Re: [i2rs] Kathleen Moriarty's Discuss on draft-ietf-i2rs-protocol-security-requirements-07: (with DISCUSS and COMMENT)

kathleen.moriarty.ietf@gmail.com Fri, 19 August 2016 10:46 UTC

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From: kathleen.moriarty.ietf@gmail.com
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Date: Fri, 19 Aug 2016 06:46:39 -0400
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References: <013b01d1f8ee$31fa09b0$95ee1d10$@ndzh.com> <20160818073203.GA4338@elstar.local> <04b501d1f949$116c63e0$34452ba0$@ndzh.com> <20160818121405.GA5282@elstar.local> <051301d1f950$7739c670$65ad5350$@ndzh.com> <20160818130555.GA5366@elstar.local> <051701d1f952$c4ae0b30$4e0a2190$@ndzh.com> <6BCE198E4EAEFC4CAB45D75826EFB0761525CCD7@eusaamb101.ericsson.se> <F8C205FB-665C-422C-B991-2F97F75CAE42@cooperw.in> <003801d1f97f$3d16eb10$b744c130$@ndzh.com> <20160819085756.GA6759@elstar.local>
To: Juergen Schoenwaelder <j.schoenwaelder@jacobs-university.de>
Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/i2rs/C-Qh0K2U8nc6FOqe8J21kzIZscs>
Cc: i2rs@ietf.org, Alissa Cooper <alissa@cooperw.in>, i2rs-chairs@ietf.org, IESG <iesg@ietf.org>, jhaas@pfrc.org, Joel Halpern <joel.halpern@ericsson.com>, Susan Hares <shares@ndzh.com>, draft-ietf-i2rs-protocol-security-requirements@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [i2rs] Kathleen Moriarty's Discuss on draft-ietf-i2rs-protocol-security-requirements-07: (with DISCUSS and COMMENT)
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> On Aug 19, 2016, at 4:57 AM, Juergen Schoenwaelder <j.schoenwaelder@jacobs-university.de> wrote:
> 
> I repeat my technical argument: While there may be deployments where
> non-secure transports may be reasonable to use, defining these
> situations statically as part of data model schemas does not follow
> established practices. The IETF has a long tradition of standardizing
> data models that can be used in a variety of operational contexts and
> I do not see reasons why we should move away from that basic approach.

What I proposed just adds a trigger so operators can make that decision and can automate it.  This isn't new for IETF protocols.  I'm proposing this since it seems it was a working group decision to allow for automation.  Is that not the case?

Kathleen 
> 
> /js
> 
>> On Thu, Aug 18, 2016 at 02:35:03PM -0400, Susan Hares wrote:
>> Alissa: 
>> 
>> Just a little input you may not know.  My background is 15 years (1995-2010)  developing a routing/switching platform (denoted as GateD) which was sold to over 200 companies.   We developed XML and a binary XML based product that configured this product.  It could do 100K configuration lines and reboot in less than a second on most hardware.  We also provide status messages in secure streams and non-secure streams.    I sold early version of this code to companies that Alia has worked for  - so she has personal viewed the code.   At the height of our work, our development team ran to 50 people which I directed (First as VP of Engineering, and then as CTO). It is due to this level of experience that Alia selected me for the co-chair.   Russ White has understood Cisco's process, and has also directed software development teams for routing. 
>> 
>> In order to freshen my direct experience with I2RS on open source work, I am working on a publically available work in Quagga based on the confD product suggested by Cisco. 
>> 
>> In contrast, Juergen is a university professor who has worked on proto-types.   He is not working on an implementation.   I hope he will. 
>> 
>> I hope you will consider this background in my response to your comments below. 
>> 
>> Sue 
>> 
>> 
>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: Alissa Cooper [mailto:alissa@cooperw.in] 
>> Sent: Thursday, August 18, 2016 12:54 PM
>> To: Joel Halpern
>> Cc: Susan Hares; Juergen Schoenwaelder; i2rs@ietf.org; i2rs-chairs@ietf.org; Kathleen Moriarty; IESG; jhaas@pfrc.org; draft-ietf-i2rs-protocol-security-requirements@ietf.org
>> Subject: Re: [i2rs] Kathleen Moriarty's Discuss on draft-ietf-i2rs-protocol-security-requirements-07: (with DISCUSS and COMMENT)
>> 
>> Jumping in here because this is relevant to my DISCUSS, hope nobody minds (but if you do, I can go back to the other thread).
>> 
>>>> On Aug 18, 2016, at 10:30 AM, Joel Halpern <joel.halpern@ericsson.com> wrote:
>>>> 
>>>> Let me try a different take approach to this particular question.
>>>> 
>>>> Let me start by putting aside the question of where things are marked, and come back to that afterwards.
>>>> 
>>>> There are a number of cases that I2RS has been asked to cover of high rate telemetry data.  This may be BGP update information, it may be frequent information about line card activity.  There are other cases, some of which have been documented.
>>>> 
>>>> While not completely insensitive, the operators have made clear that they see protecting this data as unnecessary.  While I would hope over time to move to a domain where all of it is protect, that is not trivial.  As the I2RS Architecture points out, it is expected that what we describe as a single I2RS >communication between a client and agent is actually associated with multiple channels of communication.
>>>> 
>>>> Now, if you want to say that the I2RS protocol requirements cannot allow for unprotected channels, I guess we have disconnect between the IESG and the WG.
>>>> 
>>>> If we say that we can allow for unprotected channels, we then get to the question of which data can be sent over such channels.  While architecturally I agree with Juergen that the model is a bad place to specify it, the obverse is also true.  Not having some limits on what can be sent unprotected >causes concern about insufficient protection.  If I recall correctly, earlier security reviews called us to task for being too broad in what we allowed.
>>>> 
>>>> So, if the IESG wants us to just allow it anywhere, because the model is an awkward place to define the limitation, I can live with that.  What I can't live with is being told both that the model is a bad place to define it and that there must be restrictions on what is sent unprotected, 
>>>> without any proposal on how we are to move forward.
>> 
>>> Thank you Joel, this explanation helps me a lot. I think there is a disconnect about how the restrictions are expressed. From reading the email traffic about this document, it strikes me that trying to express the restrictions programmatically doesn’t make much sense in this case. 
>>> I agree with Juergen that it will be challenging to make a judgment a priori in order to bake a restriction into a data model, because data that is considered sensitive enough to warrant a secure transport in one deployment may not be considered sensitive in another deployment. 
>>> So for any data elements where there is any question at all about whether they might be sensitive (i.e., any data elements that are not already routinely made public), 
>>> I would expect data model authors to end up indicating that they may be sent over either secure or insecure transport, which renders the indication not useful.
>>> Perhaps it would make more sense then to just enumerate in the text the cases that motivate the inclusion of protocol support for insecure transport:
>>> 
>>> 1. For conveyance of information that is already routinely made public.
>>> 2. For line card activity data where there is no likely upgrade path to support secure transports in the foreseeable future.
>>> 
>>> Then the normative requirements would be on clients and agents to use secure transports unless those clients and agents are deployed where either of the operational circumstances above necessitate otherwise.
>>> Alissa
>> 
>> Point 1: 
>> I disagree with Juergen on the difficulty in specifying the sections of the yang modules.  I have provided a suggested solution in: 
>> https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-hares-i2rs-protocol-strawman-03#section-4.5.2.    
>> 
>> Given the mount schema functionality, we can mount ephemeral state module which augment non-ephemeral state modules which are "in-secure only".  
>> 
>> Point 2: 
>> I am willing to put an enumeration of the use cases in the protocol requirement, but I would like to understand the purpose for the enumeration.   We are not doing a use case, but a requirements document.  This information appears to be a "use case" rather than a technical description.   What purpose are you looking for this enumeration to server.  Are you looking for the enumeration in SEC-REQ-08? 
>> 
>> Point 3: Could you review -08.txt on this topic, especially the text below.  Given your comments, I believe I should change the last line to a MUST. 
>> New/   The default mode of transport is
>>   secure so data models MUST clearly annotate what data nodes can be
>>   passed over an insecure connection.
>> /
>> 
>> Sue 
>> 
>> =================== 
>> As to the normative requirements (-08.txt) version: 
>> 
>> Section 3: 
>> 
>>   I2RS allows the use of an insecure transport for portions of data
>>   models that clearly indicate the use of an insecure transport.
>>   Operators deploying I2RS must determine if they want to populate and
>>   deploy the portions of the data model which use insecure transports.
>> 
>> In Section 3.2 in version -08.txt 
>> 
>>   SEC-REQ-08: The I2RS protocol MUST be able to transfer data over a
>>   secure transport and optionally MAY be able to transfer data over a
>>   non-secure transport.  A secure transport MUST provide data
>>   confidentiality, data integrity, and replay prevention.
>> 
>>   The default I2RS transport is a secure transport.
>> 
>>   A non-secure transport can be used for publishing telemetry data or
>>   other operational state that was specifically indicated to non-
>>   confidential in the data model in the Yang syntax.
>> 
>>   The configuration of ephemeral data in the I2RS Agent by the I2RS
>>   client SHOULD be done over a secure transport.  It is anticipated
>>   that the passing of most I2RS ephemeral state operational status
>>   SHOULD be done over a secure transport.  As
>>   [I-D.ietf-i2rs-ephemeral-state] notes,  a data model MUST indicate
>>   whether the transport exchanging the data between I2RS client and
>>   I2RS agent is secure or insecure.  
>> 
>>   The default mode of transport is
>>   secure so data models SHOULD clearly annotate what data nodes can be
>>   passed over an insecure connection.
>> 
>>> 
>>> Yours,
>>> Joel
>>> 
>>> -----Original Message-----
>>> From: Susan Hares [mailto:shares@ndzh.com]
>>> Sent: Thursday, August 18, 2016 9:17 AM
>>> To: 'Juergen Schoenwaelder' <j.schoenwaelder@jacobs-university.de>
>>> Cc: i2rs@ietf.org; i2rs-chairs@ietf.org; 'Kathleen Moriarty' 
>>> <Kathleen.Moriarty.ietf@gmail.com>om>; 'The IESG' <iesg@ietf.org>rg>; 
>>> jhaas@pfrc.org; 
>>> draft-ietf-i2rs-protocol-security-requirements@ietf.org
>>> Subject: RE: [i2rs] Kathleen Moriarty's Discuss on 
>>> draft-ietf-i2rs-protocol-security-requirements-07: (with DISCUSS and 
>>> COMMENT)
>>> 
>>> Juergen and Kathleen: 
>>> 
>>> Let me proceed with two examples: BGP route views data model and the event for the web-service data.  
>>> 
>>> The content of these data models are designated as exposed to public.  The routing system only populates the proposed BGP route views data model with the data destined for the BGP looking glass.  The policy on the routing system indicates what information gets transferred.  The data model is completely available to the public.  The Yang Doctors are going to review this by seeing the whole model is public and available via non-secure means.
>>> The security people are going to review this seeing that the whole model is public, and available via an unprotect means.  The fact the data model is all public should simplify the review. 
>>> 
>>> An event from the I2RS RIB that a web-service route is up is the second case.  The I2RS RIB has an event based on policy that indicates a web-service route is up.  The yang-1.1 doctors must review the content of the event text to see it does not break privacy or provide too much
>>> information   The event mechanisms will need to work over secure transport
>>> and insecure transport.  Most of the data will go over the secure transport event stream. However, a small amount of information may go over the insecure transport stream. 
>>> 
>>> First, let me know if my use cases are understandable.  Second, let me know if you disagree with this use cases. 
>>> 
>>> Fyi -  IESG approved the architecture with the insecure stream. 
>>> 
>>> Sue
>>> 
>>> -----Original Message-----
>>> From: Juergen Schoenwaelder 
>>> [mailto:j.schoenwaelder@jacobs-university.de]
>>> Sent: Thursday, August 18, 2016 9:06 AM
>>> To: Susan Hares
>>> Cc: i2rs@ietf.org; i2rs-chairs@ietf.org; 'Kathleen Moriarty'; 'The 
>>> IESG'; jhaas@pfrc.org; 
>>> draft-ietf-i2rs-protocol-security-requirements@ietf.org
>>> Subject: Re: [i2rs] Kathleen Moriarty's Discuss on
>>> draft-ietf-i2rs-protocol-security-requirements-07: (with DISCUSS and
>>> COMMENT)
>>> 
>>> I just do not know on which basis a data model writer can decide whether a data object can be exposed in an unprotected way. How are YANG doctors going to review this? How are security directorate people going to judge this? But as promised, I leave (still puzzled) now.
>>> 
>>> /js
>>> 
>>>> On Thu, Aug 18, 2016 at 09:00:14AM -0400, Susan Hares wrote:
>>>> Juergen: 
>>>> 
>>>> Yes, we seem to disagree on the value of making it hardwired in the model.
>>>> For me, the value is a common understanding of deployment 
>>>> distribution
>>> such
>>>> as the route-views.   Since the operators argued strongly for this point,
>>> I
>>>> think the best idea is to get it working in code and then see if the 
>>>> deployment matches the requests.
>>>> 
>>>> Sue
>>>> 
>>>> -----Original Message-----
>>>> From: i2rs [mailto:i2rs-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Juergen 
>>>> Schoenwaelder
>>>> Sent: Thursday, August 18, 2016 8:14 AM
>>>> To: Susan Hares
>>>> Cc: i2rs@ietf.org; i2rs-chairs@ietf.org; 'Kathleen Moriarty'; 'The 
>>>> IESG'; jhaas@pfrc.org; 
>>>> draft-ietf-i2rs-protocol-security-requirements@ietf.org
>>>> Subject: Re: [i2rs] Kathleen Moriarty's Discuss on
>>>> draft-ietf-i2rs-protocol-security-requirements-07: (with DISCUSS and
>>>> COMMENT)
>>>> 
>>>> Sue,
>>>> 
>>>> I still do not see why the 'mode of exposure' of data benefits from 
>>>> being hard-wired in the data model. For me, it is a situational and 
>>>> deployment specific question. But I shut up here since I aired this 
>>>> concern before (and we simply seem to disagree).
>>>> 
>>>> /js
>>>> 
>>>>> On Thu, Aug 18, 2016 at 08:07:18AM -0400, Susan Hares wrote:
>>>>> Juergen: 
>>>>> 
>>>>> My example is the looking glass servers for the BGP route views 
>>>>> project
>>>>> (http://www.routeviews.org/) or a route indicating the presence of a
>>>>> web-server that is public.   For the BGP I2RS route, a yang model could
>>>>> replace the looking glass function, and provide events for these looking
>>>>> glass functions.    For the web-server route,  an event be sent when
>>> that
>>>>> one route is added.  
>>>>> 
>>>>> Sue
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>> -----Original Message-----
>>>>> From: Juergen Schoenwaelder
>>>>> [mailto:j.schoenwaelder@jacobs-university.de]
>>>>> Sent: Thursday, August 18, 2016 3:32 AM
>>>>> To: Susan Hares
>>>>> Cc: 'Kathleen Moriarty'; 'The IESG'; jhaas@pfrc.org; i2rs@ietf.org; 
>>>>> i2rs-chairs@ietf.org; 
>>>>> draft-ietf-i2rs-protocol-security-requirements@ietf.org
>>>>> Subject: Re: [i2rs] Kathleen Moriarty's Discuss on
>>>>> draft-ietf-i2rs-protocol-security-requirements-07: (with DISCUSS and
>>>>> COMMENT)
>>>>> 
>>>>>> On Wed, Aug 17, 2016 at 09:16:48PM -0400, Susan Hares wrote:
>>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------
>>>>>> --
>>>>>> --
>>>>>> COMMENT:
>>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------
>>>>>> --
>>>>>> --
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> Section 3: 
>>>>>>> Can you clarify the second to last sentence?  Do you mean there 
>>>>>>> are
>>>>> sections that indicate an insecure transport should be used?
>>>>>>> I2RS allows the use of an
>>>>>>> insecure transport for portions of data models that clearly 
>>>>>>> indicate  insecure transport.
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> Perhaps:
>>>>>>> I2RS allows the use of an
>>>>>>> insecure transport for portions of data models that clearly 
>>>>>>> indicate the use of an  insecure transport.
>>>>> 
>>>>> I still wonder how a data model writer can reasonably decide whether 
>>>>> a piece of information can be shipped safely over an insecure 
>>>>> transport since this decision often depends on the specifics of a 
>>>>> deployment
>>>> situation.
>>>>> 
>>>>> /js
>>>>> 
>>>>> PS: I hope we do not end up with defining data multiple times (once
>>>>>   for insecure transport and once for secured transports).
>>>>> 
>>>>> -- 
>>>>> Juergen Schoenwaelder           Jacobs University Bremen gGmbH
>>>>> Phone: +49 421 200 3587         Campus Ring 1 | 28759 Bremen | Germany
>>>>> Fax:   +49 421 200 3103         <http://www.jacobs-university.de/>
>>>>> 
>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>> i2rs mailing list
>>>>> i2rs@ietf.org
>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/i2rs
>>>> 
>>>> -- 
>>>> Juergen Schoenwaelder           Jacobs University Bremen gGmbH
>>>> Phone: +49 421 200 3587         Campus Ring 1 | 28759 Bremen | Germany
>>>> Fax:   +49 421 200 3103         <http://www.jacobs-university.de/>
>>>> 
>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>> i2rs mailing list
>>>> i2rs@ietf.org
>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/i2rs
>>> 
>>> -- 
>>> Juergen Schoenwaelder           Jacobs University Bremen gGmbH
>>> Phone: +49 421 200 3587         Campus Ring 1 | 28759 Bremen | Germany
>>> Fax:   +49 421 200 3103         <http://www.jacobs-university.de/>
> 
> -- 
> Juergen Schoenwaelder           Jacobs University Bremen gGmbH
> Phone: +49 421 200 3587         Campus Ring 1 | 28759 Bremen | Germany
> Fax:   +49 421 200 3103         <http://www.jacobs-university.de/>