[Id-event] Poll document - shepherd review comments

Yaron Sheffer <yaronf.ietf@gmail.com> Thu, 07 November 2019 10:06 UTC

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Date: Thu, 07 Nov 2019 12:06:33 +0200
From: Yaron Sheffer <yaronf.ietf@gmail.com>
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Thread-Topic: Poll document - shepherd review comments
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Subject: [Id-event] Poll document - shepherd review comments
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Hi,

I’m jumping the gun a little bit, but since the authors seem to have implemented the WGLC comments, we should move forward to publish the document.

Please address my comments below and republish the document, hopefully on the week of IETF or shortly thereafter. Then we will send it to Ben.

Thanks,
	Yaron

(Note: I used the latest version of the document, from GitHub.)

• 1. Introduction: Please add, "This is an alternative SET delivery method to the one defined in [push]".
• "How SETs are defined and the process by which events are identified for SET Recipients" - are both defined in RFC 8417.
• The sentence "Transmitted SETs SHOULD be self-validating..." Is very awkward, please reword as two or more sentences.
• 2.2: the description for setErrs is unclear. Specifically, please mention that the jti values are JSON object keys for the inner objects. (And a JSON schema definition would have been nice).
• 2.4: "the ack and errs request parameters" - there is no "errs" parameter, and the "setErrs" parameter as defined requires one or more members (and the definition doesn't mention that it is optional).
• "If after a period of time, negotiated between the SET Transmitter and Recipient, a SET Transmitter MAY redeliver SETs it has previously delivered." - The "if" is redundant, also, the period is not "negotiated", it is preconfigured.
• The "err" flag is mentioned several times, where it should be "setErrs".
• 2.4.1: "without acknowledgement parameters (sets and setErrs)" - "sets" is a response member.
• "and notifies the SET Transmitter" - you might want to add "of successful receipt and of errors".
• "This specification considers authentication as a feature to prevent denial-of-service attacks." It sounds like this is the *only* justification for authentication, which is clearly not the case.
• Sec. 3.1 is completely out of context. There is also a dangling "including:" in the middle of the section. And a dangling reference at the end.