RE: [humanresolv] Tentative problem statement

"Vanderveen, Michaela" <> Wed, 31 October 2007 18:25 UTC

Return-path: <>
Received: from [] ( by with esmtp (Exim 4.43) id 1InIFg-0007l4-Ay; Wed, 31 Oct 2007 14:25:16 -0400
Received: from [] ( by with esmtp (Exim 4.43) id 1InIFf-0007iE-1s for; Wed, 31 Oct 2007 14:25:15 -0400
Received: from ([]) by with esmtp (Exim 4.43) id 1InIFY-0003l7-7F for; Wed, 31 Oct 2007 14:25:15 -0400
Received: from ( []) by (8.13.6/8.12.5/1.0) with ESMTP id l9VIOuxJ005535 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=FAIL); Wed, 31 Oct 2007 11:24:57 -0700
Received: from ( []) by (8.13.6/8.13.6/1.0) with ESMTP id l9VIOue2016627; Wed, 31 Oct 2007 11:24:56 -0700
Received: from ([]) by with Microsoft SMTPSVC(6.0.3790.3959); Wed, 31 Oct 2007 11:24:56 -0700
X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft Exchange V6.5
Content-class: urn:content-classes:message
MIME-Version: 1.0
Subject: RE: [humanresolv] Tentative problem statement
Date: Wed, 31 Oct 2007 11:24:54 -0700
Message-ID: <>
In-Reply-To: <>
Thread-Topic: [humanresolv] Tentative problem statement
Thread-Index: Acgb3Metb5vg5BGUTuGMIPK2Ka/LugADiGqg
References: <> <> <> <> <> <> <> <>
From: "Vanderveen, Michaela" <>
To: Pars Mutaf <>
X-OriginalArrivalTime: 31 Oct 2007 18:24:56.0334 (UTC) FILETIME=[568C02E0:01C81BEB]
X-Spam-Score: 0.0 (/)
X-Scan-Signature: b5299d0955d21ceeb18e25a232290fec
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
X-Content-Filtered-By: Mailman/MimeDel 2.1.5
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.5
Precedence: list
List-Id: Pairing cellular hosts <>
List-Unsubscribe: <>, <>
List-Archive: <>
List-Post: <>
List-Help: <>
List-Subscribe: <>, <>

Hi Pars

Please see inline.





From: Pars Mutaf [] 
Sent: Wednesday, October 31, 2007 9:40 AM
To: Vanderveen, Michaela
Subject: Re: [humanresolv] Tentative problem statement



On 10/30/07, Vanderveen, Michaela < > wrote:

Specifically, users should be able to turn
undiscoverable to a particular user with whom they already shared SIP
URIs, phone nrs, etc. Such as example is the selective user blocking and
unblocking feature of popular Instant Messaging apps. Changing phone 
numbers is cumbersome, and made even more difficult if one wishes to
re-instate that user.

I'm not sure to understand this sounds like a requirement to me?

MCV>> This is "IP host de-pairing" if you wish. Not necessarily a
requirement, but desirable IMO. And of course we don't mean just putting
an expiration time on shared credentials. Ideally hosts should be able
to disable the pairing with other hosts immediately upon user action.
This translates in not being reachable by this one other agent at the
old SIP URI, for example. 

OK I see. Maybe it is also noteworthy that SIP is probably not the only
protocol that will be used between paired hosts.
Some folks are interested in "mobile web servers". 

MCV>> Understood about SIP.

They also explain why this is a good idea:

(note that in our case we don't need a special infrastructure, Mobile
IPv6 takes care of routing) 

MCV>> Not sure whether the MWS covers this case, as the "Access Control"
and "Security & Privacy" sections are "to be added"...

Using IP pairing:
-Alice and Bob share their SIP URIs. 
-Alice also offers an Web URL to allowing Bob access her photos stored
in her phone for example. 

All exchanges are secured by IPsec. 

Bob is authorized to call Alice. He can also look at photos taken by
Alice using a standard web 
browser. Later Alice can cancel the HTML access to her phone. Bob can
still make a SIP call, but 
no longer look at photos or other files. 

What do you think?

MCV>> Perhaps in this type of scenario this is as good as de-pairing
gets. I don't have any better ideas for now.



humanresolvers mailing list