Re: Discussion of 9.2.2

[Jason Greene <[e-mail]>]

On Sep 27, 2014, at 2:39 AM, Willy Tarreau <[e-mail]> wrote:

> On Fri, Sep 26, 2014 at 09:13:23AM -0700, Michael Sweet wrote:
>> Eric,
>> 
>> If you have a multi-protocol client that opportunistically uses HTTP/2 (which
>> will likely be the case for a very long time for any web browser at least),
>> then you can't simply require TLS/1.2 or omit non-HTTP/2 cipher suites from
>> negotiation because that will cause existing HTTP/1.1 (and SPDY) servers to
>> stop working if they don't support the specific TLS/1.2 ciphers or cannot
>> negotiate TLS/1.2 at all.
> 
> I'm suddenly wondering about something : why is it that we have to support
> different ciphers for H1 and H2 despite transporting the exact same contents ?
> If some ciphers are not acceptable for H2, that makes me think they are at
> risk for H1 as well,
> so shouldn't we say that if an agent wants to support
> H1 as a fallback to H2 during a handshake, then it should only support the
> ciphers that are compatible with both, even if this means the handshake
> might fail on some old H1 servers (hence they'll have to retry with H1 only
> and more ciphers).

It would break a large number of working H1-only clients just because the server the client is talking to also supports H2. The non-supported ciphers aren’t all bad they just aren’t state-of-art as of today.

--
Jason T. Greene
WildFly Lead / JBoss EAP Platform Architect
JBoss, a division of Red Hat