Re: Comments on draft-stark-expect-ct-00

Emily Stark <estark@google.com> Fri, 02 December 2016 17:24 UTC

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From: Emily Stark <estark@google.com>
Date: Fri, 2 Dec 2016 09:18:57 -0800
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To: Nick Sullivan <nicholas.sullivan@gmail.com>
Cc: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>, HTTP Working Group <ietf-http-wg@w3.org>
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Subject: Re: Comments on draft-stark-expect-ct-00
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Just a note that I've uploaded a new version which caches report-only
headers based on the feedback here:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-stark-expect-ct/

On Mon, Nov 28, 2016 at 3:54 PM, Nick Sullivan <nicholas.sullivan@gmail.com>
wrote:

> Cloudflare is considering using this header in report-only mode to help
> identify issues in our CT-stapling infrastructure. This data will help us
> with future CT decisions.
>
> We would naturally expect report-only and enforce mode to have the same
> semantics, which includes caching. Although our CT-stapling and
> header-adding infrastructures are de-coupled, there is a use case for
> caching report-only headers: load balancing. Our connections are load
> balanced, so subsequent connections may not end up on the same server as
> the previous connection. Cached enforcement headers would help us catch
> issues where both the CT-stapling configuration and the header-adding
> configuration failed to run on a server. With caching, it's more likely
> that a
> that server with a broken CT config will end up handling resumed
> connection from a user agent that had previously connected to a
> properly-configured server that that had set the header.
>
> Nick
>
> On Fri, Nov 25, 2016 at 11:21 AM Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> wrote:
>
>> On Mon, Nov 21, 2016 at 3:28 PM, Emily Stark <estark@google.com> wrote:
>>
>> Summarizing some hallway conversations from IETF:
>>
>> - Caching in report-only mode: I can be convinced that this is useful,
>> in case where you are e.g. rolling out a CT-compliant certificate in
>> conjunction with Expect-CT (for example if you have a config that
>> turns on CT and also turns on Expect-CT in report-only mode, and the
>> config didn't make it out to a few of your servers). Will be
>> especially convinced if site owners say that this is how they want it
>> to work.
>>
>>
>> I'd in general be interested in hearing from site owners on how they
>> feel about this header. That would be a good addition to this discussion.
>>
>>
>> - Policy: One can draw an analogy to HSTS, where a site promises to
>> provide a certificate that is valid according to the client's
>> definition of valid, including factors that vary across clients
>> (variations in trust stores, SHA1 deprecation, etc.). In practice, I
>> don't think CT will be more of a foot-gun than HSTS (and certainly
>> much less than HPKP) because browsers are in close collaboration to
>> work out policies that play nicely with each other.
>>
>>
>> I'm not sure how strong the analogy is here. It's actually a nontrivial
>> inconvenience
>> for sites that different browsers have different policies. With that
>> said, it's not something
>> I'm willing to make a big deal of if the send of the WG is otherwise.
>>
>> -Ekr
>>
>>
>>
>> On Mon, Nov 14, 2016 at 8:53 PM, Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> wrote:
>> > On Tue, Nov 15, 2016 at 10:50 AM, Emily Stark <estark@google.com>
>> wrote:
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> >>
>> >> >> (https://groups.google.com/d/msg/mozilla.dev.security.
>> policy/VJYX1Wnnhiw/ZaJBaKfKBQAJ).
>> >> >> That is, eventually, when browsers require CT for all certificates,
>> >> >> site owners will have to face this same problem of making sure that
>> >> >> all their certificate chains are compliant with the CT policies of
>> all
>> >> >> the UAs that they care about. So I guess I see the interop problem
>> as
>> >> >> somewhat separate, perhaps something that should be addressed on its
>> >> >> own when the CT ecosystem and implementations have matured enough
>> that
>> >> >> UAs are able to standardize on one policy...?
>> >> >>
>> >> >> To put it another way, I see Expect-CT as a way that individual
>> sites
>> >> >> can opt in to the future early ("the future" being when browsers
>> >> >> require CT for all certificates), and the future is quite possibly
>> >> >> different policies in different browsers, at least for some amount
>> of
>> >> >> time.
>> >> >
>> >> >
>> >> > The problem is that as written the future is likely to involve a lot
>> of
>> >> > bustage.
>> >>
>> >> I feel like maybe I'm not understanding what you'd like to see
>> >> instead. Are you arguing that the Expect-CT draft should contain a
>> >> policy like "all EE certs must come with 2 SCTs from different logs",
>> >> even if that policy differs from what different browsers plan to
>> >> actually enforce for new certificates? Or that browsers shouldn't
>> >> require CT for all certificates until they standardize on such a
>> >> policy?
>> >
>> >
>> > I'm arguing that we shouldn't define a header that says "you must
>> enforce
>> > CT"
>> > without defining what "enforce CT" means.
>> >
>> > -Ekr
>> >
>> >>
>> >> >
>> >> >
>> >> >> > S 2.1.3.
>> >> >> > What's the rationale for not caching the directive in report-only
>> >> >> > mode.
>> >> >> > If the purpose of the report-only mode is to tell you when you
>> have
>> >> >> > nonconforming servers, then don't you want to be able to turn it
>> on
>> >> >> > on server A and detect hwen server B is broken? That seems like it
>> >> >> > doesn't work if you don't cache.
>> >> >>
>> >> >> I'm tempted to say "because that's how HPKP does it", but that's
>> >> >> probably not the answer you're looking for. :) I'd expect that sites
>> >> >> would generally serve the report-only header on all responses
>> >> >> unconditionally. I can't really think of a common misconfiguration
>> >> >> scenario that would cause a CT violation and would *also* cause the
>> >> >> header to not be served, but maybe that's a failure of imagination
>> on
>> >> >> my part.
>> >> >
>> >> >
>> >> > Two different independent servers with the same name behind
>> >> > a load balancer? Or a server farm where policies are rolled out
>> slowly.
>> >> >
>> >> > -Ekr
>> >> >
>> >> >>
>> >> >>
>> >> >> >
>> >> >> > -Ekr
>> >> >>
>> >> >
>> >
>> >
>>
>>