Re: Report on preliminary decision on TLS 1.3 and client auth

"Jason T. Greene" <jason.greene@redhat.com> Tue, 20 October 2015 12:35 UTC

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From: "Jason T. Greene" <jason.greene@redhat.com>
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Date: Tue, 20 Oct 2015 08:31:05 -0400
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To: Ilari Liusvaara <ilariliusvaara@welho.com>
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Cc: Martin Thomson <martin.thomson@gmail.com>, HTTP Working Group <ietf-http-wg@w3.org>
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Thread-Topic: Report on preliminary decision on TLS 1.3 and client auth
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Subject: Re: Report on preliminary decision on TLS 1.3 and client auth
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> On Oct 20, 2015, at 1:33 AM, Ilari Liusvaara <ilariliusvaara@welho.com> wrote:
> 
>> On Mon, Oct 19, 2015 at 03:10:17PM -0700, Martin Thomson wrote:
>>> On 23 September 2015 at 10:16, Martin Thomson <martin.thomson@gmail.com> wrote:
>>> Here is a summary of the applicable pieces, plus what I options it provides
>>> HTTP/2...
>> 
>> With the help of Mike Bishop [7], I've just submitted a draft that
>> describes option 2 in more detail, including something for TLS 1.2.
>> 
>>  https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-thomson-http2-client-certs-00
> 
> How does client refuse to change authentication on existing connection
> and open a new one for new authentication[1]?
> 
> Because client can be rather easily forced into situation where the
> existing connection can't change authentication without resetting
> potentially numerious streams first (e.g. streams from cross-origin
> XMLHttpRequest/Fetch non-credentials[2][3]).

Wouldn't the semantics be a hell of a lot cleaner, and implementations a lot simpler, if we just pushed this to an HTTP cert auth protocol? 

Having two different TLS solutions which in and of themselves are brittle sounds like a recipe for security vulnerabilities and broken interop.