Martin Duke's No Objection on draft-ietf-httpbis-message-signatures-17: (with COMMENT)

[Martin Duke via Datatracker <[e-mail]>]

Martin Duke has entered the following ballot position for
draft-ietf-httpbis-message-signatures-17: No Objection

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COMMENT:
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What is the position on including national crypto and other potentially
compromised algorithms? Section 6.2 doesn't demand that the DE evaluate
algorithm security, but section 7.3.1 says "The HTTP Message Signatures
Algorithm Registry is one source of trusted signature algorithms for
applications to apply to their messages."

I could see a case for including not-provably secure algorithms in the registry
to avoid squatting, assuming they are fully specified, but if this were the
case the registry probably needs a recommended/non recommended field.