Re: [Ideas] WG Review: IDentity Enabled Networks (ideas)

Dino Farinacci <farinacci@gmail.com> Wed, 04 October 2017 20:35 UTC

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From: Dino Farinacci <farinacci@gmail.com>
In-Reply-To: <dd2c3bd5-dd37-109b-2e81-0327db4daa09@cs.tcd.ie>
Date: Wed, 4 Oct 2017 13:35:32 -0700
Cc: Alexander Clemm <alexander.clemm@huawei.com>, Tom Herbert <tom@herbertland.com>, "ideas@ietf.org" <ideas@ietf.org>, "phill@hallambaker.com" <phill@hallambaker.com>, "ietf@ietf.org" <ietf@ietf.org>, "lisp@ietf.org list" <lisp@ietf.org>
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References: <150670160872.14128.2758037992338326085.idtracker@ietfa.amsl.com> <778d5504-ba4f-d418-7b20-356353bb0fb2@cs.tcd.ie> <CAMm+Lwg61PGrcmu=-e8ciD6Q+XmEaWWDys4g2M657VOjWmaGcg@mail.gmail.com> <CALx6S370-TuoUicWep5vV2NjLPS4d-HP1qVxW_nGrxhBLw6Eug@mail.gmail.com> <8kd5pq.oxb4pv.rtlo8t-qmf@mercury.scss.tcd.ie> <644DA50AFA8C314EA9BDDAC83BD38A2E0EAA7204@sjceml521-mbx.china.huawei.com> <dd2c3bd5-dd37-109b-2e81-0327db4daa09@cs.tcd.ie>
To: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
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Subject: Re: [Ideas] WG Review: IDentity Enabled Networks (ideas)
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Adding lisp@ietf.org to cc list.

How about creating a working group that solely focuses on deployment of a mapping system and does not specify how and where identifiers are allocated?

I have made suggestions before that such a working group should be in the ops area. Some examples include and are not limited to v6ops, dnsop, and mboned.

Cheers,
Dino

> On Oct 4, 2017, at 12:45 PM, Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie> wrote:
> 
> 
> Hiya,
> 
> TL;DR - I am now even more convinced that this ought not
> go ahead. (Sorry;-)
> 
> On 04/10/17 19:48, Alexander Clemm wrote:
>> There were a couple of things raised in the overall thread that I
>> just wanted to quickly respond to:
>> 
>> Clearly privacy is an important issue and concern.  The current
>> charter proposal includes a requirement for a detailed analysis of
>> this aspect.  If this aspect needs to be expanded, sure, let's do
>> this.
> 
> TBH, I don't think that'd help, for me at least. I don't
> see any way in which such permanent strings representing
> identity can be defined to be usable as claimed and not
> be perniciously privacy invasive. So some promises to
> ponder the problem in charter text wouldn't do it for
> me. (And tbh, I've seen that can kicked down that road
> before, so I'm skeptical of such promises in general.)
> 
>> Everyone seems to be jumping up and down regarding the use of the
>> term of "identity" as if a foregone conclusion that this is a synonym
>> for "privacy invasion".   However: - "Identity" does not imply
>> "personal identity".  Really, this is an identifier scheme for
>> endpoints.   
> 
> Sorry, what I assume is the relevant draft [1] says the "identity"
> (denoted "IDy") is a "Unique and Permanent Identity" and that
> "Networks may treat traffic differently depending on the IDy of
> source or destination" and also seems to envisage a large logical
> database of everyone's IDy's: "Identity also allows to have metadata
> associated it to be applied, regardless of which IDf is used to
> refer it." (Where IDf is the identifier that'll later be mapped
> to a locator via, I assume, HIP or LISP or similar.)
> 
> I think it's entirely correct to jump up and down about the
> privacy consequences of the above. (Not to mention the potential
> censorship and discriminatory aspects.)
> 
>     [1] https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ccm-ideas-identity-use-cases-01
> 
>> Perhaps even "identity" is a misnomer.  
> 
> Well, it was presumably your choice (where your == some set of
> the proponents). If that's a mistake, then it seems a fairly
> fatal one - to get the name wrong for an effort all about mapping
> names to identifiers;-)
> 
>> If you will,
>> identity as conceived in the context of IDEAS is a second level of
>> identifier that does not have to be exposed over the data plane -
>> Because of this, it may result in greater privacy than existing
>> schemes, not less. 
> 
> I see that argument in [1] but I'm not buying it tbh. To get
> that level of protection from such an indirection, one would
> have to have something like Tor hidden services and perhaps
> one would have to *not* standardise the mapping from human
> meaningful identifiers to those used as IDf, and esp. not the
> reverse mapping. Defining that reverse mapping cannot but be
> privacy invasive afaics. (There could maybe be ways to define
> how an already hashed human meaningful identifier could then
> be further hashed to become an IDy but I don't really see the
> point of that at all, other than to just standardise something
> for the fun of the process.)
> 
>> It enables you, for example, to obfuscate
>> endpoints to outside observers as you wouldn't need to use personal
>> unique long-lived identifiers, quite the contrary. - There is also a
>> security dimension here. If I am victim of a phishing attack because
>> my network information (like today) is exposed to botnets, 
> 
> (Nit: that says nothing about being a victim of, only of being
> a target of, an attempted attack. Speaking of victims also
> tends not to lead to more objective analysis, so I think it's
> better to not go there unless it's relevant, which I don't
> think is the case here, because...)
> 
> I don't understand what network information you mean. If you
> mean email addresses, and are proposing that the email ecosystem
> change to use some IDf or LOC values, that doesn't seem at all
> realistic to me. If you don't mean email addresses then I don't
> see how any lower layer change will affect attempted phishes.
> The routing area is probably also the entirely wrong venue for
> any real anti-phishing effort.
> 
> That really wasn't a good example;-)
> 
>> phishers
>> etc who can hide from me (but not I from them) and remain anonymous
>> or impersonate legitimate users, I do consider this a very serious
>> threat also to my privacy.  How can IETF counteract such threats?  I
>> think that IDEAS, if done right, can provide a contribution here.
> 
> I don't see that at all. Unless I'm mistaken that seems like
> wishful thinking to me.
> 
>> 
>> One aspect that has been missing from the discussion is the question
>> whether there is a distinction between the network provider who
>> provides GRIDS services and an outside attacker / observer.  I think
>> this distinction is important.  The way I see it, if done right
>> (sure, big "if", and requiring detailed analysis), IDEAS as I would
>> envision it can contribute greatly to provide greater security and
>> privacy from outside attackers.  At the same time, as it is currently
>> envisioned, there clearly is a trust relationship between an entity
>> and the provider of "its" GRIDS services.  The mapping database will
>> have information about locator-identifier and identifier-identifier
>> mappings, so GRIDS will know which identifiers its endpoints are
>> using.  Clearly, if this trust is abused because the provider cannot
>> be trusted, if you are concerned that it sells your endpoint’s
>> information to the mob or a suppressive government, there is an
>> issue.  However, when concerned about this scenario, it seems to me
>> one would have equal reason to e.g. not trust your mobile service
>> provider either, who can track you, knows your location, and has your
>> customer data.
> 
> ISTM that introducing that GRIDS thing makes matters worse and not
> better, because, as you yourself say, it is clear that whoever has
> access to the GRIDS information would be better able to track people
> compared to now.
> 
> I would prefer to see fewer long lived identifiers in networking
> and not more, and this proposal introduces more long lived identifiers
> (erroneously calling those identities).
> 
> Regardless of what one thinks of them, given that things like
> HIP and LISP exist, and try tackle the ID/LOC split, I see no benefit
> adding this extra layer of indirection with a privacy invasive
> "Unique and Permanent" identifier which seems to be the only
> non-overlapping part of this work - in fact I only see downsides.
> 
> Cheers,
> S.
> 
> 
>> 
>> --- Alex
>> 
>> 
>>> -----Original Message----- From: Ideas
>>> [mailto:ideas-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of 
>>> stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie Sent: Wednesday, October 04, 2017 9:35
>>> AM To: tom@herbertland.com Cc: ideas@ietf.org;
>>> phill@hallambaker.com; ietf@ietf.org Subject: Re: [Ideas] WG
>>> Review: IDentity Enabled Networks (ideas)
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On Wednesday, 4 October 2017, Tom Herbert wrote:
>>>> On Wed, Oct 4, 2017 at 7:57 AM, Phillip Hallam-Baker 
>>>> <phill@hallambaker.com> wrote:
>>>>> On Fri, Sep 29, 2017 at 2:31 PM, Stephen Farrell 
>>>>> <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie> wrote:
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> As currently described, I oppose creation of this working
>>>>>> group on the basis that it enables and seemingly encourages
>>>>>> embedding identifiers for humans as addresses. Doing so would
>>>>>> have significant privacy downsides, would enable new methods
>>>>>> for censorship and discrimination, and could be very hard to
>>>>>> mitigate should one wish to help protect people's privacy, as
>>>>>> I think is current IETF policy.
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> If the work precluded the use of any identifiers that
>>>>>> strongly map to humans then I'd be ok with it being done as
>>>>>> it'd then only be a waste of resources. But I don't know how
>>>>>> that could be enforced so I think it'd be better to just not
>>>>>> do this work at all.
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> S.
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>> +1
>>>>> 
>>>>> I know how to restrict the work to 'meaningless' identifiers, 
>>>>> require that the identifiers be the output of a cryptographic
>>>>> algorithm.
>>>>> 
>>>>> Now strictly speaking, this only limits scope to identifiers
>>>>> that are indexical as opposed to rendering them meaningless but
>>>>> I think that was the sense of it.
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>> Nöth proposed a trichotemy of identifiers as follows
>>>>> 
>>>>> * Identity, the signifier is the signified (e.g. data: URI)
>>>>> 
>>>>> * Indexical, the signifier is related to the signified by a 
>>>>> systematic relationship, (e.g. ni URIs, SHA256Data), PGP 
>>>>> fingerprints etc.)
>>>>> 
>>>>> * Names,  the signifier is the related to the signified by a
>>>>> purely conventional relationship, (e.g. example.com to its
>>>>> owner)
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>> There is a big difference between attempting to manage
>>>>> indexical signifiers and names. Especially when the people
>>>>> trying to do so refuse to read any of the literature on
>>>>> semiotics.
>>>>> 
>>>>> Names are problematic because the only way that a conventional 
>>>>> relationship can be implemented is through some sort of
>>>>> registration infrastructure and we already have one of those
>>>>> and the industry that manages it has a marketcap in the tens of
>>>>> billions.
>>>>> 
>>>>> Identifiers do lead to tractable solutions. But, this proposal
>>>>> looks a bit unfocused for IRTF consideration, an IETF WG?
>>>>> Really?
>>>>> 
>>>> Identifiers are equivalent to addresses in that they indicate a
>>>> node in the network for the purposes of end to end
>>>> communications. The only difference between identifiers and
>>>> addresses is that identifiers are not topological. Virtual
>>>> addresses in network virtualization are also identifiers. So the
>>>> security properties are the same when considering privacy. For
>>>> instance, if applications use temporary addresses for privacy, it
>>>> would have equivalent properties using temporary identifiers. In
>>>> fact from the application POV this would be transparent. It could
>>>> get a pool of apparently random addresses to choose from as
>>>> source of communication, it shouldn't know or even care if the
>>>> addresses are identifiers.
>>>> 
>>>> Identity is a completely separate concept from identifiers. Is
>>>> not required in any of the identifier/locator protocols and AFAIK
>>>> none of them even mention the term. There is no association of an
>>>> identity of user behind and identifier any more than there is an
>>>> association of identity behind IP address. The fact that the
>>>> words "identifier" and "identity" share a common prefix is an
>>>> unfortunate happenstance :-).
>>> 
>>> 
>>> Yes. But doesn't that mean either the name of this effort is wildly
>>> misleading or else the effort is hugely problematic from a privacy
>>> POV? Either way, istm this ought not proceed.
>>> 
>>> S.
>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> Tom
>>>> 
>>> _______________________________________________ Ideas mailing list 
>>> Ideas@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ideas
> 
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