RE: [humanresolv] Tentative problem statement

"Vanderveen, Michaela" <mvanderv@qualcomm.com> Tue, 30 October 2007 18:37 UTC

Return-path: <humanresolvers-bounces@ietf.org>
Received: from [127.0.0.1] (helo=stiedprmman1.va.neustar.com) by megatron.ietf.org with esmtp (Exim 4.43) id 1Imvxu-0002Yt-DZ; Tue, 30 Oct 2007 14:37:26 -0400
Received: from [10.90.34.44] (helo=chiedprmail1.ietf.org) by megatron.ietf.org with esmtp (Exim 4.43) id 1Imvxt-0002Ym-9F for humanresolvers@ietf.org; Tue, 30 Oct 2007 14:37:25 -0400
Received: from ithilien.qualcomm.com ([129.46.51.59]) by chiedprmail1.ietf.org with esmtp (Exim 4.43) id 1Imvxs-0004yi-48 for humanresolvers@ietf.org; Tue, 30 Oct 2007 14:37:25 -0400
Received: from totoro.qualcomm.com (totoro.qualcomm.com [129.46.61.158]) by ithilien.qualcomm.com (8.13.6/8.12.5/1.0) with ESMTP id l9UIbLGP018110 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=FAIL); Tue, 30 Oct 2007 11:37:22 -0700
Received: from sanexcas01.na.qualcomm.com (sanexcas01.qualcomm.com [172.30.36.175]) by totoro.qualcomm.com (8.13.6/8.13.6/1.0) with ESMTP id l9UIbKKF015821; Tue, 30 Oct 2007 11:37:21 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from NAEX15.na.qualcomm.com ([10.47.5.246]) by sanexcas01.na.qualcomm.com with Microsoft SMTPSVC(6.0.3790.3959); Tue, 30 Oct 2007 11:37:21 -0700
X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft Exchange V6.5
Content-class: urn:content-classes:message
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Subject: RE: [humanresolv] Tentative problem statement
Date: Tue, 30 Oct 2007 11:37:19 -0700
Message-ID: <4B3FE0E0367A2F4EB75EE82BC0B21EFCE23A41@NAEX15.na.qualcomm.com>
In-Reply-To: <18a603a60710301109w17a1de6k3d5984cb08a6cc0b@mail.gmail.com>
X-MS-Has-Attach:
X-MS-TNEF-Correlator:
Thread-Topic: [humanresolv] Tentative problem statement
Thread-Index: AcgbICYk7TalNM5CSVilxb8ff77fgQAA2zaw
References: <18a603a60710260508h281a126bjda7179c2b896448b@mail.gmail.com><47220ECD.9020204@gmail.com><18a603a60710290322n151e0650hd9f405957f67c169@mail.gmail.com> <18a603a60710301109w17a1de6k3d5984cb08a6cc0b@mail.gmail.com>
From: "Vanderveen, Michaela" <mvanderv@qualcomm.com>
To: "Pars Mutaf" <pars.mutaf@gmail.com>
X-OriginalArrivalTime: 30 Oct 2007 18:37:21.0001 (UTC) FILETIME=[E7FD6D90:01C81B23]
X-Spam-Score: 0.0 (/)
X-Scan-Signature: a4cdc653ecdd96665f2aa1c1af034c9e
Cc: humanresolvers@ietf.org
X-BeenThere: humanresolvers@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.5
Precedence: list
List-Id: Pairing cellular hosts <humanresolvers.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/humanresolvers>, <mailto:humanresolvers-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www1.ietf.org/pipermail/humanresolvers>
List-Post: <mailto:humanresolvers@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:humanresolvers-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/humanresolvers>, <mailto:humanresolvers-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
Errors-To: humanresolvers-bounces@ietf.org

Hi Pars,

It seems that this problem is targeted at peer-to-peer scenarios rather
than client-server. Therefore password-based authentication (e.g. IKEv2
with EAP) does not fit well, unless users are sharing passwords? Would
you clarify what you mean by the statements below (snipped). I for one
don't see how users can possess some shared keys without also possessing
the other party's associated private info. In order words, a public key
infrastructure might be required.

Also, as you mention in your PQI draft, the problem of selective user
blocking should be kept in mind; it's not fully addressed in the
description below. Specifically, users should be able to turn
undiscoverable to a particular user with whom they already shared SIP
URIs, phone nrs, etc. Such as example is the selective user blocking and
unblocking feature of popular Instant Messaging apps. Changing phone
numbers is cumbersome, and made even more difficult if one wishes to
re-instate that user.

Best regards,

Michaela

"My own opinions only."


> Since there is user contact, IKEv2 authentication can be less 
challenging
> than the general case. I.e., a global PKI hierarchy is probably not
> needed. Solutions like password-based IKEv2 authentication can be
applied.
> Human name certificates can be applicable, certificate revocation may 
not
> be needed, and human name collisions may not be harmful in this
context.
> Certificates may be signed by the cellular operators for example, or
> PGP-like web of trust solutions may be applicable. 
>




> -----Original Message-----
> From: Pars Mutaf [mailto:pars.mutaf@gmail.com]
> Sent: Tuesday, October 30, 2007 11:10 AM
> To: Alexandru Petrescu
> Cc: humanresolvers@ietf.org
> Subject: Re: [humanresolv] Tentative problem statement
> 
> A simplified alternate take based on Alex's comments.
> Thanks,
> pars
> 
> --------------
> 
>                   IP host pairing problem statement
> 
> In the current model of operation (phone number privacy obligates it),
> cell phone users exchange their phone numbers upon user contact. This
> model is likely to persist in IP telephony, yet under exploited and
can be
> extended using an IP protocol. Upon their meeting, an "IP host
pairing"
> protocol can allow two cell phone users to:
> 
>   1. Exchange their SIP URIs, mobile IPv6 home addresses, and possibly
>      other information.
>   2. Establish an IPsec security association using IKEv2.
> 
> under user control, i.e. _if accepted_ by the users. For example, one
> user will initiate a pairing request, and the target user's phone
display
> the initiator user's human name and ask for approval.
> 
> Since there is user contact, IKEv2 authentication can be less
challenging
> than the general case. I.e., a global PKI hierarchy is probably not
> needed. Solutions like password-based IKEv2 authentication can be
applied.
> Human name certificates can be applicable, certificate revocation may
not
> be needed, and human name collisions may not be harmful in this
context.
> Certificates may be signed by the cellular operators for example, or
> PGP-like web of trust solutions may be applicable.
> 
> An IP-layer pairing solution can also allow for re-pairing or updating
> the pairing state through the Internet. The users may change their
> SIP URIs and/or Mobile IPv6 home addresses or other information. The
users
> will need to update these informations without waiting until their
next
> meeting. Or, they may need additional information which was not
previously
> exchanged when there was user contact.
> 
> 
> 
> On 10/29/07, Pars Mutaf <pars.mutaf@gmail.com>; wrote:
> >
> > Hi Alex,
> >
> > On 10/26/07, Alexandru Petrescu <alexandru.petrescu@gmail.com>;
wrote:
> > >
> > > Pars Mutaf wrote:
> > > > Hello, Please find below a tentative problem statement, comments
are
> > > > welcome. pars
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > IP host pairing problem statement
> > > >
> > > > Today, cell phone numbers are not published in a phonebook for
> > > > avoiding telemarketers, prank callers, Spam and SPIT (SPam over
> > > > Internet Telephony). Users today exchange their phone numbers
upon
> > > > user contact, often through oral communication.
> > > >
> > > > In IP telephony, users will need a user friendly "pairing"
protocol
> > > > that identifies the two phones and let them exchange their SIP
URIs
> > > > and Mobile IPv6 home addresses, and possibly other information.
The
> > > > phones will establish an IPsec security association upon this
first
> > > > contact.
> > >
> > > IKE already does this (establish IPsec SA).
> > >
> > > > IPsec will be required not only for protecting their SIP URIs
from
> > > > eavesdroppers, but also for protecting data.
> > >
> > > IPsec already protects data.
> >
> >
> > Our goal is to obtain a SIP URI and home address from the target
device,
> > and to establish an IPsec SA using IKE with the target device, **if
> > accepted**
> > by the target user.  For example, the target user will see a message
on
> > the
> > screen "Pairing request from Michael Knight. Accept?" .  If accepted
by
> > the target user, the devices will exchange SIP URIs, home addresses,
> etc.,
> > and create an IPsec SA using standard IKE(v2).
> >
> > IKE, for example, does not ask user authorization.
> >
> > We can also make IKE authentication easier.
> > We can use human name certificates, or something like the PGP web of
> > trust or self-signed certificates perhaps. Authentication is in
general
> > considered a difficult problem, and requires global PKI hierarchy.
This
> > is
> > not true in our case. I hope we can talk about that. My guess is
that
> > we can use certificates.
> >
> >
> > > "IP host pairing" is defined as a pairing protocol that can
operate
> > > > over IP;
> > >
> > > Is ND a host pairing protocol, if so can we say so.  Is Bluetooth
a
> > > pairing protocol, if so can we say so.
> >
> >
> > ND is not a pairing protocol. Bluetooth has a pairing function.
> >
> > Pairing, in general, is about introducing two devices to each other
> > (there is human intervention), creating a security association, and
> > making sure that your device is paired with the intended device and
> > not with an attacker's device.
> >
> > You may want to look at the following paper to have some ideas:
> >
>
sparrow.ece.cmu.edu/~adrian/projects/sib.pdf<http://sparrow.ece.cmu.edu/
%7
> Eadrian/projects/sib.pdf>
> >
> >
> > Is Bluetooth VCARD exchange a
> > > means to achieve what IP host pairing tries to achieve.
> >
> >
> >
> > Please see above. I'm not sure Bluetooth pairing can be used for
> > creating an IPsec SA. I also don't see why we would do this for
> > Bluetooth. See also below, the problems (2) and (3) can not be
addressed
> > via Bluetooth.
> >
> >
> > > upon user contact and also over the Internet i.e. long distances.
It
> > > > will address three problems of pairing:
> > > >
> > > > 1. Pairing when there is user contact: In this case, users can
> > > > exchange their names or pseudonyms helping identify the hosts to
> each
> > > >  other the first time they meet.
> > >
> > > Define better "user contact": visual contact?  Natural talk/hear
> > > distance?  "Out-of-band" communication?  Letter-through-mail
> > > communication?
> >
> >
> > Good point.
> >
> > (When in a meeting and I want to talk to someone next to me, but
talking
> > > disturbs the meeting, and hushing is too incomprehensible - then I
> write
> > > on paper and show the paper.)
> > >
> > > > 2. Re-pairing, or updating pairing state through the Internet:
The
> > > > users may change their SIP URIs and/or Mobile IPv6 home
addresses or
> > > > other information. The users will need to update these
informations
> > > > without waiting until their next meeting. Or, they may need
> > > > additional information which was not previously exchanged when
there
> > > > was user contact.
> > > >
> > > > 3. Pairing without user contact (where possible): Users may know
> each
> > > >  other but user contact may not be possible. Or, two previously
> > > > paired hosts may lose pairing state. Users cannot probably wait
> until
> > > >  their next meeting to recover from loss of state.
> > > >
> > > > Engineering problems:
> > > >
> > > > - Identifying the two hosts to each other in (1) and (3). -
> > > > Preventing unauthorized and annoying pairing attempts from
unknown
> > > > users. - The design of the pairing protocol used to exchange and
> > > > update the SIP URIs, home addresses and possibly other
information.
> > >
> > > I think ND with link-local addresses, followed by an IKE exchange
and
> > > then by some extensions to "IPv6 Node Information Queries" rfc4620
> > > (extensions to deliver the URI, or the phone number, instead of
just
> the
> > >
> > > FQDN) - can do the trick.  Could this work?
> >
> >
> > Please see above. We need more than that.
> >
> > Thanks,
> > pars
> >
> >
> > Alex
> > >
> > >
> > >
______________________________________________________________________
> > > This email has been scanned by the MessageLabs Email Security
System.
> > > For more information please visit http://www.messagelabs.com/email
> > >
______________________________________________________________________
> > >
> >
> >
> _______________________________________________
> humanresolvers mailing list
> humanresolvers@ietf.org
> https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/humanresolvers

_______________________________________________
humanresolvers mailing list
humanresolvers@ietf.org
https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/humanresolvers