Re: Authentication over HTTP
Nico Williams <nico@cryptonector.com> Wed, 17 July 2013 18:02 UTC
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Date: Wed, 17 Jul 2013 13:00:59 -0500
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From: Nico Williams <nico@cryptonector.com>
To: Amos Jeffries <squid3@treenet.co.nz>
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Subject: Re: Authentication over HTTP
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On Wed, Jul 17, 2013 at 12:59 AM, Amos Jeffries <squid3@treenet.co.nz> wrote: > On 17/07/2013 5:34 a.m., Nico Williams wrote: >> On Tue, Jul 16, 2013 at 7:54 AM, Amos Jeffries <squid3@treenet.co.nz> >> wrote: >>> *Every single claim* that HTTP-auth is broken and needs re-designing >>> seems >>> to me to be based on the flawed assumption that HTTP-auth is not >>> extensible >>> and that the common existing schemes are the only ones HTTP permits. Or >>> that >>> somehow a user authenticating with N different and fragile mechanisms for >>> one transaction is a good thing (I rather disagree, the UX on that would >>> be >>> tricky and implementation nightmares). >> >> That's either a strawman or you misunderstood the arguments against >> doing authentication in HTTP. It's not that "HTTP auth is broken", >> but that HTTP is the *wrong layer* -- that's not because HTTP or HTTP >> auth is broken, but because properties of the stack of protocols >> spoken make HTTP auth a problematic proposition. >> >> BTW, I've not see any arguments about N different mechanisms (fragile >> or not) being a problem. > > Maybe I have been misunderstanding some of them. But the auth proposals I've > seen in the last few years all seem to fall into three brackets with regards > to their claims about HTTP: But you don't even list here the argument you listed above, nor give examples. Why argue about this anyways? You and I seem to agree: > 1) "HTTP auth is broken". Aka "do it all in payload entities and have HTTP > endpoints interpret those" ... well so what? payload format is not HTTP. > Good luck but go away and do it at a different layer. Yes, do it at a different layer: that's my answer. > 2) "HTTP auth is broken". Aka the headers dont let me login user X to proxy > A and proxy B at the same time, in the same chain, with different > credentials all controlled by user X ... seem to be making a few wrong > assumptions about how HTTP works there. Go away and do (1) instead the > user-application ha sa lot more control over end-to-end pathways in > application layer. Oh, I'd never seen this argument. This is an interesting one because authentication to proxies is very interesting. So this one is definitely a legitimate argument, and one I would make. Also, this means I have to think about proxy auth for RESTauth (well, it's straightforward, but I have to add it). This is very helpful, thanks! > 3) "HTTP auth is broken". Aka its missing a scheme to do mechanism Z ... and > we do see these followed by specs to do Z in HTTP. But none of them are > exactly replacing the existing HTTP mechanism design, just extending it as > it was intended to be extended. > > What am I missing? At least the argument you'd made above: >>> *Every single claim* that HTTP-auth is broken and needs re-designing >>> seems >>> to me to be based on the flawed assumption that HTTP-auth is not >>> extensible >>> and that the common existing schemes are the only ones HTTP permits. Or >>> that >>> somehow a user authenticating with N different and fragile mechanisms for >>> one transaction is a good thing (I rather disagree, the UX on that would >>> be >>> tricky and implementation nightmares). I've never seen that argument.
- Authentication over HTTP M Stefan
- Re: Authentication over HTTP J Ross Nicoll
- Re: Authentication over HTTP Poul-Henning Kamp
- Re: Authentication over HTTP Yoav Nir
- Re: Authentication over HTTP Henry Story
- Re: Authentication over HTTP Poul-Henning Kamp
- Re: Authentication over HTTP Yoav Nir
- Re: Authentication over HTTP Nicolas Mailhot
- Re: Authentication over HTTP Ludin, Stephen
- Re: Authentication over HTTP Henry Story
- Re: Authentication over HTTP J Ross Nicoll
- Re: Authentication over HTTP Adrien W. de Croy
- Re: Authentication over HTTP Nico Williams
- Re: Authentication over HTTP Nico Williams
- Re: Authentication over HTTP Henry Story
- Re: Authentication over HTTP Josh Howlett
- Re: Authentication over HTTP Amos Jeffries
- Re: Authentication over HTTP Bjoern Hoehrmann
- Re: Authentication over HTTP Nico Williams
- Re: Authentication over HTTP Amos Jeffries
- Re: Authentication over HTTP David Morris
- Re: Authentication over HTTP Amos Jeffries
- Re: Authentication over HTTP Yoav Nir
- Re: Authentication over HTTP Albert Lunde
- Re: Authentication over HTTP Nicolas Mailhot
- Re: Authentication over HTTP Nico Williams
- Re: Authentication over HTTP Nico Williams
- Re: Authentication over HTTP Nico Williams
- Re: Authentication over HTTP Amos Jeffries
- Re: Authentication over HTTP Nico Williams
- Re: Authentication over HTTP Nicolas Mailhot
- Re: Authentication over HTTP Adrien W. de Croy