Re: [i2rs] Alissa Cooper's Discuss on draft-ietf-i2rs-protocol-security-requirements-06: (with DISCUSS and COMMENT) - resending comment

"Susan Hares" <> Thu, 18 August 2016 02:13 UTC

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From: "Susan Hares" <>
To: "'Alia Atlas'" <>, "'Alissa Cooper'" <>
Date: Wed, 17 Aug 2016 22:11:52 -0400
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Subject: Re: [i2rs] Alissa Cooper's Discuss on draft-ietf-i2rs-protocol-security-requirements-06: (with DISCUSS and COMMENT) - resending comment
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Alia and Alissa: 


Resending – this comment in case it got ost 



On the DISCUSS: 


Operators indicated that there are events which they will want to send publically.   One example of such an event is the route establishment/loss (such as the routes available to or looking glass sites).   This data is specific route information that is publically known.   


Right now this information requires a BGP connection, or data from a BGP connection.   In the future, it would simply require an I2RS client to have a connection to an I2RS agent.  



  I2RS Client=======I2RS Agent 


This data can also be distributed in tiers – where a massive amount of clients connect to an I2RS agent which draws its information in a proxy mode: 


                  Insecure    Proxy-model                           secure 

 I2RS client-1=========  I2RS Agent /I2RS client ----------------------- I2RS Agent

I2RS client-2===========|



Does this provide you enough information to resolve your discuss or do you have additional questions?





On the editorial 




From: Alia Atlas [] 
Sent: Wednesday, August 17, 2016 11:07 AM
To: Alissa Cooper
Cc: The IESG; Jeffrey Haas;;;
Subject: Re: Alissa Cooper's Discuss on draft-ietf-i2rs-protocol-security-requirements-06: (with DISCUSS and COMMENT)


Hi Alissa,


On Wed, Aug 17, 2016 at 10:54 AM, Alissa Cooper <> wrote:

Alissa Cooper has entered the following ballot position for
draft-ietf-i2rs-protocol-security-requirements-06: Discuss

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== Section 3.2 ==

"A non-secure transport can be can be used for publishing telemetry
   data or other operational state that was specifically indicated to
   non-confidential in the data model in the Yang syntax."

What kind of telemetry data is it that is of no potential interest to any
eavesdropper? This is not my area of expertise so I'm having a hard time
conceiving of what that could be. I'm also wondering, since I2RS agents
and clients will have to support secure transports anyway (and RESTCONF
can only be used over a secure transport), why can't they be used for all
transfers, instead of allowing this loophole in the name of telemetry,
which undoubtedly will end up being used or exploited for other data

If the argument was that this loophole is needed for backwards
compatibility with insecure deployments of NETCONF or something like that
I think it would make more sense, but my impression from the text is that
those will have to be updated anyway to conform to the requirements in
this document.


Data coming from a router can come from many different line-cards and processors.

The line-cards that may be providing the data are not going to be supporting the 

secure transports anyway.  A goal is to allow easy distribution of streaming data

and event notifications.  As for what type of data, as far as I know, currently IPFIX 

streams telemetry data without integrity much less authorization protection.


There are existing deployments that use gRPC now for streaming telemetry data.






In general I agree with Mirja that where other documents already provide
definitions, they should be referenced, not copied or summarized, in this

== Section 2.1 ==

Using "privacy" as a synonym for "confidentiality" is outmoded, I think,
given current understanding of the many other facets of privacy (see,
e.g., RFC 6793). I would suggest dropping the definition of data privacy
and just using the word confidentiality when that is what you mean.

== Section 2.2 ==

"The I2RS protocol exists as a higher-level protocol which may
      combine other protocols (NETCONF, RESTCONF, IPFIX and others)
      within a specific I2RS client-agent relationship with a specific
      trust for ephemeral configurations, event, tracing, actions, and
      data flow interactions."

Reading the provided definition of "trust," I'm not sure what "with a
specific trust for" means in the sentence above.

"The I2RS architecture document [I-D.ietf-i2rs-architecture]
      defines a secondary identity as the entity of some non-I2RS entity
      (e.g. application) which has requested a particular I2RS client
      perform an operation."

Per my comment above, I would suggest just referencing the definition
from the architecture document. The text above is circular ("the entity
of some ... entity") and conflates an identity with an identifier.

== Section 3.1 ==

Agree with Mirja that this section is superfluous.

== Section 3.3 ==

Since the normative recommendation here isn't to be enforced by the
protocol, why is it SHOULD rather than MUST? Same question applies to

== Section 3.5 ==

Is the omission of normative language from Sec-REQ-20 purposeful?