective approach that the PCH letter takes and yet the
>>> >             political risks are tremendous. If we are to build the capacity in
>>> >             internet governance spaces like the IRTF/IETF-- and I would argue that
>>> >             is a far better goal than a new IG body-- it had better be on rock solid
>>> >             ground in terms of understanding efficacy and tradeoffs.
>>> > 
>>> > 
>>> >         One of the questions which Bill raised was whether it was appropriate to do nothing in response to the recent events.  There is anecdotal evidence that some "digital" certificates were revoked.  I doubt that it has anything to do with protocol considerations or either of the two statements.
>>> > 
>>> >         There was agenda item nearly a decade ago [1].  There hasn't been much open discussion on those topics in response to the recent events.  This could mean two things:
>>> > 
>>> >            (i) There isn't the capacity in those spaces; or
>>> > 
>>> >            (ii) People in those spaces are not interested in those topics.
>>> > 
>>> > 
>>> >     I would argue it’s worth building that capacity and garnering that interest.
>>> > 
>>> >     -Mallory
>>> > 
>>> > 
>>> > 
>>> >         1. https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/LTD/G12/147/10/PDF/G1214710.pdf <https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/LTD/G12/147/10/PDF/G1214710.pdf> <https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/LTD/G12/147/10/PDF/G1214710.pdf <https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/LTD/G12/147/10/PDF/G1214710.pdf>>
>>> > 
>>> > 
>>> > 
>>> >     -- 
>>> >     Mallory Knodel
>>> >     CTO, Center for Democracy and Technology
>>> >     gpg fingerprint :: E3EB 63E0 65A3 B240 BCD9 B071 0C32 A271 BD3C C780
>>> > 
>>> > 
>>> >     _______________________________________________
>>> >     hrpc mailing list
>>> >     [e-mail] <mailto:[e-mail]> <mailto:[e-mail] <mailto:[e-mail]>>
>>> >     https://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/hrpc <https://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/hrpc> <https://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/hrpc <https://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/hrpc>>
>>> > 
>>> > 
>>> > _______________________________________________
>>> > hrpc mailing list
>>> > [e-mail] <mailto:[e-mail]>
>>> > https://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/hrpc <https://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/hrpc>
>>> 
>>> -- 
>>> Niels ten Oever, PhD
>>> Postdoctoral Researcher - Media Studies Department - University of Amsterdam
>>> Affiliated Faculty - Digital Democracy Institute - Simon Fraser University
>>> Non-Resident Fellow 2022-2023 - Center for Democracy & Technology
>>> Associated Scholar - Centro de Tecnologia e Sociedade - Fundação Getúlio Vargas
>>> Research Fellow - Centre for Internet and Human Rights - European University Viadrina
>>> 
>>> W: https://nielstenoever.net <https://nielstenoever.net/>
>>> E: [e-mail] <mailto:[e-mail]>
>>> T: @nielstenoever
>>> P/S/WA: [phone]
>>> PGP: 2458 0B70 5C4A FD8A 9488 643A 0ED8 3F3A 468A C8B3
>>> 
>>> Read my latest article on Internet infrastructure governance in Globalizations here: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14747731.2021.1953221 <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14747731.2021.1953221>
>>> 
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> hrpc mailing list
>>> [e-mail] <mailto:[e-mail]>
>>> https://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/hrpc <https://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/hrpc>
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> hrpc mailing list
>>> [e-mail] <mailto:[e-mail]>
>>> https://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/hrpc <https://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/hrpc>
>> 
>> 
>> _______________________________________________
>> hrpc mailing list
>> [e-mail] <mailto:[e-mail]>
>> https://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/hrpc <https://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/hrpc>
> _______________________________________________
> hrpc mailing list
> [e-mail] <mailto:[e-mail]>
> https://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/hrpc <https://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/hrpc>