Re: [hybi] On TLS-only Approaches

John Tamplin <jat@google.com> Sun, 22 August 2010 20:10 UTC

Return-Path: <jat@google.com>
X-Original-To: hybi@core3.amsl.com
Delivered-To: hybi@core3.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 1497A3A6862 for <hybi@core3.amsl.com>; Sun, 22 Aug 2010 13:10:28 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -105.29
X-Spam-Level:
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-105.29 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=0.686, BAYES_00=-2.599, FM_FORGED_GMAIL=0.622, HTML_MESSAGE=0.001, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED=-4, USER_IN_WHITELIST=-100]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32]) by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id aulOOZOnaqFd for <hybi@core3.amsl.com>; Sun, 22 Aug 2010 13:10:22 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from smtp-out.google.com (smtp-out.google.com [74.125.121.35]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 5C64A3A6954 for <hybi@ietf.org>; Sun, 22 Aug 2010 13:10:16 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from wpaz21.hot.corp.google.com (wpaz21.hot.corp.google.com [172.24.198.85]) by smtp-out.google.com with ESMTP id o7MKAmfq026818 for <hybi@ietf.org>; Sun, 22 Aug 2010 13:10:49 -0700
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha1; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=google.com; s=beta; t=1282507849; bh=LVhRrbQ5TJ2mwQ3J+0bCaZNe9UQ=; h=MIME-Version:In-Reply-To:References:From:Date:Message-ID:Subject: To:Cc:Content-Type; b=jW+KWRm3m/VEXfs+nQQC2cjkDTzdZYCVSBVuSo7nCSUgdHfx+Q7qyekQQqCloSHDq kagoCjXKMqErwF99ePBRQ==
DomainKey-Signature: a=rsa-sha1; s=beta; d=google.com; c=nofws; q=dns; h=mime-version:in-reply-to:references:from:date:message-id: subject:to:cc:content-type:x-system-of-record; b=DDrSKI6c4krlKbb07iKMLVfI7WjcykDcGyz6m9uriYwAtzeBC6GPXp87lAWQch4kX jehq39fHFz4fH2z0IbmXQ==
Received: from ywt2 (ywt2.prod.google.com [10.192.20.2]) by wpaz21.hot.corp.google.com with ESMTP id o7MKAlpN014953 for <hybi@ietf.org>; Sun, 22 Aug 2010 13:10:47 -0700
Received: by ywt2 with SMTP id 2so483777ywt.13 for <hybi@ietf.org>; Sun, 22 Aug 2010 13:10:47 -0700 (PDT)
Received: by 10.151.101.19 with SMTP id d19mr4140379ybm.330.1282507846289; Sun, 22 Aug 2010 13:10:46 -0700 (PDT)
MIME-Version: 1.0
Received: by 10.151.60.3 with HTTP; Sun, 22 Aug 2010 13:10:26 -0700 (PDT)
In-Reply-To: <AANLkTikJcbyEZ-Y0FOXni89L8Awa_UBmMMDvLgsOuoou@mail.gmail.com>
References: <AANLkTikJcbyEZ-Y0FOXni89L8Awa_UBmMMDvLgsOuoou@mail.gmail.com>
From: John Tamplin <jat@google.com>
Date: Sun, 22 Aug 2010 16:10:26 -0400
Message-ID: <AANLkTin3r+f1Fn_X5O401PSANRrcgttLR-P4qMJZWKtV@mail.gmail.com>
To: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="00151750ef02998826048e6f2094"
X-System-Of-Record: true
Cc: Server-Initiated HTTP <hybi@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [hybi] On TLS-only Approaches
X-BeenThere: hybi@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9
Precedence: list
List-Id: Server-Initiated HTTP <hybi.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/hybi>, <mailto:hybi-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/hybi>
List-Post: <mailto:hybi@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:hybi-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/hybi>, <mailto:hybi-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Sun, 22 Aug 2010 20:10:29 -0000

On Sun, Aug 22, 2010 at 3:45 PM, Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> wrote:

> I'd like to take a brief detour from the topic of framing and (re)discuss
> the topic of whether
> we want to require TLS only. Aside from the obvious security advantages, it
> appears
> that TLS-based approaches are likely to be a lot more successful. Adam
> Langley
> reports (http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg05593.html)
> that their
> tests show 95% success with TLS-only approaches as compared to 67% with
> HTTP approaches. This argues that people who want to be successful will
> choose
> to run WebSockets over TLS.
>
> OK, you say, so what's the harm in specifying HTTP and HTTPS versions. I
> see
> two arguments against this:
>
> (1) It just increases the attack surface.
> (2) It means that we're forced to design things into this protocol that we
> could get
> from TLS.
>
> Exhibit A for the second argument is of course NPN or something like it.
> Currently,
> we're forced to design a handshake that ensures that the client and server
> are
> both speaking Websockets; this is necessarily a bit hacky and likely to
> either
> make the proxy problem worse (encryption) or cost us a round trip (MAC
> handshake).
> By contrast, if we're really using TLS, then we can just build this
> mechanism into
> TLS without paying any penalty.
>
> I just want to get ahead of one possible objection to this line of
> reasoning: that
> there is a performance penalty for TLS. Even if you don't find the
> arguments that
> TLS perf isn't an issue convincing (
> http://www.imperialviolet.org/2010/06/25/overclocking-ssl.html),
> and FWIW I do, if, as I argue, you're going to pay that cost anyway, then
> our
> goal should be to minimize the cost of the combined system, and that is
> easiest
> to do if we simply assume TLS all the time.
>

We have people complaining about the complexity of doing an extra comparison
to interpret the length of a frame -- it seems to me that requiring a TLS
implementation is unacceptable.  Think about all the small embedded devices
which run a web server on very underpowered machines -- should they all be
required to implement TLS?

I think there is room for multiple connection establishment / handshake /
outer framing schemes, and I am fine with TLS being one of them, but I don't
think it can be required.

-- 
John A. Tamplin
Software Engineer (GWT), Google