Re: [Idr] AD Review of draft-ietf-idr-bgp-extended-messages-20

"Susan Hares" <> Tue, 07 March 2017 15:28 UTC

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From: Susan Hares <>
To: 'Robert Raszuk' <>
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Subject: Re: [Idr] AD Review of draft-ietf-idr-bgp-extended-messages-20
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<individual contributor hat on> 

Let’s take this offline.  The complexity is in the changes to the RFC4271 finite state machine.  I’m glad to explain the design of the BGP FSM offline, but I’ve gone through the precise reasons already on the mail list.   My suggestion is to include all messages including future messages if approved.   



From: [] On Behalf Of Robert Raszuk
Sent: Tuesday, March 7, 2017 10:14 AM
To: Susan Hares
Cc: Randy Bush; Enke Chen; Jeffrey Haas; Alvaro Retana (aretana);;; idr wg
Subject: Re: [Idr] AD Review of draft-ietf-idr-bgp-extended-messages-20




I don't understand your point of "more complex". 


Current proposal extends single message type. I indicated that future defined messages needs also to have an option to be extended with proposed capability. 


That's all. 







On Tue, Mar 7, 2017 at 2:55 PM, Susan Hares <> wrote:



<individual contributor hat on>

This is a more complex change to the state machine than just extending all messages. 


Sue Hares 


From: [] On Behalf Of Robert Raszuk
Sent: Tuesday, March 7, 2017 5:09 AM
To: Susan Hares; Randy Bush
Cc: Enke Chen; Jeffrey Haas; Alvaro Retana (aretana);;; idr wg

Subject: Re: [Idr] AD Review of draft-ietf-idr-bgp-extended-messages-20


Hi Sue, Authors,


Current draft says: 


"Currently, the Extended Message Capability only applies to UPDATE messages."


I would like to ask authors to change the below restriction to also consider future BGP messages still compliant with RFC4271 RFC. I would therefor propose to extend the above sentence with:


"The Extended Message Capability applies to UPDATE messages as well as if required to any new BGP messages."


- - -


I am less concerned in making Extended Message Capability applicable to OPEN or KEEPALIVE messages. IMHO Capabilities from OPEN should be moved to new BGP message (BGP CAPABILITIES MESSAGE) which would by design allow their dynamic nature along the lines of current dynamic capabilities proposal except outside of messing up with OPEN. 


For NOTIFICATION as Enke already pointed there is good reason for it to be extended. Alternatively a new provision for signalling the errors between peers should be provided in new message (example: BGP OPERATIONAL message). 










On Tue, Mar 7, 2017 at 1:42 AM, Susan Hares <> wrote:

Enke and IDR WG:
<WG chair hat on>
If there is enough concern about the extended messages covering all messages versus UPDATE messages,  I will need to do  1 week call on this topic.
<WG Chair hat off>

Sue Hares

-----Original Message-----
From: Enke Chen []
Sent: Monday, March 6, 2017 3:22 PM
To: Jeffrey Haas; Alvaro Retana (aretana)
Cc:;; Susan Hares;; Enke Chen
Subject: Re: [Idr] AD Review of draft-ietf-idr-bgp-extended-messages-20

Hi, Folks:

I see benefits and no drawbacks for the "BGP-Extended Message Capability" to cover all the message types, that is, requiring a speaker that advertises the capability to be able to receiving large messages of any type.  While the requirement for the large message is driven by the UPDATE message, other messages (such as NOTIFICATION or OPEN) can potentially exceed the 4K message size as well. It is better to deal with this issue once.

Clearly a large UPDATE message may require a large NOTIFICATION message, e.g., for carrying a malformed attribute.

Regarding the OPEN message, as BGP capabilities are carried inside the OPEN message and a number of capabilities are AFI/SAFI specific and thus have the "multiplier"
effect on the message size, potentially the OPEN message may exceed the message size in the future. This "extended message capability" can be used in a couple of ways to deal with the large OPEN message if the capability is made to mean support for all message types:

   o A speaker can remember the capability from its previous OPEN, and infer that
     the large message is most likely supported over the current session, and send
     the large OPEN message if needed. (It can back off from sending the large OPEN
     based on NOTIFICATION message.)

   o A speaker can send a normal OPEN, and once it determines from the received
     OPEN message that the large message capability is supported by the remote
     speaker, the speaker can close the connection and start with a large OPEN.

Admittedly these mechanism are not as elegant as the one that bumps the BGP version.
They can be just as effective (especially the first one) in practice.

Thanks.  -- Enke

On 2/28/17 1:06 PM, Jeffrey Haas wrote:
> Alvaro,
> I'm not speaking for the authors.  However, a few comments on your writeup:
> On Thu, Feb 23, 2017 at 07:17:05PM +0000, Alvaro Retana (aretana) wrote:
>> M1. Section 4. (Operation): “An implementation that supports the BGP
>> Extended Messages MUST be prepared to receive an UPDATE message that
>> is larger than 4096 bytes.“  Only UPDATEs?  I know that the most
>> likely case for exceeding the 4k size is an UPDATE, but why are the
>> other messages not considered?
> The fundamental issue is with regards to not only the basic behavior
> of RFC 4271 and its earlier RFC 1771 but also to BGP Versioning.
> Those RFCs set the expectation that version 4 of BGP will have at most
> a 4k packet size.  Capability advertisement, an extension on top of
> BGP, isn't a required feature - although it's certainly very common these days.
> Thus, for backward compatibility reasons, OPEN messages must be no
> bigger than 4k if we're still BGP-4.
> I don't think there's an argument for larger KEEPALIVE messages. :-)
> Similarly, the NOTIFICATION with no restrictions for version
> compatibility reasons.  *However*, once BGP has reached the
> Established state, it is possible for it to send longer NOTIFICATION
> messages, if we permitted it and the feature was duly negotiated.
> This is probably not the best idea because it will still be necessary
> to be able to deal with an old speaker in such cases.
> Also, most implementations don't dump that much information in the
> NOTIFICATION Data section.  Putting sufficient semantics on the
> content would start to get messy.  We don't want XML or backtrace over that message.
> The case for UPDATE is clear.
> The remaining message with some potential motivation is ROUTE-REFRESH.
> The basic refresh message is likely to be able to hold AFI/SAFI sets
> for some time.  The ORF feature that is built upon refresh already
> deals with sending its filters over the course of multiple messages.
> So, there's not a lot of motivation.
> And that's the messages we have so far.  While I can see new messages
> being defined that may want it, I don't think there's a strong
> argument for it today.
>> Also, what does “prepared to receive”
>> mean, and how can “MUST be prepared to receive” be enforced?  Given
>> the discussion in Section 5 (Error Handling), you might want to add
>> something like “…even if the Capability is not advertised”.
> If the capability hasn't been negotiated, then the expectation is that
> it's a PDU error and the session should be dropped.  See prior
> comments about BGP versioning.
>> M2. Section 5 (Error Handling).  “A BGP speaker that has the ability
>> to use extended messages but has not advertised the BGP Extended
>> Messages capability, presumably due to configuration, SHOULD NOT
>> accept an extended message.  A speaker MAY implement a more liberal
>> policy and accept extended messages even from a peer that has not
>> advertised the capability.”  This paragraph troubles me a lot because
>> it is in direct contraction with Section 3: “A peer which does not
>> advertise this capability MUST NOT send BGP Extended Messages, and
>> BGP Extended Messages MUST NOT be sent to it.”.  However, I think
>> that John Scudder’s reasoning [3] makes sense ("keep the session up
>> at (almost) all costs", and there’s clear precedence in the WG) for
>> the case where the sender did advertise the Capability, but I’m not
>> convinced on the case where it didn’t – please include something like John’s explanation in the text.
> John can own this one.  I find the case a little weaker.  It vaguely
> makes me want a probe message to verify that I can indeed get a
> full-sized PDU through.
>> M5. Section 5 (Error Handling).  “The inconsistency between the local and
>> remote BGP speakers MUST be reported via syslog and/or SNMP.”   SNMP?
>> AFAIK, there’s no object that can report this inconsistency since
>> there’s no NOTIFICATION generated.  In the proposed text by Gunter
>> Van De Velde [4], SNMP and syslog were mentioned as examples – I
>> suggest you follow that path (no need for all the “flowery language”)
>> and just reference mechanisms by example to avoid having to point at how it would be done.
> IMO, "brought to the attention of the operator.  Example mechanisms
> might include syslog or SNMP notifications."
> While you're correct that no IETF standard MIB object covers such a
> scenario, we shouldn't be proscriptive about some vendor deciding they
> want it in their enterprise implementation.
> At some point, we need similar boilerplate language for yang notifications.
>> M7. What about transition/migration/partial deployment?  What should
>> the behavior be if, for example, an Extended Message UPDATE is
>> received from a peer, but can’t be propagated to others because they
>> don’t support Extended Messages (think route reflectors or simple
>> eBGP -> iBGP)??  There should be some guidance for the general case
>> (i.e. when the total size is
>>> 4k due simply to the total amount of information, and not because a
>> single attribute, for example, is really big), and some requirements
>> looking forward to potential new messages/attributes that
>> specifically rely on Extended Messages.
> I'm not sure such guidance belongs in this document.  We already have
> scenarios wherein normal protocol machinery can result in messages
> that are too large.  The expected behavior is "treat as withdraw" to
> the next downstream, similar to the BGP Error handling RFC.
> Examples of this include AS_PATH or CLUSTER_LIST attributes needing to
> add a new entry on a full PDU.
>> M7.2. What should the default be for this extension?  Should it be enabled by default or not?
> IMO, there are good reasons to not turn it on for existing BGP
> deployments but alternatively good reasons once the extension is
> widely enough present in a given topology.  The latter example includes bgpsec.
> -- Jeff
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