Re: [Iasa20] Barry Leiba's Discuss on draft-ietf-iasa2-rfc4071bis-08: (with DISCUSS and COMMENT)

[John C Klensin <[e-mail]>]

--On Tuesday, April 9, 2019 13:39 +0200 Mirja Kuehlewind
<[e-mail]> wrote:

>>> As Joe noted, they do not have to be members of the IESG at
>>> all.  If they were appointed while on the IESG and then
>>> rotated off by NomCom action, they could still serve the
>>> remaining year.  Presumably, the IESG would have to take
>>> that into account when deciding who to select, but it is
>>> pretty clearly permitted by the document now.
>> 
>> Agreed. And as somebody else pointed out, the incumbent can
>> always resign if they happen to leave the IESG mid-term; or
>> not, if they are happy to continue for another year,
>> including of course communicating with the IESG as needed. If
>> they were a worthy Board member in the first place, where's
>> the problem?
> 
> That actually brings me to another question of my comment.
> Yes, the appointee can reign but as far as I understand there
> is no way for the IESG to remove someone. Was that considered.
> Is that intended. I mean if the chair takes the director
> position, it would be very unlikely or uncommon to for the
> IESG to move that person. However, if someone else is hold
> this position, I can imagine situations that could occur.

Very interesting for another reason.  If someone, either the
Chair or another appointee were removed from the IESG --either
by term running out at different times or by recall -- would
they continue to occupy the LLC position?  And could an
appointee who was not an IESG member be recalled by the
community?  Presumably we don't really want someone on the LLC
Board who cannot be removed, regardless of circumstances, unless
they voluntarily resign.

Having that person serve at the pleasure of the IESG seems too
fragile for exactly the reasons Ted suggested earlier.  The most
obvious answer would make that position subject to recall even
if the person in it is not a current IESG member who could be
recalled from the IESG position (assuming that removal would
carry over).   On the other hand, if that were the right
solution, it would further strengthen the argument in
draft-moonesamy-recall-rev for allowing IESG members to initiate
recalls.

I would suppose the scenarios that could require such measures
are so unlikely that we shouldn't spend time on them except that
one of them closely parallels a problem we've had with an IAOC
member that nearly forced up into using recall provisions.

best,
   john