IDPR as a Proposed Standard
yakov@watson.ibm.com Mon, 06 April 1992 14:56 UTC
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Date: Mon, 6 Apr 92 10:23:04 EDT
From: yakov@watson.ibm.com
To: idpr-wg@bbn.com
Subject: IDPR as a Proposed Standard
Message-ID: <9204061058.aa14558@NRI.Reston.VA.US>
Martha, Thanks for your answers. Most of these answers prompted more questions. So, my original questions are preceded with ">>" mark, your answers are preceded with ">" mark, and my new questions have no preceding marks. >> Do you think that design of a new inter-domain routing protocol can, >> by itself, justify creation of a new network layer protocol ? > >IDPR was designed to support policy-based routing. It is not a single >"inter-domain routing protocol" but rather a suite of protocols which >together provide policy routes and message forwarding along those >routes. > >I believe that traffic sources that wish to use policy-based routing >will also wish to ensure (in the absence of malicious intervention) >that their traffic travels over the policy routes they select. >Hop-by-hop message forwarding does not provide this assurance; >source-specified message forwarding is the only way to gain the >forwarding control required for true policy-based routing. So the >answer to your question is yes, I do think that to provide >policy-based routing, we need a network layer protocol that provides >efficient source-specified forwarding. > >However, the wording "a new network-layer protocol" may be a bit >of a jolt for most people, and so I have removed it. > Can you provide any technical details that would elaborate on why "hop-by-hop message forwarding does not provide this assurance" ? Likewise, would you please elaborate more on why source-specified forwarding is "the only way to gain the forwarding control required to true policy-based routing". By the way, what is the "true policy-based routing" ? >> If the answer is yes, then we either: > >> (a) have to assume that IDPR will be THE inter-domain routing protocol, or >> (b) assume that each inter-domain routing protocol may come up with its >> own network layer that needs not be compatible with network layers >> introduced by other inter-domain routing protocols. > >> Which of these choices do you think are likely to happen in practice ? > >I do not believe that IDPR will be the only inter-domain routing >scheme. I have now added to the document a section that briefly >describes how IDPR can coexist with other inter-domain routing >procedures. > >While it is possible that each new inter-domain routing scheme may >choose its own new network layer forwarding mechanism, I don't believe >that will be the case. One can break down message forwarding into two >generic classes: hop-by-hop and source-specified. An efficient >hop-by-hop mechanism exists, namely IP. However, there was no such >mechanism available for efficient source-specified forwarding (IP >source routing is not efficient for forwarding large numbers of data >messages). Hence, we had to develop such a mechanism for use with >IDPR. Do you have any specific details that would substantiate your claim that there is "no efficient source-specified forwarding" ? You also claim that "IP source routing is not efficient for forwarding large numbers of data messages". First of all, I wonder whether you have any data in support of such claim. Second of all, does your statement implies that IP source routing is efficient for forwarding SMALL numbers of data messages and "is not efficient" ONLY when the number of messages to be forwarded is large ? If the answer is yes, then how could you justify a need for a special network layer protocol when the number of messages is not large ? > >> Section 1. > >> There is a notion of transit and stub domains. How do you define a "backbone" >> domain. Even today we have well above 10 transit domains (likely on the >> order of at least 30). Do you expect that by 1997 (1992 + 5 years) the >> global world-wide internet will have AT MOST 99 transit domains ? (99 is as >> far as I can stretch O(10)). > >Backbone domain is not synonymous with transit domain. All backbone >domains are transit domains, but not all transit domains are backbone >domains. While I did not provide a crisp definition of backbone, I >did say that backbone domains are those that provide transit service >for large numbers of source and destination domains. I assumed, >perhaps incorrectly, that the readers were familiar with the current >backbone, regional, and campus hierarchy of the current Internet. For >example, I would classify NSFNet as a backbone domain, NEARNet as a >regional domain, and BBN as a campus domain. Yes, I do expect O(10) >backbone domains over the next five years, but I expect perhaps >O(1000) transit domains. Defining a backbone as a transit domain "that provide transit services for large numbers of source and destination domains" is an EXTREMELY vague definition. It hinges on the notion of "large" which may mean quite different things for different people. Therefore, your answer did not clarify the issue at all. In any case it is not clear what will happen with IDPR if the number of the backbones within the global Internet will become O(10) + 1 ? If nothing breaks, then O(10) is irrelevant; if something breaks, then the "something" needs to be spelled out explicitly. > >> Does that mean to imply that the major driving force behind IDPR is >> to accommodate these new applications that have strict requirements >> on delivery, delay, and bandwidth ? > >No, there are two motivations for IDPR. This first is to ensure that >transit domains have control over which traffic flows use their >resources. The second is ensure that sources have access to routes >that provide the services that their applications require. Let's separate these two motivations. Do you imply that IDPR is THE ONLY way to provide such control over the transit traffic ? That is, that if a transit domain wants to have control over which traffic flows use it, it has to use IDPR ? The second objective, providing the services that their applications require, assumes AT LEAST that the applications are capable of expressing their service requirements. Does that mean that the major customers of IDPR are such applications ? Does ability to express service requirements by an application imply host modifications ? > >> What do you expect be the percentage of traffic/users who will need to >> support these new applications ? > >I cannot predict the number of users that will need to run these >applications at any given time in the future. As more services are >offered, more users will be able to run applications that require >these services. In turn, this may stimulate more requirements for >such applications. What I've been trying to get at is what is the expected clientele of IDPR in terms of percentage of the total user population. Seems, like you have no answer to this. What is the impact (positive or negative) of IDPR on applications that do not require these services; on service providers that aren't capable of providing these services ? > >> Do you assume that IDPR, on its own, will be able to accommodate these >> "strict requirements" ? > >No, I don't. To guarantee services, we need to be able to reserve >resources and to control traffic flow rates. These functions are >not part of IDPR. That needs to be articulated as clearly as possible. Or, otherwise, reading your document people may get an impression that IDPR, by itself, is sufficient. Thus, deploying IDPR, by itself, is not going to make a dent. Rather, IDPR needs to be part of a more global scheme that enables resources reservations, control traffic flow rates, etc... All this needs to be clearly spelled out. To put this in a proper perspective it is necessary to say where the Internet stands with respect to such things as enabling resources reservations, control traffic flow rates, etc... >> In the next paragraph you said "We believe that IDPR meets this >> goal... " (with respect to ensuring that traffic receives its required >> service). I think it needs to be explained in TECHNICAL details how >> IDPR, on its own, will accomplish that, rather than just "We >> believe...". > >> If, on the other hand, you do not assume that IDPR, on its own, can >> accomplish this, then you need clearly articulate what are the >> dependencies, and how much support is needed (versus available today) >> from other components. Moreover, if not all the dependencies provide >> the required support, you need to discuss whether the required support >> is feasible, and if feasible, what needs to be done to put it in place. > >My phrase "the routing procedures must be capable of simultaneously >ensuring that traffic receives its required service" is misleading and >incorrect. Thanks for pointing this out! The phrase should say "the >routing procedures must be capable of simultaneously ensuring that >traffic is forwarded along routes that offer the required service". >IDPR can provide routes that meet traffic service requirements, but it >alone cannot ensure that traffic forwarded along the route will >receive the required service. See my previous comment. I think that to avoid misunderstanding the document should be very explicit about dependencies on other components. In addition, your answer is only partial. Specifically, you did not say anything about accommodating O(10^4) domains, and the impact associated with such accommodation. > >> There are two issues: required services and usage restrictions. > >> Usage restrictions are unlikely to be applicable to commercial >> service providers. Indeed, just look at who in the current Internet >> has AUPs (which are nothing more than the usage restrictions documents) >> and who doesn't. Thus, the only potential candidates for >> usage restriction are government subsidized networks. Thus, >> the issue of usage restriction is likely to be relevant only >> to a subset of domains. This is especially true given "privatization" >> and "commercialization" of the Internet. > >While I agree that government-subsidized networks (for example, >NSFNet) are candidates for usage restriction, I don't agree that they >are the only candidates. Examples of other types of networks that I >expect will impose usage restrictions are as follows. Those service >providers who charge for service (the commercial service providers) >will exercise usage restrictions in the form of restricting use to >paying customers only. Also, I can imagine a consortium of >universities or companies working together on a set of projects and >purchasing special communications links between the consortium >members for use by the consortium members only. > Some of the AUPs imposed by government-subsidized networks are easy to implement within the current routing technology, even with EGP-2. For example, AUP of NSI requires that it should not be used as a transit for non-NSI sites. This AUP is supported today with today's technology. A scheme for restricting usage to paying customer depends very heavily on the charging scheme. So, the usage restrictions will be tightly coupled with the charging scheme. Restricting usage to paying customers supported TODAY with TODAY's technology. A typical example of this is PSI. What would be the value added features of doing this with IDPR ? Does IDPR assume a particular charging scheme/model ? >> Likewise, definition of required services is likely to be rather loose >> for a wide variety of applications. For example, what is the meaning >> of "ensuring required service" for e-mail, FTP, Telnet, NFS ? > >For these applications, the only service requirement that I see is >that the information gets delivered intact. I don't believe there are >stringent delay or bandwidth requirements defined for such >applications, although such requirements could be defined. Would any of these applications be able to obtain noticeable benefits as a result of deploying IDPR ? > >> While I have no doubts that IDPR can theoretically accommodate an Internet >> comprising of O(10^4) domains, we need to look at what are the practical >> implications (in terms of storage, computational, etc overhead) of doing >> this. For example, what would be the implications on overhead if we'll >> deploy IDPR as a dominant inter-domain routing protocol in existing internet; >> would it require less/more storage, CPU, etc..; what would be >> the implications on overhead if we'll deploy IDPR as a dominant inter-domain >> routing protocol in an internet twice the size of the current one, but >> with addresses assigned in a hierarchical fashion. > >I did provide any actual numbers that demonstrate the processing, >memory, and link bandwidth overhead of IDPR compared to other >inter-domain routing procedures, for the current Internet. According >to RFC 1264, providing such numbers is not a requirement for >requesting proposed standard status for a routing procedure. Would you please share these numbers with the rest of us. I would be quite interested in seeing them. > >However, a little further on in the document (Section 4), I did >provide some size information for the routing information database and >the forwarding information database. These are order estimates only, >to indicate those factors that affect the size of each database. In >fact, they are worst case estimates. The question is, is the worst >case the average case? For the current Internet, the answer is no, >but for the future? I don't know. Do you? Yes, in Section 4 you made a statement saying, for example, that "... the size of the routing information database maintained by a route server depends only on the number of domains and transit policies and not on the number of hosts, gateways, or networks in the Internet." I personally did not find this information sufficient. For example, does the dependence linear, quadratic, exponential ? Likewise, you said that "the size of the forwarding information database maintained by a policy gateway depends on the number of domains and source policies and not on the number of hosts in the Internet." Again, does the size grow linearly, quadratically, exponentially with the number of domains ? To summarize, I did not find any quantitative estimates in Section 4, neither for the worst, nor for the average case. In Section 4 you stated that the size of routing information database does not depend on the number of networks in the Internet. Does this statement assume that network to AD mapping will be performed by DNS ? If the answer is yes, then would you please provide information on where does the Internet stand with respect to implementing and deploying this function in DNS. > >Also, in section 2.3, I talked about moving the route computation >function to a route server rather than keeping it in the policy >gateways, in order to reduce the computational load on the policy >gateways. > That brings another interesting issue. How long does it take to compute a route, and what is going to happen with the IP packets to be forwarded along that route, while the route is being computed ? >> There are two aspects in the design: >> (a) ability to accommodate O(10^4) domains >> (b) ability to accommodate domains with diverse offering and requirements > >> How relevant is the first aspect to the existing Internet ? How soon >> the Internet would exceed the limit that the design claims to support ? >> Likewise, how relevant is the second aspect to the existing Internet ? >> How many diverse offering do you see in the Internet today, two years >> from now ? > >The claim that IDPR can accommodate O(10^4) domains applies to those >domains that are directly visible to IDPR. In an environment >supporting a hierarchy of domains, where the hierarchy is built by >forming "confederations of domains" in your terminology or "super >domains" in IDPR terminology, many domains may be hidden from view. >In this case, IDPR would only care about those domains that are at the >top level of the hierarchy. And according to the claim, IDPR can >support O(10^4) such domains. > While I read the description of "confederations of domains" in the architecture document, I did not find any protocol support for this architectural feature. I do not think you should ask people to assume that all the feature specified in the architecture are implementable (this is a general statement; has nothing to do with IDPR in particular). Even, if they are implementable, it is impossible to access their impact unless they are fully specified. >Service offerings must be accompanied by mechanisms for allowing users >to take advantage of these offerings. In the current Internet, there >aren't many different services offered. However, I believe that this >is in part because there aren't many protocols that can distinguish >between such offerings. In the near term, I believe that applications >that require bandwidth reservation will become prevalent. The ability >to generate and use routes that supply the requested bandwidth and to >manage the traffic flows over such routes will be the responsibility >of Internet routing and flow control mechanisms. > Your predictions may be correct. However, they are only predictions. Even if they are correct, you explicitly mentioned such requirements as: - ability to supply the requested bandwidth - ability to manage the traffic flows over such routes If the "applications that require bandwidth reservation will become prevalent", what is going to happen with all the existing applications, like SMTP, Telnet, FTP, etc... that DO NOT require bandwidth reservation. Are the applications that require bandwidth reservation form the main clientele that needs IDPR ? What are the plans for developing and deploying these new applications, as well as providing communication infrastructure capable of meeting the requirements of these applications ? >> Do you have an example of an environment for which the protocol is not >> suitable, or is it suitable for any environment ? > >I think IDPR will perform well in almost all environments, even those >where policy routing is not an issue. Some may argue that in such and >environment, the overhead of path setup does not justify its >existence. However, if paths persist for long periods of time, then >the initial overhead of path setup is not significant compared to the >life of the path. > >IDPR is not as well suited to extremely dynamic environments, where >connectivity between domains is constantly changing because of failing >equipment or because of mobility of nodes. Routes will require >frequent recalculation and paths will be setup and torn down often. >However, no routing procedures with which I'm aware (including those >used in the packet radio environment) deal gracefully with a very >dynamic Internet. In other words, I don't think there is anything >special about IDPR that will make it perform worse than other routing >procedures in a dynamic environment. > I think that your statement needs a bit more support. For example, what is the meaning of "perform well" ? Is this an absolute or a relative statement ? Some of the problems (but not all of them) associated with IDPR were articulated in the paper on Unified Routing Architecture written by Deborah Estrin, Steve Hotz, and myself. Do you think that the problems articulated in the paper are not real ? Or do you think that IDPR "will perform well", regardless of the problems stated in the paper ? I think there are few things that are QUITE SPECIAL about IDPR that are likely to have direct performance implications. Specifically, its rigidity with respect to the forwarding granularity, where the granularity is of a single source/destination domain pair, unconstrained flooding of routing information that may be of no interest to some of the participants, and lack of ability to perform information aggregation/abstraction. These factors will amplify problems associated with handling routing in a dynamic environment. >> Section 4. > >> Again, the issue is not how many domains the design is capable of >> accommodating, but what are the implications of the design on the storage >> and processing >> capabilities required by routers. For example, for an internet of 10,000 >> domains how many forwarding entries need to be maintained simultaneously at >> various routers within the internet ? > >Please see above. I still did not find the answer to the question about how many forwarding entries need to be maintained simultaneously at various routers within the internet. So, I do not think you answered my question. > >> "Less likely" compared to what ? >> This assumption may not be correct, as IDPR aims at providing routes >> consistent with "required services", and services provided by a domain may be >> a function of intra-domain routing. > >The text should say "unlikely". True, if each intra-domain route >supported a completely different type of service, then the loss of a >particular intra-domain route would be visible at the inter-domain >level. However, I don't expect this to be the case. Do you? I am >interested in your projections of what the Internet will look like and >how it will be used. My expectation is that usually, there will be >more than one intra-domain route that will satisfactorily provide the >services required. (Or if no redundancy is provided, that component >failure is a rare event.) This is all depends on a particular nature of the services advertised by a domain. I think that rather than looking at projections (which is in realm of speculations), the document needs to explicitly spell out the underlying assumptions (like the one you mentioned here, but did not place in the original document). Moreover, the document needs to state the implications of violating these assumptions. Such an approach has more solid scientific foundation than my personal thinking about "what the Internet will look like and how it will be used". > >> That assumes that a domain is at LEAST 2-connected. First of all, this may, >> or may not be the common case. Even if the topology is 2-connected, switch >> failure may cause inability to select an alternative route. For example, in >> T3 NSFNET Backbone if an E-NSS that is used to attach a regional network >> fails (E-NSS is just a single machine), then the regional network >> loses its connectivity altogether. Similar situation exists on T1 NSFNET >> if an E-PSP crashes. Thus, even single temporary intra-domain failures will >> be quite visible at the inter-domain level, contrary to your assertion. > >As part of the IDPR architecture, we suggest multiple policy gateways >connecting two adjacent domains to handle exactly this situation. >Domain administrators are free to choose how much policy gateway >redundancy their domains support. Connecting two adjacent domains by multiple policy gateways may be a nice suggestion, but it does not correspond to the existing practice. While you are saying that "domain administrators are free to choose how much policy gateway redundancy their domains support", such freedom of choice has DIRECT implications on the validity of one of your assumptions. All that brings me to my previous observation, that the assumptions and the implications of violating the assumptions should be stated explicitly. > >> Even if you have the redundant connectivity, the services provided by such >> connectivity may be quite different from the services provided via primary >> connectivity. For example, an E-NSS may have T3 connection to the C-NSS as >> its primary link, but only T1 connection as its secondary. Obviously, that >> services provided via T1 (in the case when T3 fails) are quite different that >> the one provided via T3 (primary). Thus, if the IDPR route selection is >> sensitive to bandwidth, then temporary intra-domain failure will be visible >> at the inter-domain level, contrary to your assertion. > >Yes, the more diverse the service offerings in a domain and the less >redundancy in the resources used to provide those offerings, the >greater the chance that an intra-domain failure will be visible at the >inter-domain level. I don't disagree. However, I believe that money >will drive redundancy. People paying for a service will expect to get >that service. The service provider, in order to attract and keep >customers, will try to provide that service almost all of the time. >And that may mean redundancy of components or extremely reliable >components or both. > >> Based on these facts your expectations may not be correct. What are the >> implications of these expectations on the performance of the protocol ? > >Changes visible at the inter-domain level will prompt distribution of >updated routing information and establishment of new paths. Precisely because IDPR claims to provide routes consistent with service requirements, intra-domain changes that impact services provided by a domain will have global significance in terms of flooding new routing information. So, as far as I can see intra-domain routing changes are LIKELY to to force inter-domain routing changes (which is exactly the opposite to what you said in the document). >> The frequency with which policy gateways need to generate and distribute >> routing information messages depends on: > >> (1) stability of inter-domain links >> (2) stability of inter-domain switches >> (3) stability of services provided within a domain > >> Why do you think that even if the distribution of routing information is >> triggered only by detectable inter-domain changes, these changes are not >> going to occur often. Moreover, what does it mean "often" (e.g. once a day, >> once per hour) ? > >For me, once an hour is often; once a day is not often. As an example >of a large network, I look at the MILNET (~200 nodes) which has >"mature" packet switches and some pretty error-prone links throughout >the world. It seems that nodes seldom go down (many remain up for >months at a time) and when they do fail, they are often down for a >while, so they don't tend to "flap". Links are more likely to flap >but the subset of links that do tend to flap is less than 10% of the >total number of links. Perhaps I am being overly optimistic when I >expect that the fancy new routers and communications media, for >example of the NSFNet, should be at least as reliable as MILNET >technology. Am I wrong in assuming such reliability? I guess, NSFNet bashing is getting more and more popular... But you may also need to consider performance characteristics (e.g. link speed, switching capacities, number of routes that switches can handle) of "fancy new routers and communications media" versus "MILNET technology". Sue Hares did a study on the Internet stability based on the NSFNET data. To put a sanity check on your assumptions I would suggest to look at Sue's study to see whether current Internet meets the necessary requirements on stability imposed by IDPR. By the way, would it be possible to EXPLICITLY spell out requirements that IDPR imposes on stability (in terms of numbers !!!) > >> Conceptually this sounds fine, but I wonder how important this feature is in >> practice. I heard several comments that suggest that if there is a traffic >> between domains A and B, then the average number of hosts involved in this >> traffic is equal to 2 (one source and one destination). If, indeed, this >> is the case, then it does not matter whether "many different traffic flows >> may use ... the same policy... and the same path", since on average there >> will be only ONE traffic flow. > >The feature is there as one of many that are meant to keep the size of >IDPR databases "manageable". I also do not know how often it will be >used. However, I can imagine circumstances under which it would be >useful, for example, several people on different hosts in a given >domain simultaneously accessing a service provided in another domain. >An an example, when a new RFC is announced, several people on >different hosts in the same domain may simultaneously go to the same >RFC repository (in a different domain) in order to extract a copy. >Here one path would clearly be a savings. Here we are dealing with a situation when on the one hand you "do not known how often it will be used", but on the other hand empirical data shows that the likelyhood of using this feature tends to 0. I think the empirical data should be taken as a very strong hint to protocol designers, so that the protocol would not be overburden with features that need to be implemented by everybody, but whose utility tends to 0. >> *************** An architecture for inter-domain policy routing > >> As you indicated, there is a new version of the document dated March 1992. >> I think you need to give members of the group a chance to read it before >> submitting it to IESG. >> If this version is identical to the one you posted in July 1991, >> then I have quite a few substantial comments on it which I would like to >> discuss within the WG (we can do it over e-mail). >> If it is different, then I would like to read it, before making any comments. > >> ************** Inter-Domain policy routing protocol specification: version 1 > >> This is again was dated March 1992. Again, I think you need to give members >> of the group a chance to read it before submitting it to IESG. > >Actually, the March 1992 versions have not yet hit the Internet drafts >directory. They are not significantly different from their earlier >counterparts. The changes in the documents are for readability, not >basic protocol functionality. (Some message formats may have changed >slightly, but those are basically the only "technical" changes.) Just at the beginning of your response to me you stated that "I have now added to the document a section that briefly describes how IDPR can coexist with other inter-domain routing procedures". That is a new material which needs to be reviewed. > >Yakov, if you have had comments since July 1991, why have you not sent >them to the working group list or brought them up in IETF working >group meetings? As you know, at every IETF meeting I have begged for >comments on IDPR. Although I have received some responses, I would >love to receive more. (I seem to remember that you made a similar >statement last summer about earlier versions of the IDPR documents, >some of which had been in existence for a year by that time.) > >Guys, it is not fair to the working group to hold out on significant >comments, only to allude to them at the time that the working group is >trying to submit the work as a standard. Please, if anyone has any >comments on any versions of the documents, mail them in to the working >group list idpr-wg@bbn.com. > I fully agree with you and I plan to start sending my comments to the mailing list. However, I would prefer to comment on the latest version of the documents, since the latest version may address some of my comments already. So, I would appreciate if you'll make the latest version of the documents available. While staying on the subject of fairness, I think it is not fair to the working group members trying to submit as a Proposed Standard documents that are NOT EVEN in the Internet Drafts directory and were not available for review to ALL the members of the IDPR WG. Yakov Rekhter.
- IDPR as a Proposed Standard yakov
- IDPR as a Proposed Standard Gene Tsudik
- IDPR as a Proposed Standard Tony Li
- IDPR as a Proposed Standard yakov
- Re: IDPR as a Proposed Standard Milo S. Medin (NASA ARC NSI Project Office)
- IDPR as a Proposed Standard yakov
- Re: IDPR as a Proposed Standard Deborah Estrin
- IDPR as a Proposed Standard yakov
- Re: IDPR as a Proposed Standard Noel Chiappa
- IDPR as a Proposed Standard yakov
- Re: IDPR as a Proposed Standard Noel Chiappa
- Re: IDPR as a Proposed Standard Deborah Estrin
- Re: IDPR as a Proposed Standard little
- Re: IDPR as a Proposed Standard vcerf
- Re: IDPR as a Proposed Standard Noel Chiappa
- IDPR as a Proposed Standard yakov
- Re: IDPR as a Proposed Standard Noel Chiappa
- IDPR as a Proposed Standard yakov
- Re: IDPR as a Proposed Standard Noel Chiappa
- IDPR as a Proposed Standard yakov
- Re: IDPR as a Proposed Standard Noel Chiappa