Return-Path: X-Original-To: ietfarch-httpbisa-archive-bis2Juki@ietfa.amsl.com Delivered-To: ietfarch-httpbisa-archive-bis2Juki@ietfa.amsl.com Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 84848129621 for ; Wed, 23 Nov 2016 17:19:31 -0800 (PST) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -6.615 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-6.615 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS=0.001, HTML_MESSAGE=0.001, HTML_OBFUSCATE_05_10=0.26, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_HI=-5, RCVD_IN_SORBS_SPAM=0.5, RP_MATCHES_RCVD=-1.497, SPF_HELO_PASS=-0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001, URI_HEX=1.122] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no Authentication-Results: ietfa.amsl.com (amavisd-new); dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=google.com Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id qrdSiudcbz7G for ; Wed, 23 Nov 2016 17:19:29 -0800 (PST) Received: from frink.w3.org (frink.w3.org [128.30.52.56]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id BE845129606 for ; Wed, 23 Nov 2016 17:19:29 -0800 (PST) Received: from lists by frink.w3.org with local (Exim 4.80) (envelope-from ) id 1c9idQ-0002p4-M4 for ietf-http-wg-dist@listhub.w3.org; Thu, 24 Nov 2016 01:15:32 +0000 Resent-Date: Thu, 24 Nov 2016 01:15:32 +0000 Resent-Message-Id: Received: from titan.w3.org ([128.30.52.76]) by frink.w3.org with esmtps (TLS1.2:RSA_AES_128_CBC_SHA1:128) (Exim 4.80) (envelope-from ) id 1c9idI-0001ta-UB for ietf-http-wg@listhub.w3.org; Thu, 24 Nov 2016 01:15:24 +0000 Received: from mail-io0-f182.google.com ([209.85.223.182]) by titan.w3.org with esmtps (TLS1.2:ECDHE_RSA_AES_128_GCM_SHA256:128) (Exim 4.84_2) (envelope-from ) id 1c9idC-0002LY-NR for ietf-http-wg@w3.org; Thu, 24 Nov 2016 01:15:19 +0000 Received: by mail-io0-f182.google.com with SMTP id a124so54579909ioe.2 for ; Wed, 23 Nov 2016 17:14:58 -0800 (PST) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=google.com; s=20120113; h=mime-version:in-reply-to:references:from:date:message-id:subject:to :cc; bh=TOb3eh2QNor4PYkm+MOHUdku6dLqp15W8b0fmL5yfhY=; b=Y7kYDAqXhxkzBWO/W1R3OUbHGu7Xeu2r3mVuoT/PuETGIXC0qeiVx2KO5TPZ5taNFT aB0z++7VuMm9b18Rr1HqZFGEzwAZ6Eh/Ylm3yipjpHGjx7C22ElU5nKtl23d7H+aBWHq 0TimzrlRxnjpID6uP6H101wCvJ3Tx897uthZsxT1khJcxhXVZo5736fPELDE0aQMfvKD tSawROdh+g8bSStmP59sM479otE2T+arWogPDx+IvTQWytFeJec86TCg6/PN3aLZOts9 OKpGf9ct+e3VNZRnC+VauQlTMD+loHh3Z/aGelweMKoM3QUNxbdGOGDvPnEhf81kBYY2 2E9g== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20130820; h=x-gm-message-state:mime-version:in-reply-to:references:from:date :message-id:subject:to:cc; bh=TOb3eh2QNor4PYkm+MOHUdku6dLqp15W8b0fmL5yfhY=; b=cXIhzcQiijFBKZOOVOzH8TKzdpV04piVjvcwLmVc+GjUMahLZ3a3B1BOcVUuv9N0Dk Zc2BV1NZCrVi5UAbvE3PvELcn6aVOH+TknWCz041Muh2vZ+C8ziivyWDVZToRr0J85TD fUc8WQp+A0Jgl/77dzceV5cxd/1zex5RyRqDrT/cUlgHLL9eblvlGcUhnET2UgC2s1Z8 mtCj44Ova2eZjxt+SndHVwzEfCbnLRXjxuvKRl5ByWrEl63t+0SBNe7xPqePkv2+I38K YgSxtXYcFHJy3ngCGnAULUtbIOck5595guyIYZXAxh2rb8llBHLC53eFWMNPcoqF5ZMn 5k3g== X-Gm-Message-State: AKaTC01yFQ3UobNouzk+aJ1SD4hiLhw38ScA0GsPRLyP/wQ8fHf+qfYSXbffp8YgF7NN71dmki0Hf6cx/bgt3Rxn X-Received: by 10.107.5.210 with SMTP id 201mr5558606iof.189.1479950092473; Wed, 23 Nov 2016 17:14:52 -0800 (PST) MIME-Version: 1.0 Received: by 10.107.136.84 with HTTP; Wed, 23 Nov 2016 17:14:32 -0800 (PST) In-Reply-To: <975592dc-5053-bd19-b91e-e50ab72ffbe6@KingsMountain.com> References: <975592dc-5053-bd19-b91e-e50ab72ffbe6@KingsMountain.com> From: Emily Stark Date: Wed, 23 Nov 2016 17:14:32 -0800 Message-ID: To: "=JeffH" Cc: IETF HTTP WG , Eric Rescorla Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=001a113ee5e48c976e054201bb0b Received-SPF: pass client-ip=209.85.223.182; envelope-from=estark@google.com; helo=mail-io0-f182.google.com X-W3C-Hub-Spam-Status: No, score=-5.2 X-W3C-Hub-Spam-Report: AWL=0.807, BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, HTML_MESSAGE=0.001, HTML_OBFUSCATE_05_10=0.26, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_NONE=-0.0001, RCVD_IN_MSPIKE_H2=-0.001, RCVD_IN_SORBS_SPAM=0.5, RP_MATCHES_RCVD=-2.897, SPF_PASS=-0.001, URI_HEX=1.122, W3C_AA=-1, W3C_DB=-1, W3C_WL=-1 X-W3C-Scan-Sig: titan.w3.org 1c9idC-0002LY-NR a2289b713200f090ca27210842b0c554 X-Original-To: ietf-http-wg@w3.org Subject: Re: CT-Policy (was: Comments on draft-stark-expect-ct-00) Archived-At: Resent-From: ietf-http-wg@w3.org X-Mailing-List: archive/latest/32982 X-Loop: ietf-http-wg@w3.org Resent-Sender: ietf-http-wg-request@w3.org Precedence: list List-Id: List-Help: List-Post: List-Unsubscribe: --001a113ee5e48c976e054201bb0b Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Jeff -- thanks for the comments. Do you think it would be reasonable to reference the Chromium + Mozilla CT policies but not define a particular policy in a normative way? I maintain that it isn't Expect-CT's place to define a CT policy just as it isn't HSTS's place to define what goes in a trust store, but I'm totally open to having the draft discuss some of the factors that browsers should consider when choosing a policy. On Wed, Nov 23, 2016 at 4:29 PM, =JeffH wrote: > "Expect-CT" (aka "the > I-D" in the below) uses the term "CT policy" in many places but does not > define the meaning of the term, as noted by EKR. > > On Tuesday, November 15, 2016 at 1:53 PM EKR wrote: > > > > I'm arguing that we shouldn't define a header that says "you must > > enforce CT" without defining what "enforce CT" means. > > Agreed. > > Emily Stark also wrote on Monday, November 21, > 2016 at 3:28 PM: > > > > - Policy: One can draw an analogy to HSTS, where a site promises to > > provide a certificate that is valid according to the client's > > definition of valid, including factors that vary across clients > > (variations in trust stores, SHA1 deprecation, etc.). > > Although I would not characterize HSTS policy in that fashion (i.e., see > ), I agree there are > (some) variations in UAs' contextual determination of whether any error > conditions arise during secure channel establishment. > > > In practice, I don't think CT will be more of a foot-gun than HSTS > > (and certainly much less than HPKP) because browsers are in close > > collaboration to work out policies that play nicely with each other. > > Hopefully that is the case. > > I note the present Chrome CT Policy is here: > > Certificate Transparency in Chrome > mium.org/dev/Home/chromium-security/root-ca-policy/ > CTPolicyMay2016edition.pdf> > > A first draft of the Mozilla CT Policy is here: > Qus9e37HuVyafQvEeNro> > (see also: https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/forum/#!topic/ct-po > licy/waQ5oqg-USg) > > And discussions of CT policy overall are occurring on: "Certificate > Transparency Policy" > > The I-D should reference them in some fashion. The Moz draft has CT and CT > background info that may be useful to borrow for the I-D or explicitly > reference. > > > Hm, it seems the term "CT qualified" (or "CT-qualified" (sigh)) -- as in a > "CT qualified certificate" -- has traction with both GOOG and Moz, perhaps > it ought to be employed as appropriate in the I-D. > > > HTH, > > =JeffH > --001a113ee5e48c976e054201bb0b Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Jeff -- thanks for the comments. Do you think it would be = reasonable to reference the Chromium + Mozilla CT policies but not define a= particular policy in a normative way? I maintain that it isn't Expect-= CT's place to define a CT policy just as it isn't HSTS's place = to define what goes in a trust store, but I'm totally open to having th= e draft discuss some of the factors that browsers should consider when choo= sing a policy.

On Wed, Nov 23, 2016 at 4:29 PM, =3DJeffH <Jeff.Hodges@kin= gsmountain.com> wrote:
&quo= t;Expect-CT" <https://tools.ietf.org/html/d= raft-stark-expect-ct> (aka "the I-D" in the below) us= es the term "CT policy" in many places but does not define the me= aning of the term, as noted by EKR.

On Tuesday, November 15, 2016 at 1:53 PM EKR wrote:
>
> I'm arguing that we shouldn't define a header that says "= you must
> enforce CT" without defining what "enforce CT" means.
Agreed.

Emily Stark <esta= rk@google.com> also wrote on Monday, November 21,
2016 at 3:28 PM:
>
> - Policy: One can draw an analogy to HSTS, where a site promises to > provide a certificate that is valid according to the client's
> definition of valid, including factors that vary across clients
> (variations in trust stores, SHA1 deprecation, etc.).

Although I would not characterize HSTS policy in that fashion (i.e., see <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6797#section-= 5.2>), I agree there are
(some) variations in UAs' contextual determination of whether any error=
conditions arise during secure channel establishment.

> In practice, I don't think CT will be more of a foot-gun than HSTS=
> (and certainly much less than HPKP) because browsers are in close
> collaboration to work out policies that play nicely with each other.
Hopefully that is the case.

I note the present Chrome CT Policy is here:

Certificate Transparency in Chrome
<https://a77db9aa-a-7b23c8ea-s-= sites.googlegroups.com/a/chromium.org/dev/Home/chromium-security/= root-ca-policy/CTPolicyMay2016edition.pdf>

A first draft of the Mozilla CT Policy is here:
<https://docs.goog= le.com/document/d/1rnqYYwscAx8WhS-MCdTiNzYQus9e37HuVyafQvEeNro>
(see also: https://group= s.google.com/a/chromium.org/forum/#!topic/ct-policy/waQ5oqg-USg)

And discussions of CT policy overall are occurring on: "Certificate Tr= ansparency Policy" <ct-policy@chromium.org>

The I-D should reference them in some fashion. The Moz draft has CT and CT = background info that may be useful to borrow for the I-D or explicitly refe= rence.


Hm, it seems the term "CT qualified" (or "CT-qualified"= (sigh)) -- as in a "CT qualified certificate" -- has traction wi= th both GOOG and Moz, perhaps it ought to be employed as appropriate in the= I-D.


HTH,

=3DJeffH

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