Re: [I2nsf] AD Review of draft-ietf-i2nsf-applicability-07

["Mr. Jaehoon Paul Jeong" <[e-mail]>]

Eric,
Let me answer your further questions below.

On Thu, Dec 27, 2018 at 11:59 PM Eric Rescorla <[e-mail]> wrote:

>
>
> On Wed, Dec 26, 2018 at 6:42 PM Mr. Jaehoon Paul Jeong <
> [e-mail]> wrote:
>
>> Hi Eric,
>> Here are my answers inlines below.
>>
>> On Thu, Dec 27, 2018 at 3:44 AM Eric Rescorla <[e-mail]> wrote:
>>
>>> Paul,
>>>
>>> Thanks for your new version. Some responses below.
>>>
>>>
>>> On Tue, Dec 25, 2018 at 6:42 AM Mr. Jaehoon Paul Jeong <
>>> [e-mail]> wrote:
>>>
>>>> Hi Eric, Linda and Yoav,
>>>> I have reflected all the comments from Eric and submitted the revision
>>>> -08 as follows:
>>>> https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-i2nsf-applicability-08
>>>>
>>>> The changes are described in Appendix A of -08 document as follows:
>>>>
>>>> -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
>>>> Appendix A.  Changes from draft-ietf-i2nsf-applicability-07
>>>>
>>>>    The following changes have been made from
>>>>    draft-ietf-i2nsf-applicability-07:
>>>>
>>>>    o  This version has reflected all the comments from Eric Rescorla who
>>>>       is a Security Area Director as follows.
>>>>
>>>>    o  In Section 1, Network Security Function (NFV) is defined in the
>>>>       viewpoint of the I2NSF framework.
>>>>
>>>>    o  In Section 1, a user using the I2NSF User is clarified as a system
>>>>       administrator in the I2NSF framework.
>>>>
>>>>    o  In Section 1, as the applicability of the I2NSF framework, four
>>>>       different scenarios are represented with a standard bulleted list.
>>>>
>>>>    o  The standard document about ETSI-NFV is moved to Normative
>>>>       References.
>>>>
>>>>    o  In Section 2, key terms (e.g., Network Function, Network Security
>>>>       Function, Network Functions Virtualization, and Servive Function
>>>>       Chaining) are internally defined along with the reference to open
>>>>       specifications.
>>>>
>>>>    o  In Section 2, the definition of Firewall is corrected such that
>>>>       some suspicious packets are inspected by the firewall rather than
>>>>       every packet.
>>>>
>>>>    o  In Section 3, for a Developer's Management System, the problem of
>>>>       an inside attacker is addressed, and a possible solution for the
>>>>       inside attacks is suggested through I2NSF NSF monitoring
>>>>       functionality.
>>>>
>>>
>>> I'm still pretty concerned about this. Standardizing a situation in
>>> which the
>>> developer of your firewall has real-time management-level access to
>>> that firewall seems extremely insecure, especially when that access is
>>> authenticated via conventional credentials that are online as part of
>>> the transaction (as opposed to software builds which can be signed
>>> offline). This doesn't seem like a best practice. Why is it necessary?
>>>
>>
>>
>>>  =>  The developer of a firewall does not have real-time
>> management-level access
>>        even though its management system works the control plane as part
>> of the I2NSF system.
>>        The developer's management system provides the Security Controller
>> with
>>        the interface (i.e., Registration Interface) that is used to
>> register the capability of
>>        the developer's security network function (i.e., firewall), to
>> search an NSF for the required capability for a high-level security policy,
>> and to help the lifecycle management
>>        of such an NSF for the Security Controller through an NFV
>> interface (i.e., Ve-Vnfm interface) with the NFV's MANO.
>>
>
> I don't understand the distinction you are drawing here. Under what
> conditions can the developer modify the behavior of the I2NSF system? Can
> it do so at any time and without explicit action by the admin.
>
>  =>  The developer means a security solution vendor (e.g., McAfee and
Symantec) who provides the I2NSF system with security solutions,
       such as firewall, web filter, DPI, IDS/IPS, and DDoS-attack
mitigator. Actually, the developer's management system
       cannot modify the behavior of the I2NSF system in run-time as long
as the vendor doesn't have any backdoor to
       their developer's management system.
       This developer's management system facilitates the security service
government by the Security Controller
       by providing the Security Controller with the Registration Interface
for the capability registration and instantiation/de-instantiation
       of the image of a security service function.
       Thus, only the administrator can modify the behavior of the I2NSF
system.

       Maybe,
       Diego Lopez can clarify my answer because he is the editor of RFC
8329 (Framework for Interface to Network Security Functions):
       https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8329



>
>       In our NFV system, it is assumed that the developer's management
>> system and its
>>       NSF images are trustworthy as an element management system and
>> Virtual Network Functions, respectively.
>>
>
> This sounds like you are describing what I am saying is bad practice.
>

 => If the developer's management system and NSFs are not trustworthy, our
I2NSF system is vulnerable to an insider's attack
      in the same way with the legacy security systems. However, I would
say that the I2NSF monitoring functionality can be used to
      monitor and regulate the behaviors of the developer's management
system and NSFs.

     For this answer, maybe other I2NSF members can help me clarify my
assumption for you.

>
>
>>
>>>
>>>
>>>    o  In Section 4, an XML file for the RESTCONF/YANG for the time-
>>>>       dependent web access control is pointed out with a reference to
>>>>       the Consumer-Facing Interface's data model
>>>>       [consumer-facing-inf-dm].
>>>>
>>>
>>> I didn't follow this change. The example you give of a high level
>>> security
>>> policy is clearly freeform text and then you talk about XML. Is this just
>>> example a summary of the semantics of something which would actually be
>>> an
>>> XML file? Something else?
>>>
>>
>>   => Even though the high-level security policy looks like a freeform
>> text,  it is formatted
>>       in an XML according to the high-level security policy YANG model
>> for the Consumer-Facing Interface.
>>       Yes, it is just an example of a summary of the semantics for such a
>> high-level security policy,
>>       which is represented as an XML file.
>>       Here it an XML file for the web filter from the Consumer-Facing
>> Interface Data Model document
>>       (
>> https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-i2nsf-consumer-facing-interface-dm-02
>> ):
>>
>>       You can see the XML file from
>>
>> https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-i2nsf-consumer-facing-interface-dm-02#page-49
>>
>>       <?xml version="1.1" encoding="UTF-8"?>
>>  <rpc message-id="4" xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:restconf:base:1.0">
>>   <edit-config>
>>    <target>
>>     <running/>
>>    </target>
>>     <config>
>>      <i2nsf-cf-interface-wf-req nc:operation="create">
>>          <policy-wf>
>>              <rule-wf>
>>                  <rule-wf-id>03</rule-wf-id>
>>                  <rule-wf-name>wf-policy-example</rule-wf-name>
>>                  <rule-wf-date>2018.10.26/14:03:17</rule-wf-date>
>>                  <event>
>>                      <event-id>04</event-id>
>>                      <event-name>wf</event-name>
>>                      <event-date>2018.10.26/14:03:17</event-date>
>>                      <event-type>wf</event-type>
>>                      <event-map-group>04</event-map-group>
>>                      <enable>True</enable>
>>                  </event>
>>                  <condition>
>>                      <condition-id>04</condition-id>
>>                      <source-ip>192.168.1.3</source-ip>
>>                      <destination-url>www.facebook.com</destination-url>
>>                      <time-information>
>>                          <begin-time>09:00</begin-time>
>>                          <end-time>18:00</end-time>
>>                      </time-information>
>>                      <match-direction>default</match-direction>
>>                      <exeption>00</exeption>
>>                  </condition>
>>                  <action>
>>                      <action-id>04</action-id>
>>                      <action-name>action-wf</action-name>
>>                      <action-date>2018.10.26/14:03:17</action-date>
>>                      <primary-action>REJECT</primary-action>
>>                      <secondary-action>LOG</secondary-action>
>>                  </action>
>>                  <precedence>none</precedence>
>>                <owner>
>>                  <owner-id>03</owner-id>
>>                  <name>i2nsf-admin</name>
>>                </owner>
>>              </rule-wf>
>>          </policy-wf>
>>      </i2nsf-cf-interface-wf-req>
>>     </config>
>>   </edit-config>
>>  </rpc>
>>   => In the above, source ip is used for the employees.
>>   Instead of the source ip, we can make and use "source group" for
>> employees that can be translated
>>   into a set of IP addresses of the source group.
>>
>
> You need to make this clear, then. It would probably be easier to just
> show the XML and then provide the text summary.
>
>   => Okay. I will include a simplified example XML code for web filter and
provide the text summary as below.

   This service scenario assumes that an enterprise network
   administrator wants to control the staff members' access to a
   particular Internet service (e.g., Example.com) during business
   hours.  The following is an example high-level security policy rule
   for a web filter that the administrator requests: Block the staff
members' access to Example.com from 9 AM to 6 PM.
   Here is an example XML code for this web filter:
<I2NSF>
    <name>block_website</name>
        <cond>
            <src>Staff_Member's_PC</src>
            <dest>Example.com</dest>
    <time-span-start>9:00AM</time-span-start>
            <time-span-end>-6:00PM</time-span-end>
        </cond>
        <action>block<action>
</I2NSF>

   The security policy name is "bloc_website" with the tag "name".
   The filtering condition has the source group "Staff_Member's_PC" with
the tag "src",
   the destination website "Example.com" with the tag "dest",
   the filtering start time is the time "9:00AM" with the tag "
time-span-start",
   and the filtering end time is the time "6:00PM" with the tag "
time-span-end".
   The action is to "block" the packets satisfying the above condition,
   that is, to drop those packets.


>
>    o  In Section 6, the definitions of an SDN forwarding element and an
>>>>       NSF are clarified such that an SDN forwarding element is a switch
>>>>       running as either a hardware middle box or a software virtual
>>>>       switch, and an NSF is a virtual network function for a security
>>>>       service.
>>>>
>>>
>>> This wasn't clear to me either. Based on this text it would seem that
>>> you could run an NSF on an SDN element, so it's not clear why they
>>> are disjoint sets. Can you give me more information here?
>>>
>>
>>  => An SDN switch can run as a virtual network function like an NSF, but
>> the main functionality of the SDN switch is packet forwarding with a flow
>> table along with simple filtering rules. More complicated security services
>> can be done at dedicated NSFs. For example, there is the Open Virtual
>> Switch (OVS) project for such a software-based SDN switch:
>> https://www.openvswitch.org
>>
>> Thus, the SDN switches and NSFs are logically disjoint sets though all of
>> them  can run physically as virtual network functions.
>>
>
> I'm sorry, this still isn't clear, at least to me. How can I look at a
> given software element and determine whether it's an NSF or a virtualized
> SDN switch?
>

 => The distinction is logically done such that the NFV system having the
I2NSF system categorizes some VNFs as NSFs for dedicated security services
      and some VNFs as virtualized SDN switches for packet switching and
simple filtering rule enforcement.

     If there is an expert in the NFV, please let us know for further
clarification.

     Thanks.

     Best Regards,
     Paul


>
> -Ekr
>
>>
>> If you have further questions, please let me know.
>>
>> Thanks.
>>
>> Best Regards,
>> Paul
>>
>>>
>>> -Ekr
>>>
>>>
>>>>    o  In Section 6.3, a flow forwarding path management scheme in
>>>>       [AVANT-GUARD] is described in a self-contained way as follows.
>>>>       For DDoS-attack mitigation, the forwarding of traffic flows in
>>>>       switches can be dynamically configured such that malicious traffic
>>>>       flows are handled by the paths separated from normal traffic flows
>>>>       in order to minimize the impact of those malicious traffic on the
>>>>       the servers.  This flow path separation can be done by a flow
>>>>       forwarding path management scheme based on [AVANT-GUARD].
>>>>
>>>>    o  Some typos are corrected such as "Interner -> Internet",
>>>>       "Registation -> Registration", "The low-level security rules for
>>>>       web filter checks -> The low-level security rules for web filter
>>>>       check", "fltering -> filtering", "illegal packets -> malicious
>>>>       packets", "manipulate rules -> configure rules", "managenent ->
>>>>       management", and "DDoS-attack mitigation operations -> DDoS-attack
>>>>       mitigation".
>>>>
>>>> -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
>>>>
>>>> Thanks and Merry Christmas!
>>>>
>>>> Best Regards,
>>>> Paul
>>>>
>>>> On Fri, Dec 21, 2018 at 11:33 PM Eric Rescorla <[e-mail]> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> Rich version of this review at:
>>>>> https://mozphab-ietf.devsvcdev.mozaws.net/D3181
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> I found a number of typographical and grammar errors. Please give this
>>>>> document a thorough read.
>>>>>
>>>>> IMPORTANT
>>>>> S 1.
>>>>> >
>>>>> >      Interface to Network Security Functions (I2NSF) defines a
>>>>> framework
>>>>> >      and interfaces for interacting with Network Security Functions
>>>>> >      (NSFs).  The I2NSF framework allows heterogeneous NSFs
>>>>> developed by
>>>>> >      different security solution vendors to be used in the Network
>>>>> >      Functions Virtualization (NFV) environment [ETSI-NFV] by
>>>>> utilizing
>>>>>
>>>>> Much of this document cannot be understood without reading ETSI-NFV,
>>>>> so it has to be a normative reference. It also would be helpful to
>>>>> provide a link.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> S 2.
>>>>> >      This document uses the terminology described in [RFC7149],
>>>>> >      [ITU-T.Y.3300], [ONF-OpenFlow], [ONF-SDN-Architecture],
>>>>> >      [ITU-T.X.1252], [ITU-T.X.800], [RFC8329], [i2nsf-terminology],
>>>>> >      [consumer-facing-inf-im], [consumer-facing-inf-dm],
>>>>> >      [i2nsf-nsf-cap-im], [nsf-facing-inf-dm], [registration-inf-dm],
>>>>> and
>>>>> >      [nsf-triggered-steering].  In addition, the following terms are
>>>>>
>>>>> Every term in this document needs to be understandable without
>>>>> reference to closed specifications or internally defined. Please
>>>>> ensure that this is so,
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> S 3.
>>>>> >      used for the I2NSF NSF-Facing Interface.
>>>>> >
>>>>> >      The Registration Interface between the Security Controller and
>>>>> the
>>>>> >      Developer's Management System can be implemented by RESTCONF
>>>>> >      [RFC8040].  The data model defined in [registration-inf-dm] can
>>>>> be
>>>>> >      used for the I2NSF Registration Interface.
>>>>>
>>>>> What role does the Developer's Management System play in this? I think
>>>>> this refers to the text above starting with "The developers (or
>>>>> vendors)...". Is that correct?
>>>>>
>>>>> Assuming I am correct, this seems like a potentially serious security
>>>>> vulnerability in this design in that it potentially allows an inside
>>>>> attacker at the developer to seriously weaken a system's security.
>>>>> What protections exist to prevent this?
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> S 4.
>>>>> >      administrator wants to control the staff members' access to a
>>>>> >      particular Interner service (e.g., Example.com) during business
>>>>> >      hours.  The following is an example high-level security policy
>>>>> rule
>>>>> >      that the administrator requests: Block the staff members'
>>>>> access to
>>>>> >      Example.com from 9 AM to 6 PM.  The administrator sends this
>>>>> high-
>>>>> >      level security policy to the Security Controller, then the
>>>>> Security
>>>>>
>>>>> The text above suggests that high-level policies are via
>>>>> RESTCONF/YANG, but this is clearly freeform text.
>>>>> COMMENTS
>>>>> S 1.
>>>>> >
>>>>> >   1.  Introduction
>>>>> >
>>>>> >      Interface to Network Security Functions (I2NSF) defines a
>>>>> framework
>>>>> >      and interfaces for interacting with Network Security Functions
>>>>> >      (NSFs).  The I2NSF framework allows heterogeneous NSFs
>>>>> developed by
>>>>>
>>>>> Please define "Network Security Functions" here.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> S 1.
>>>>> >      functions in the NFV platform.  In the I2NSF framework, each NSF
>>>>> >      initially registers the profile of its own capabilities into the
>>>>> >      system in order for themselves to be available in the system.
>>>>> In
>>>>> >      addition, the Security Controller is validated by the I2NSF
>>>>> Client
>>>>> >      (also called I2NSF User) that the user is employing, so that
>>>>> the user
>>>>> >      can request security services through the Security Controller.
>>>>>
>>>>> In this case the user is the system administrator.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> S 1.
>>>>> >      [RFC7149] to provide different security functionality such as
>>>>> >      firewalls [opsawg-firewalls], Deep Packet Inspection (DPI), and
>>>>> >      Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack mitigation; (iv)
>>>>> the use
>>>>> >      of NFV as supporting technology.  The implementation of I2NSF in
>>>>> >      these scenarios has allowed us to verify the applicability and
>>>>> >      effectiveness of the I2NSF framework for a variety of use cases.
>>>>>
>>>>> This would be easier to read with a standard bulleted list.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> S 2.
>>>>> >         network resources, which facilitates the design, delivery and
>>>>> >         operation of network services in a dynamic and scalable
>>>>> manner
>>>>> >         [ITU-T.Y.3300].
>>>>> >
>>>>> >      o  Firewall: A service function at the junction of two network
>>>>> >         segments that inspects every packet that attempts to cross
>>>>> the
>>>>>
>>>>> Nit: It might not inspect *every* packet.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> S 4.
>>>>> >
>>>>> >   4.  Time-dependent Web Access Control Service
>>>>> >
>>>>> >      This service scenario assumes that an enterprise network
>>>>> >      administrator wants to control the staff members' access to a
>>>>> >      particular Interner service (e.g., Example.com) during business
>>>>>
>>>>> Nit: "Internet"
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> S 4.
>>>>> >      inspection capability is required to check whether the target
>>>>> URL of
>>>>> >      a received packet is in the Example.com domain or not.
>>>>> >
>>>>> >      The Security Controller maintains the security capabilities of
>>>>> each
>>>>> >      NSF running in the I2NSF system, which have been reported by the
>>>>> >      Developer's Management System via the Registation interface.
>>>>> Based
>>>>>
>>>>> Nit: "Registration"
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> S 4.
>>>>> >      currently using the network.  Based on the retrieved
>>>>> information, the
>>>>> >      Security Controller generates low-level security rules to check
>>>>> >      whether the source IP address of a received packet matches any
>>>>> one
>>>>> >      being used by a staff member.  In addition, the low-level
>>>>> security
>>>>> >      rules should be able to determine that a received packet is of
>>>>> HTTP
>>>>> >      protocol.  The low-level security rules for web filter checks
>>>>> that
>>>>>
>>>>> Nit: "rules"... "checks" disagree.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> S 6.
>>>>> >      translated into their packet forwarding rules, whereas NSFs
>>>>> enforce
>>>>> >      NSF-related security rules requiring the security capabilities
>>>>> of the
>>>>> >      NSFs.  For this purpose, the Security Controller instructs the
>>>>> SDN
>>>>> >      Controller via NSF-Facing Interface so that SDN forwarding
>>>>> elements
>>>>> >      can perform the required security services with flow tables
>>>>> under the
>>>>> >      supervision of the SDN Controller.
>>>>>
>>>>> I'm having some trouble understanding the difference here between NSFs
>>>>> and SDN elements. They both seem to be software controlled network
>>>>> elements. Is this just some continuum about CPU power?
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> S 6.
>>>>> >      can perform the required security services with flow tables
>>>>> under the
>>>>> >      supervision of the SDN Controller.
>>>>> >
>>>>> >      As an example, let us consider two different types of security
>>>>> rules:
>>>>> >
>>>>> >      Rule A is a simple packet fltering rule that checks only the IP
>>>>>
>>>>> Nit: "filtering"
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> S 6.2.
>>>>> >          packets that have the same call-id.
>>>>> >
>>>>> >      6.  The SDN Controller installs new rules (e.g., drop packets)
>>>>> into
>>>>> >          underlying switches.
>>>>> >
>>>>> >      7.  The illegal packets are dropped by these switches.
>>>>>
>>>>> "Illegal" is probably the wrong wrod here.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> S 6.3.
>>>>> >         is helpful to determine security policies for such a network.
>>>>> >
>>>>> >   6.3.  Attack Mitigation: Centralized DDoS-attack Mitigation System
>>>>> >
>>>>> >      A centralized DDoS-attack mitigation can manage each network
>>>>> resource
>>>>> >      and manipulate rules to each switch through a common server for
>>>>> DDoS-
>>>>>
>>>>> "manipulate rules to" is not grammatical.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> S 6.3.
>>>>> >
>>>>> >      Servers are categorized into stateless servers (e.g., DNS
>>>>> servers)
>>>>> >      and stateful servers (e.g., web servers).  For DDoS-attack
>>>>> >      mitigation, traffic flows in switches are dynamically
>>>>> configured by
>>>>> >      traffic flow forwarding path management according to the
>>>>> category of
>>>>> >      servers [AVANT-GUARD].  Such a managenent should consider the
>>>>> load
>>>>>
>>>>> 1. This seems hard to understand without this reference, which is not
>>>>> public.
>>>>> 2. "management"
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> S 6.3.
>>>>> >      mitigation, traffic flows in switches are dynamically
>>>>> configured by
>>>>> >      traffic flow forwarding path management according to the
>>>>> category of
>>>>> >      servers [AVANT-GUARD].  Such a managenent should consider the
>>>>> load
>>>>> >      balance among the switches for the defense against DDoS attacks.
>>>>> >
>>>>> >      The procedure of DDoS-attack mitigation operations in this
>>>>> system is
>>>>>
>>>>> "procedure of... operations" is ungrammatical
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> --
>>>> ===========================
>>>> Mr. Jaehoon (Paul) Jeong, Ph.D.
>>>> Associate Professor
>>>> Department of Software
>>>> Sungkyunkwan University
>>>> Office: [phone]
>>>> Email: [e-mail]
>>>> Personal Homepage: http://iotlab.skku.edu/people-jaehoon-jeong.php
>>>> <http://cpslab.skku.edu/people-jaehoon-jeong.php>
>>>>
>>>
>>
>> --
>> ===========================
>> Mr. Jaehoon (Paul) Jeong, Ph.D.
>> Associate Professor
>> Department of Software
>> Sungkyunkwan University
>> Office: [phone]
>> Email: [e-mail], [e-mail]
>> Personal Homepage: http://iotlab.skku.edu/people-jaehoon-jeong.php
>> <http://cpslab.skku.edu/people-jaehoon-jeong.php>
>>
>

-- 
===========================
Mr. Jaehoon (Paul) Jeong, Ph.D.
Associate Professor
Department of Software
Sungkyunkwan University
Office: [phone]
Email: [e-mail], [e-mail]
Personal Homepage: http://iotlab.skku.edu/people-jaehoon-jeong.php
<http://cpslab.skku.edu/people-jaehoon-jeong.php>