Re: RFC 9113 and :authority header field
"Roy T. Fielding" <fielding@gbiv.com> Wed, 29 June 2022 17:53 UTC
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From: "Roy T. Fielding" <fielding@gbiv.com>
In-Reply-To: <20220629055254.GA18881@1wt.eu>
Date: Wed, 29 Jun 2022 10:49:58 -0700
Cc: Tatsuhiro Tsujikawa <tatsuhiro.t@gmail.com>, HTTP <ietf-http-wg@w3.org>
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To: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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Subject: Re: RFC 9113 and :authority header field
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> On Jun 28, 2022, at 10:52 PM, Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu> wrote: > > Hi Tatsuhiro, > > On Wed, Jun 29, 2022 at 08:58:47AM +0900, Tatsuhiro Tsujikawa wrote: >> RFC 7540 even says that :intermediary MUST omit :authority "when translating >> from an HTTP/1.1 request that has a request target in >> origin or asterisk form (see [RFC7230], Section 5.3)." >> >> Now RFC 9113 has this text: >> >> An intermediary that forwards a request over HTTP/2 MUST construct >> an ":authority" pseudo-header field using the authority >> information from the control data of the original request, unless >> the original request's target URI does not contain authority >> information (in which case it MUST NOT generate ":authority"). >> Note that the Host header field is not the sole source of this >> information; see Section 7.2 of [HTTP]. >> >> This means :authority must be included if the host header field exists in >> an HTTP/1.1 request. > > My understanding is that Host doesn't necessarily count as "control data" > here, and that the goal was to accurately represent an HTTP/1.x request > targetting an HTTP/1.0 server after being transported over HTTP/2. For > example, let's say that a client passes this to a proxy: > > GET http://example.com/ HTTP/1.0 > Proxy-connection: keep-alive > > and nothing more. If instead it gets sent via a gateway that transports > it over H2, it could make sense to consider that the scheme is "http", > the authority is "example.com", that there's no host, hence the request > would be passed as: > > :method: GET > :scheme: http > :authority: example.com > > and that's all. Conversely, let's see the same HTTP/1.0 request sent > directly to the origin server: > > GET / HTTP/1.0 > > There's no more authority nor host, so a gateway receiving that cannot > invent one, unless it uses its own configured name corresponding to its > own address, that it expects the client used to construct the request. > > With HTTP/1.1 there are less ambiguities since Host is mandatory, but > the distinction between "proxy requests" and origin requests is still > relevant, especially when you don't know whether or not the origin > server supports HTTP/1.1 or only 1.0 (and may be confused by the > presence of an authority in the request line). For example, if a > client sends: > > GET / HTTP/1.1 > Host: example.com > > to an HTTP/1.0 server that parses Host, it will work. If it sends > > GET http://example.com/ HTTP/1.1 > Host: example.com > > To an HTTP/1.1 server, it will work as well, but it may fail to an HTTP/1.0 > server (or worse, loop over itself if it supports proxing requests and > resolves itself as example.com). Well, this ship has sailed, but I must have missed that original discussion. The premise is incorrect in all respects, since all of those HTTP/1.1 requests are also valid HTTP/1.0 requests (even with an absolute URI) and so is the presence of Host in those requests. Host is an HTTP/1.x field that was used in HTTP/1.0 requests (in 1995) as soon as we reached consensus on the field name. That was long before 1.1 was finished and 1.0 obsoleted. Host is a required part of HTTP/1.0 now just by virtue of the Internet as deployed, regardless of the informational RFC. [The idea was originally proposed in 1994 by John Franks https://lists.w3.org/Archives/Public/ietf-http-wg-old/1994SepDec/0019.html but it took a long time to converge on a single syntax https://lists.w3.org/Archives/Public/ietf-http-wg-old/1995JanApr/0067.html https://lists.w3.org/Archives/Public/ietf-http-wg-old/1995JanApr/0084.html https://lists.w3.org/Archives/Public/ietf-http-wg-old/1995JanApr/0130.html https://lists.w3.org/Archives/Public/ietf-http-wg-old/1995SepDec/0291.html and while we still talk about it as an important addition of HTTP/1.1 (because that's where we chose to document it), the feature is required for 1.0 to work with deployed servers.] So, an HTTP proxy recipient that receives any form of authority/host information must forward that information in either Host or :authority, no matter what version it is using. Failure to do so introduces a security bypass because L7 routers act on that information whether or not the client/server pair is aware of their presence. Hence, an HTTP/1.0 proxy that receives your first example should forward that as GET / HTTP/1.0 Host: example.com Proxy-connection: keep-alive because the routing doesn't work otherwise due to name-based hosts being deployed before HTTP/1.1. And, no, there is absolutely no reason to concern ourselves with proxies that loop over their own hostnames, since that is a self-correcting error whenever a full URI is received as the request target. > If the first request is transported over H2, thus converted from H1 to > H2 then back from H2 to H1, adding an authority that was not initially > present would introduce exactly this problem. By not adding it and using > Host only, the request representation is preserved, and the origin server > can receive the same request that the client took care to encode, and not > be confused. That's why I'm saying that in this case it's clearly visible > that Host isn't part of the "control data" and must not appear in an > authority that was not initially encoded. > > I know it's a bit complicated but we have to deal with history. What we're > doing in haproxy is that both Host and :authority are used interchangeably > after having been checked for proper matching, and are modified at the > same time if needed, and we have a flag indicating if an authority was > present in the incoming request to know if we have to produce one on > output or not. That's in the end what seems to preserve the most accurate > representation along a chain of multiple versions. This allows us to emit > a Host field only if one was present, and an authority only if one was > present, regardless of the HTTP version. I don't think that RFC9113 brings > any changes regarding this, it might only be a matter of what constitutes > "control data". Sorry, that is a broken implementation. You need to send Host regardless of the original request version. ....Roy
- RFC 9113 and :authority header field Tatsuhiro Tsujikawa
- Re: RFC 9113 and :authority header field Roy T. Fielding
- Re: RFC 9113 and :authority header field Tatsuhiro Tsujikawa
- Re: RFC 9113 and :authority header field Martin Thomson
- Re: RFC 9113 and :authority header field Willy Tarreau
- Re: RFC 9113 and :authority header field Tatsuhiro Tsujikawa
- Re: RFC 9113 and :authority header field Stefan Eissing
- Re: RFC 9113 and :authority header field Tatsuhiro Tsujikawa
- Re: RFC 9113 and :authority header field Roy T. Fielding
- Re: RFC 9113 and :authority header field David Schinazi
- Re: RFC 9113 and :authority header field Martin Thomson
- Re: RFC 9113 and :authority header field Willy Tarreau
- Re: RFC 9113 and :authority header field Willy Tarreau
- Re: RFC 9113 and :authority header field Willy Tarreau
- Re: RFC 9113 and :authority header field Stefan Eissing
- Re: RFC 9113 and :authority header field Willy Tarreau
- Re: RFC 9113 and :authority header field Roy T. Fielding
- Re: RFC 9113 and :authority header field Willy Tarreau
- Re: RFC 9113 and :authority header field David Schinazi
- Re: RFC 9113 and :authority header field Kazuho Oku
- Re: RFC 9113 and :authority header field Kazuho Oku
- Re: RFC 9113 and :authority header field Willy Tarreau