Re: [Ianaplan] Consensus call -- text reply for ICG proposal review

[Seun Ojedeji <[e-mail]>]

On Sun, Aug 23, 2015 at 4:45 PM, John C Klensin <[e-mail]> wrote:

>
>
> --On Friday, August 21, 2015 18:16 +0200 Richard Hill
> <[e-mail]> wrote:
>
> > The problem is that by supporting the entire proposal you are
> > also taking a position on the names and addressing proposals.
> > And it seems to me that that goes beyond the mandate of this
> > group.
>
> Richard,
>
> I've been traveling for the last week or two and haven't read
> the various discussions during that period carefully.  But I
> think I disagree with your statement above.    Breaking this
> down, it seems to me that it must be acceptable for the IETF to
> say:
>
> (i) We have read the complete proposal and conclude that it
> addresses our specific issues and concerns, stated earlier, in
> an acceptable way.
>
> (ii) While we see a variety of ways in which assorted other
> issues could be worked out and specified, that list and the
> choices about them in the current proposal appear to us to not
> pose a risk to the things we've identified as important.
> Consequently, as the good members of a broader community that we
> aspire to be, we are supportive of those things simply because
> the other communities want them and they don't seem to pose a
> problem or challenge for us.
>

I will add my +1 to a statement similar to above. Although i was also
informed offlist(unofficially) that IAB may be addressing the proposal in a
brother sense than the IETF so maybe thats where the detailed response will
come from.

Cheers!



>
> Now, that is, I believe, more or less what Eliot is suggesting.
> It doesn't mean we would be willing to spill blood (especially
> IETF blood) to make sure that the proposals from the names and
> addresses groups are adopted, but we can still support them as
> consistent and non-harmful.
>
> I don't see why you consider such a pair of statements, in that
> form or another one, a problem.
>
> Now, whether the IETF actually believes in those statements is
> another matter.  I've concluded personally that I do not, but I
> think it is quite likely that I'm "in the rough" on these
> issues.  In particular:
>
> (1) ICANN and its many non-IANA roles (some of which I agree
> with, others I don't) have become extremely large and complex.
> Consequently, I think it is important to distinguish provisions
> in this proposal (and elsewhere) that are directly related to
> IANA, the US Government role under the current arrangements, and
> the transition of that role (either eliminating it or replacing
> it with some other arrangement) from provisions whose purpose is
> to improve those other ICANN functions.  Those other provisions
> might change how those ICANN functions are carried out,
> controlled, or managed,  or protect against abuse of or due to
> those functions.  I personally wish that the proposal would be
> rejected by the ICG and the various communities until the
> extraneous "let's fix ICANN" elements --including all
> reflections of desires to make ICANN the focus of questions
> about how to "govern" the Internet or to use ICANN or the
> Internet more generally to test assorted interesting
> sociopolitical or organizational theories -- were removed.
>
> (2) I think the broader Internet community, or at least the
> IETF, should be working to insure that IANA operations are
> adequately responsible to the relevant customer groups _and_
> that the IANA function is accountable to the Internet community.
> I've expressed this concern earlier but gotten no improvements
> as a result, however, I see the PTI model as potentially (but
> only potentially) improving accountability for a small number of
> communities, some of them with significant vested economic or
> equivalent interests, at the price of reducing accountability to
> the Internet at large and maybe even the other customer groups.
> I don't see that as an improvement, regardless of its other real
> or imaginary organizational benefits (see comment about
> theory-testing above).
>
> (3) Whatever one might say about the NTIA role (and that of the
> US Government more generally), how it has been applied, and,
> perhaps most important in practice, the horrible optics
> associated with it, the fact remains that it has provided an
> important independent mechanism for both moderating possible bad
> behavior on ICANN's part and for appeals that lie completely
> outside ICANN's ability to design and define the procedures and
> to appoint those who will consider the specifics of particular
> cases.  Sometimes just having such external mechanisms is
> important.  They inhibit bad behavior because of the possibility
> of intervention if things get bad enough.  Equally or more
> important, if one were worried about capture by a collection of
> stakeholders who are not fully representative of the Internet
> community, the odds that NTIA could be captured by that same
> collection of stakeholders are vanishingly small.
>
> A key part of the issue here is that "multistakeholder" has,
> many times in this context, come to mean "anyone with an
> opinion, regardless of knowledge or actual material concern and
> involvement with the substantive issues".  That is very much
> different from IETF values and traditions: we tend (and try) to
> value knowledge, experience, and actual involvement with the
> subject matter over what we evaluate as wild theorizing.  That
> particular version of "multistakeholder", especially in its
> ICANN incarnation, tends to give great power to factions with
> the interest and resources to make seemingly-unlimited
> investments in the process.  That doesn't require malfeasance,
> only the ability to create many committees, meetings, and long
> and complex documents until no one other than those particular
> interested and invested parties (and those subsidized by ICANN)
> can afford to participate in practice.
>
> To transition away from having the US Government in the
> oversight and appeal (whether from the broad community or from
> governments via diplomatic channels) role described above
> requires that one either have a separate oversight and appeal
> mechanism that is similar to the NTIA one in not being under
> control of ICANN or any constituency that might capture or
> dominate ICANN decision making... or one must have complete
> trust that ICANN cannot be captured, has conflict of interest
> policies that protect against decisions being dominated by a
> single self-interested party or cluster of them, and that it
> will always (now and in the future) act in the best interests of
> the Internet, even when those interests conflict with the
> organizational best interests of ICANN as an organization.
> Absent that level of trust, "independent" review mechanisms
> created by ICANN don't do the job because ICANN can control the
> criteria for appointments, the working procedures, and,
> ultimately, the membership of those bodies whether the criteria
> are satisfied or not.   Sadly, I don't have that level of trust,
> if only because ICANN has, even in the last few years,
> repeatedly provided examples that contradict it.
>
> It seems clear to me that most of that latter group of concerns
> are out of scope for IANAPlan, although not necessarily so for
> the IETF and IAB.   I hope that various of us who do have them
> will comment more generally on the process and situation and, if
> necessary, on any public call for comment that NTIA and other
> institutions may produce in the future.
>
> best,
>     john
>
>
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>



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*Seun Ojedeji,Federal University Oye-Ekitiweb:      http://www.fuoye.edu.ng
<http://www.fuoye.edu.ng> Mobile: [phone]**alt email:
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The key to understanding is humility - my view !