I-D Action: draft-ietf-pquip-hbs-state-03.txt

internet-drafts@ietf.org Sat, 07 February 2026 08:20 UTC

Return-Path: <internet-drafts@ietf.org>
X-Original-To: i-d-announce@ietf.org
Delivered-To: i-d-announce@mail2.ietf.org
Received: from [10.244.6.212] (unknown [4.156.85.76]) by mail2.ietf.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 95F8AB3413EE; Sat, 7 Feb 2026 00:20:08 -0800 (PST)
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
From: internet-drafts@ietf.org
To: i-d-announce@ietf.org
Subject: I-D Action: draft-ietf-pquip-hbs-state-03.txt
X-Test-IDTracker: no
X-IETF-IDTracker: 12.58.0
Auto-Submitted: auto-generated
Precedence: bulk
Message-ID: <177045240851.670128.14390711292424304223@dt-datatracker-6bcfd44575-g5gjh>
Date: Sat, 07 Feb 2026 00:20:08 -0800
Message-ID-Hash: EW3FELBHA7BXKPVHAWEGRTVTYRIL472I
X-Message-ID-Hash: EW3FELBHA7BXKPVHAWEGRTVTYRIL472I
X-MailFrom: internet-drafts@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Rule-Misses: dmarc-mitigation; no-senders; approved; emergency; loop; banned-address; member-moderation; header-match-i-d-announce.ietf.org-0; nonmember-moderation; administrivia; implicit-dest; max-recipients; max-size; news-moderation; no-subject; digests; suspicious-header
CC: pqc@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 3.3.9rc6
Reply-To: internet-drafts@ietf.org, pqc@ietf.org
List-Id: Internet Draft Announcements only <i-d-announce.ietf.org>
Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/i-d-announce/Q_rUpbSAx2yZw17WsviDa5nkm3A>
List-Archive: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/i-d-announce>
List-Help: <mailto:i-d-announce-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Owner: <mailto:i-d-announce-owner@ietf.org>
List-Post: <mailto:i-d-announce@ietf.org>
List-Subscribe: <mailto:i-d-announce-join@ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:i-d-announce-leave@ietf.org>

Internet-Draft draft-ietf-pquip-hbs-state-03.txt is now available. It is a
work item of the Post-Quantum Use In Protocols (PQUIP) WG of the IETF.

   Title:   Hash-based Signatures: State and Backup Management
   Authors: Thom Wiggers
            Kaveh Bashiri
            Stefan Kölbl
            Jim Goodman
            Stavros Kousidis
   Name:    draft-ietf-pquip-hbs-state-03.txt
   Pages:   24
   Dates:   2026-02-07

Abstract:

   Stateful Hash-Based Signature Schemes (Stateful HBS) such as LMS,
   HSS, XMSS and XMSS^MT combine Merkle trees with One-Time Signatures
   (OTS) to provide signatures that are resistant against attacks using
   large-scale quantum computers.  Unlike conventional stateless digital
   signature schemes, Stateful HBS have a state to keep track of which
   OTS keys have been used, as double-signing with the same OTS key
   allows forgeries.

   This document provides guidance and catalogs security considerations
   for the operational and technical aspects of deploying systems that
   rely on Stateful HBS.  Management of the state of the Stateful HBS,
   including any handling of redundant key material, is a sensitive
   topic.  This document describes some approaches to handle the
   associated challenges.  It also describes the challenges that need to
   be resolved before certain approaches should be considered.

The IETF datatracker status page for this Internet-Draft is:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-pquip-hbs-state/

There is also an HTML version available at:
https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-pquip-hbs-state-03.html

A diff from the previous version is available at:
https://author-tools.ietf.org/iddiff?url2=draft-ietf-pquip-hbs-state-03

Internet-Drafts are also available by rsync at:
rsync.ietf.org::internet-drafts