Re: [Ianaplan] CWG draft and its impact on the IETF

[JFC Morfin <[e-mail]>]

Dear John,

may be will you remember Paul Towmey at ICANN Luxembourg, annoucing in
front of Vint Cerf the creation of a DNSSEC dedicated affiliate of
ICANN. I would not be surprised if PTI was to be an ICANN replacement
in an NTIA replacement by ICANN scenario. This would make a lot of
sense in a decentralised intergovernance with ICANN at the core,
oversighting the "Internet". With equivalent relational links/beams
with PTI, NRO, IETF, W3C and further-on Versign, Rosettanet, etc.

ICANN's best interest is that the largest numbers of bilateral
relations are signed among the members (including SOs, GAC, etc.) of
its RFC 6852 global community (its periphery). The tasks defined in
these agreement will progressively stabilize as "edge functors" rather
than entities. So, if one entity is denied, it can be replaced by a
newcomer with the same/equivalent duties and procedures, without
affecting the stability of the whole organization network.

IMHO they follow a Tapscott, St-Amour & Caswell NTIA ordered GSN plan
(cf. http://gsnetworks.org/blog/governing-the-internet-a-new-era-begins/).
An NSA-compatible (for protection) networked enhanced cooperation
system for the Internet, with a multistakeholderist governance (that
will best disseminate the I*Core positions). In such schemes the
networked governance is perceived as the source of stability and
dynamism. The more connected people, the more bainstorming, the more
consensuses.

This seems a resillient approach. Is it able to nurture and welcome
innovation, I do not know (I never saw spontaneous generation).
However it seems realistic enough. Except the BUG - being unilaterally
global: the ICANN scheme has not foreseen hooks for complementary,
alternative, compettive approaches, technologis, and/or catenet uses.
This is what is to be tested.

jfc


At 21:08 12/05/2015, John C Klensin wrote:
>I've having trouble understanding it as either a compromise or a
>step in some right direction.    Unless a substantial endowment
>were somehow irrevocably assigned to it, it would still be
>dependent on ICANN for budget and it could not be spun off
>without permission from the ICANN Board and, as long as ICANN
>saw advantages to itself from being responsible for central
>coordination and administration of the Internet's names,
>numbers, and protocol spaces the Board would presumably not
>agree (and arguably could not agree).
>
>Even the idea that PTI would clarify the financial relationships
>is dubious if ICANN could set the indirect cost rate... at least
>unless that the basis for that rate, including very specific
>numbers, were made fully public and/or subject to auditors who
>were not chosen by or accountable to ICANN.  It is not obvious
>to make how such conditions could be met or how one could
>enforce their continuation in a post-transition ICANN.
>
>So, while I might be missing something, most of what I see in
>the PTI arrangement is increased organizational complexity
>(which almost always increases total costs) and the potential
>for reduced practical accountability (since two groups of people
>and entities would be responsible, not just one)).
>
>As John Curran indirectly points out, how severe the actual risk
>is depends on details that have still not been sorted out.  But
>I believe that the issues above are fundamental.  For example,
>as long as ICANN holds the purse strings, it would be
>irresponsible of them to irrevocably let go of some or all
>measures of control and that any "instability" arguments that
>can be made today could be made at any point in the future to
>support avoiding such irresponsibility.
>
>So, am I missing something and, if so, what?
>
>      john
>
>
>
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