Re: [http-auth] Ben Campbell's No Objection on draft-ietf-httpauth-scram-auth-15: (with COMMENT)

Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie> Thu, 17 December 2015 00:31 UTC

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To: "Roy T. Fielding" <fielding@gbiv.com>
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From: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
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Cc: Ben Campbell <ben@nostrum.com>, draft-ietf-httpauth-scram-auth@ietf.org, httpauth-chairs@tools.ietf.org, httpauth-chairs@ietf.org, http-auth@ietf.org, The IESG <iesg@ietf.org>, draft-ietf-httpauth-scram-auth-all@tools.ietf.org
Subject: Re: [http-auth] Ben Campbell's No Objection on draft-ietf-httpauth-scram-auth-15: (with COMMENT)
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On 17/12/15 00:20, Roy T. Fielding wrote:
> I realize that was written into the charter (to satisfy someone's personal opinion),
> but it isn't even remotely true that browsers aren't interested in new authentication
> schemes on the standards track, 

I said HTTP authentication schemes. I have seen zero evidence that
browsers are interested in those. I'd be happy if they were. Can
you point at some?

> and even if it were true it wouldn't matter: browsers
> make up less than 1% of HTTP implementations.  

Hmm. I don't at all agree that it doesn't matter if browser makers
do or do not want to adopt some technology. But that they don't like
something is not a sufficient reason to not do that thing, I hope
we do agree about that.

> The whole point of having extensible
> authentication schemes is to allow them to be defined and developed independently of
> "current practice".  

I agree that defining things that are better than basic and digest
is worthwhile. (Hence my working on RFC 7486 and an implementation
thereof.)

> And the point of having an initial standards track of Proposed
> is to make clear they are proposals that are not necessarily deployed.
> 
> More useless procedural pain for no gain.

What pain? Experimental vs. PS makes no real procedural difference to
the authors. Except it maybe gets some folks off their backs in a case
like this.

S.