Re: Reminder: Call for Proposals - HTTP/2.0 and HTTP Authentication

Mark Nottingham <mnot@mnot.net> Fri, 27 April 2012 06:56 UTC

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From: Mark Nottingham <mnot@mnot.net>
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Subject: Re: Reminder: Call for Proposals - HTTP/2.0 and HTTP Authentication
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Resent-Date: Fri, 27 Apr 2012 06:55:26 +0000

Hi James,

Thanks. Some quick responses below.


On 27/04/2012, at 4:43 PM, James M Snell wrote:

> Great to see this work getting underway. I don't have any particular
> firm proposals from a fundamental HTTP/2.0 messaging and semantics
> level, but I do have a few items on my wishlist from an HTTP-based API
> developers point of view that I would like to see addressed in 2.0..
> 
> Requirements to Consider for HTTP/2.0 from an API Developers Point of View
> 
> 1. It needs to remain as simple as possible. Right now, when showing
> someone how to utilize an API, I can simply type:
> 
>  POST /a/uri HTTP/1.1
>  Host: example.org
>  Content-Type: text/plain
> 
>  Hello World
> 
>  And give them all the information they need. Whatever the actual
> transport ends up being, at some level we have to make sure we don't
> lose this kind of "View Source" visibility.

I think there's a growing feeling that this is Nice To Have, but not required. See recent discussion.


> 2. Allow the Request-URI to be a Request-IRI so no conversion is
> necessary. E.g. it should be possible to do this at the request level
> and have it just work...
> 
>  POST /a/üri HTTP/2.0
>  Host: éxample.org

That would be interesting, but the effects of such a change would have to be carefully considered.


>  For that matter, can we allow extended characters in all the headers
> and use UTF-8 as the default encoding.

It's not clear that we're going to be able to do that, because it requires knowledge of the headers to translate between the different encodings. The benefit would be relatively small for a LOT of work.


> 3. Use ISO-8601/RFC3339 Timestamps for more precise date/time handling
> 
>  Date: 2012-12-12T12:12:12Z
>  Last-Modified: 2012-12-12T12:12:12.012Z
>  Expires: 2012-12-12T12:12:12.123Z
>  // or even
> 
>  Expires: P2D3H    (using an ISO-8601 Duration)

The encoding of such values has already been discussed quite a bit, but the focus so far has been on efficiency.


> 4. It would be helpful to have a "standard" means of signing requests
> and responses. SSL/TLS is good, but it doesn't always meet the
> requirement (see OpenSocial Signed Fetch as an example)

That's an interesting topic. So far, our discussions on security have been about TLS vs no TLS, but I'd welcome discussion that had a finer gradation.

Personally, I find signing responses quite interesting, as it would allow clients to assure that they haven't been tampered with (ads inserted, etc.), while giving intermediaries (e.g., virus-sniffing firewalls, caches) some visibility.


> 5. Batched-Requests keep popping up and implementors keep coming up
> with proprietary ways of handling them (e.g. Facebook, Google,
> OpenSocial.. and others). The primary reason given is efficiency...
> doing more stuff in a single request. It would be helpful for HTTP/2.0
> to definitively address this so we don't keep ending up with a bunch
> of relatively half-baked vendor specific batching models that attempt
> to bundle http message semantics inside message payloads.

I think that's addressed by multiplexing, which is part of most proposals we've discussed so far.


> 6. Please consider incorporating the Mac and Bearer token
> authentication mechanisms as standard HTTP authentication schemes.

We need proposals to do this.


> 7. Please consider incorporating the PATCH method into the core set of
> HTTP 2.0 Methods

It already is... see the registry.


> 8. Please consider incorporating the Prefer header into the core set
> of HTTP 2.0 request headers.

It's on a separate track. Note our charter; we're barred from introducing new features, in most cases.


> 9. The X-HTTP-Method-Override header has emerged as the de facto
> standard way of getting around intermediaries that inadvertently block
> extension http methods (like PATCH). It would be helpful for HTTP/2.0
> to offer some prescriptive solution so that this kind of
> Tunneling-through-POST hack isn't necessary any more.

So that misguided implementers can break that as well? Perhaps then we'll have an X-X-I-Really-Mean-It flag?


> 10. Currently within HTTP/1.1 the 202 Accepted response says The
> representation returned with this response SHOULD include an
> indication of the request's current status and either a pointer to a
> status monitor or some estimate of when the user can expect the
> request to be fulfilled" but otherwise does not provide a standardized
> means of referencing the location of the status monitor or determining
> whether the asynchronous operation is complete. A variety of means
> have been proposed but it would be helpful for 2.0 to flesh this out
> in detail. For instance, a Location header in the 202 response can be
> used to reference the status monitor; when a user-agent then does a
> GET on that URL, a 202 response can indicate that the request is still
> being processed. e.g.
> 
> // post a long running request //
> POST /some/resource HTTP/2.0
> Host: example.org
> 
> {.. some data to process ..}
> 
> // get back an asynchronous response //
> HTTP/2.0 202 Accepted
> Location: http://.../status-monitor/1
> Retry-After: 120
> 
> // check the status 120 seconds later //
> GET /status-monitor/1 HTTP/2.0
> Host: ...
> 
> // response is not yet completed
> HTTP/2.0 202 Accepted
> Location: http://.../status-monitor/1
> Retry-After: 120
> 
> // check the status 120 seconds later //
> GET /status-monitor/1 HTTP/2.0
> Host: ...
> 
> // processing is complete, server returns a redirect to the actual resource
> HTTP/2.0 302 Found
> Location: http://.../the/resource
> 
> The use of the 2xx status code rather than 3xx avoids the potential
> for an endless redirect loop with user-agents that blinding follow
> unknown/unrecognized redirection codes. Also, if you consider the
> nature of the status monitor, a notice to the client that the
> processing is not yet complete is a valid success response.
> 
> Specifying this kind of behavior out in detail will allow asynchronous
> operations to be deployed in an interoperable and reliable way.


That's out of scope for this work, I think.

Cheers,

--
Mark Nottingham   http://www.mnot.net/