IETF Logo Mail Archive

Re: Header compression: buffer management

"Poul-Henning Kamp" <phk@phk.freebsd.dk> Fri, 22 March 2013 07:43 UTC

Return-Path: <ietf-http-wg-request@listhub.w3.org>
X-Original-To: ietfarch-httpbisa-archive-bis2Juki@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: ietfarch-httpbisa-archive-bis2Juki@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 5B6A521F904D for <ietfarch-httpbisa-archive-bis2Juki@ietfa.amsl.com>; Fri, 22 Mar 2013 00:43:19 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -10.599
X-Spam-Level:
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-10.599 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-2.599, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_HI=-8]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([12.22.58.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id WD50og1YmKz4 for <ietfarch-httpbisa-archive-bis2Juki@ietfa.amsl.com>; Fri, 22 Mar 2013 00:43:18 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from frink.w3.org (frink.w3.org [128.30.52.56]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id C502421F9046 for <httpbisa-archive-bis2Juki@lists.ietf.org>; Fri, 22 Mar 2013 00:43:18 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from lists by frink.w3.org with local (Exim 4.72) (envelope-from <ietf-http-wg-request@listhub.w3.org>) id 1UIwca-00087P-5E for ietf-http-wg-dist@listhub.w3.org; Fri, 22 Mar 2013 07:42:40 +0000
Resent-Date: Fri, 22 Mar 2013 07:42:40 +0000
Resent-Message-Id: <E1UIwca-00087P-5E@frink.w3.org>
Received: from lisa.w3.org ([128.30.52.41]) by frink.w3.org with esmtp (Exim 4.72) (envelope-from <phk@phk.freebsd.dk>) id 1UIwcP-00083Q-VC for ietf-http-wg@listhub.w3.org; Fri, 22 Mar 2013 07:42:29 +0000
Received: from phk.freebsd.dk ([130.225.244.222]) by lisa.w3.org with esmtp (Exim 4.72) (envelope-from <phk@phk.freebsd.dk>) id 1UIwcP-000362-EI for ietf-http-wg@w3.org; Fri, 22 Mar 2013 07:42:29 +0000
Received: from critter.freebsd.dk (critter.freebsd.dk [192.168.61.3]) by phk.freebsd.dk (Postfix) with ESMTP id AD5B78A521; Fri, 22 Mar 2013 07:42:08 +0000 (UTC)
Received: from critter.freebsd.dk (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by critter.freebsd.dk (8.14.6/8.14.6) with ESMTP id r2M7g85p002963; Fri, 22 Mar 2013 07:42:08 GMT (envelope-from phk@phk.freebsd.dk)
To: Roberto Peon <grmocg@gmail.com>
cc: James M Snell <jasnell@gmail.com>, RUELLAN Herve <Herve.Ruellan@crf.canon.fr>, HTTP Working Group <ietf-http-wg@w3.org>
In-reply-to: <CAP+FsNdVz3xU=ADgUTOkDAB9gGAFSRQan5wyoZ_kGgunoLjLwA@mail.gmail.com>
From: Poul-Henning Kamp <phk@phk.freebsd.dk>
References: <6C71876BDCCD01488E70A2399529D5E5163F39C4@ADELE.crf.canon.fr> <1818.1363884575@critter.freebsd.dk> <CABP7RbdL=cV2qSMBA3Me65T8tGaU3p9F5Wc690Jqk7q8xk_=iw@mail.gmail.com> <CAP+FsNdVz3xU=ADgUTOkDAB9gGAFSRQan5wyoZ_kGgunoLjLwA@mail.gmail.com>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="ISO-8859-1"
Date: Fri, 22 Mar 2013 07:42:08 +0000
Message-ID: <2962.1363938128@critter.freebsd.dk>
Received-SPF: none client-ip=130.225.244.222; envelope-from=phk@phk.freebsd.dk; helo=phk.freebsd.dk
X-W3C-Hub-Spam-Status: No, score=-5.6
X-W3C-Hub-Spam-Report: AWL=-1.245, BAYES_00=-1.9, RP_MATCHES_RCVD=-2.497
X-W3C-Scan-Sig: lisa.w3.org 1UIwcP-000362-EI de96948fe2291cc1f71be281d9a9ca33
X-Original-To: ietf-http-wg@w3.org
Subject: Re: Header compression: buffer management
Archived-At: <http://www.w3.org/mid/2962.1363938128@critter.freebsd.dk>
Resent-From: ietf-http-wg@w3.org
X-Mailing-List: <ietf-http-wg@w3.org> archive/latest/17113
X-Loop: ietf-http-wg@w3.org
Resent-Sender: ietf-http-wg-request@w3.org
Precedence: list
List-Id: <ietf-http-wg.w3.org>
List-Help: <http://www.w3.org/Mail/>
List-Post: <mailto:ietf-http-wg@w3.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:ietf-http-wg-request@w3.org?subject=unsubscribe>

In message <CAP+FsNdVz3xU=ADgUTOkDAB9gGAFSRQan5wyoZ_kGgunoLjLwA@mail.gmail.com>
, Roberto Peon writes:

>I have doubts that one can correctly identify malicious endpoints, and so I
>chose the eviction policy based route.

We certainly cannot trust the encoder to clean up for us, and you
point about identification is true as well.

However, the point of a DoS mitigation by protocol design, is not to
make them impossible, because you can't.

A popular TV-host telling all his viewers to visit the website "RIGHT
NOW!" is an incredible effective DoS.

But what you do, and what we should do, is make them difficult and
expensive to automate:  The major cost of the first request should
be borne by the client.

-- 
Poul-Henning Kamp       | UNIX since Zilog Zeus 3.20
phk@FreeBSD.ORG         | TCP/IP since RFC 956
FreeBSD committer       | BSD since 4.3-tahoe    
Never attribute to malice what can adequately be explained by incompetence.

v2.23.0 | Report a Bug | By Email