I-D Action: draft-dkg-openpgp-abuse-resistant-keystore-05.txt

internet-drafts@ietf.org Thu, 28 April 2022 19:09 UTC

Return-Path: <internet-drafts@ietf.org>
X-Original-To: i-d-announce@ietf.org
Delivered-To: i-d-announce@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from ietfa.amsl.com (localhost [IPv6:::1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id AB1D5C1595FD for <i-d-announce@ietf.org>; Thu, 28 Apr 2022 12:09:00 -0700 (PDT)
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
From: internet-drafts@ietf.org
To: i-d-announce@ietf.org
Subject: I-D Action: draft-dkg-openpgp-abuse-resistant-keystore-05.txt
X-Test-IDTracker: no
X-IETF-IDTracker: 8.1.0
Auto-Submitted: auto-generated
Precedence: bulk
Message-ID: <165117294068.6097.10792894047715176548@ietfa.amsl.com>
Date: Thu, 28 Apr 2022 12:09:00 -0700
Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/i-d-announce/d_uglA6QuP-j44G9fsEQhT6tOAg>
X-BeenThere: i-d-announce@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.34
List-Id: Internet Draft Announcements only <i-d-announce.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/i-d-announce>, <mailto:i-d-announce-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/i-d-announce/>
List-Post: <mailto:i-d-announce@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:i-d-announce-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/i-d-announce>, <mailto:i-d-announce-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 28 Apr 2022 19:09:00 -0000

A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.


        Title           : Abuse-Resistant OpenPGP Keystores
        Author          : Daniel Kahn Gillmor
	Filename        : draft-dkg-openpgp-abuse-resistant-keystore-05.txt
	Pages           : 55
	Date            : 2022-04-28

Abstract:
   OpenPGP transferable public keys are composite certificates, made up
   of primary keys, revocation signatures, direct key signatures, user
   IDs, identity certifications ("signature packets"), subkeys, and so
   on.  They are often assembled by merging multiple certificates that
   all share the same primary key, and are distributed in public
   keystores.

   Unfortunately, since many keystores permit any third-party to add a
   certification with any content to any OpenPGP certificate, the
   assembled/merged form of a certificate can become unwieldy or
   undistributable.  Furthermore, keystores that are searched by user ID
   or fingerprint can be made unusable for specific searches by public
   submission of bogus certificates.  And finally, keystores open to
   public submission can also face simple resource exhaustion from
   flooding with bogus submissions, or legal or other risks from uploads
   of toxic data.

   This draft documents techniques that an archive of OpenPGP
   certificates can use to mitigate the impact of these various attacks,
   and the implications of these concerns and mitigations for the rest
   of the OpenPGP ecosystem.


The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-dkg-openpgp-abuse-resistant-keystore/

There is also an htmlized version available at:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-dkg-openpgp-abuse-resistant-keystore-05

A diff from the previous version is available at:
https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-dkg-openpgp-abuse-resistant-keystore-05


Internet-Drafts are also available by rsync at rsync.ietf.org::internet-drafts