Re: Ciphersuite requirements ext#26

Mark Nottingham <mnot@mnot.net> Wed, 20 August 2014 00:02 UTC

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From: Mark Nottingham <mnot@mnot.net>
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Date: Wed, 20 Aug 2014 09:59:13 +1000
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Subject: Re: Ciphersuite requirements ext#26
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So, are we saying that oppsec defers to the specific protocol negotiated for any ciphersuite requirements (e.g., h2 has a very specific high bar, while http/1.1-over-tls has none)?

Cheers,


On 20 Aug 2014, at 4:23 am, Martin Thomson <martin.thomson@gmail.com> wrote:

>> From the issue (https://github.com/httpwg/http-extensions/issues/26)
> 
> Section 3 implies that there are no cipher suite requirements on Opp
> Sec, but it'd be good to discuss and formalise this. May require
> tweaks to HTTP/2 (which places requirements on use of TLS, not TLS
> with "https").
> 
> --
> 
> PHK will disagree, but I think that we're OK here. Better to have a
> single robust profile than to permit exceptions. There are several
> problems with exceptions or variations:
> 
> * oppsec will be detectable as such to a passive observer
> 
> * a single configurations is more robust; better to use a single code
> path and far better not to risk weakening "https" accidentally
> 

--
Mark Nottingham   https://www.mnot.net/