Re: [Idr] Kathleen Moriarty's Yes on draft-ietf-idr-error-handling-18: (with COMMENT)

Kathleen Moriarty <kathleen.moriarty.ietf@gmail.com> Mon, 20 April 2015 18:32 UTC

Return-Path: <kathleen.moriarty.ietf@gmail.com>
X-Original-To: idr@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: idr@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 3F5581B3014; Mon, 20 Apr 2015 11:32:30 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -1.999
X-Spam-Level:
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.999 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, FREEMAIL_FROM=0.001, HTML_MESSAGE=0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001] autolearn=ham
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id 2X0cgp5IAT2i; Mon, 20 Apr 2015 11:32:28 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from mail-lb0-x236.google.com (mail-lb0-x236.google.com [IPv6:2a00:1450:4010:c04::236]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 7816D1B300B; Mon, 20 Apr 2015 11:32:28 -0700 (PDT)
Received: by lbbuc2 with SMTP id uc2so137599581lbb.2; Mon, 20 Apr 2015 11:32:27 -0700 (PDT)
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20120113; h=mime-version:in-reply-to:references:date:message-id:subject:from:to :cc:content-type; bh=dO8BG6ftorH4Wly8tCnxT95zgK6MFPwPJE4PYuFJtMQ=; b=m4n1SyrOD/nfdbOQDAXHNEmLPoRoajky2Qbb8sKJRxREgVW142gWmyjJjsXMf7MBB+ 31CJVNl9LyT0yCBaa3vO8RyLpH+EWrQKis6Ir8eUZ3jsC/NQc6jAMyVWUeFMvfHVrwYO 9VG0C3RMR227GXD+6gWp0vYMeb6RGPOplErV9L0wkwF2IaY0UhoHPUmvb3jStlkKJVLh GZ0bGY+aydLBi0CDO50Np7tTNbMJmPcTEgbl9MCmPAC0Gb2XZFFysacp89Z73yjM63rL EDnqvPGfJWYYKjEizFBF2wwxnYtvPqd3tZp2wvKjCo/nUTmclP0/SgGOBUdMfCgTzuth RHew==
MIME-Version: 1.0
X-Received: by 10.152.19.199 with SMTP id h7mr17254092lae.32.1429554746958; Mon, 20 Apr 2015 11:32:26 -0700 (PDT)
Received: by 10.112.11.199 with HTTP; Mon, 20 Apr 2015 11:32:26 -0700 (PDT)
In-Reply-To: <D2F6CB8C-F6C0-4869-A96D-5CE2E9C2332A@juniper.net>
References: <20150310000753.14666.46982.idtracker@ietfa.amsl.com> <D2F6CB8C-F6C0-4869-A96D-5CE2E9C2332A@juniper.net>
Date: Mon, 20 Apr 2015 14:32:26 -0400
Message-ID: <CAHbuEH7+=Epprj0gN0_Q4vBWJbBj5PPYQk2qrDOMXD7QiFqqAw@mail.gmail.com>
From: Kathleen Moriarty <kathleen.moriarty.ietf@gmail.com>
To: "John G. Scudder" <jgs@juniper.net>
Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="089e014942aae1273905142c26c2"
Archived-At: <http://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/idr/5y2ma06YKPuwGKyC_5SEcJRZBCA>
Cc: idr@ietf.org, rob.shakir@bt.com, draft-ietf-idr-error-handling.all@ietf.org, The IESG <iesg@ietf.org>, idr-chairs@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [Idr] Kathleen Moriarty's Yes on draft-ietf-idr-error-handling-18: (with COMMENT)
X-BeenThere: idr@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.15
Precedence: list
List-Id: Inter-Domain Routing <idr.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/idr>, <mailto:idr-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/idr/>
List-Post: <mailto:idr@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:idr-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/idr>, <mailto:idr-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Mon, 20 Apr 2015 18:32:30 -0000

Hi John,

On Mon, Apr 20, 2015 at 1:53 PM, John G. Scudder <jgs@juniper.net> wrote:

> Hi Kathleen,
>
> On Mar 9, 2015, at 8:07 PM, Kathleen Moriarty <
> kathleen.moriarty.ietf@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> > My only comment would be to see if you could break the first paragraph of
> > the security considerations into a few sentences.  Maybe getting rid of
> > the parens to help break out the additional sentences would help.
>
> Good point, thanks. Parentheses are the bane of my existence. How about
> this?
>
>    This specification addresses the vulnerability of a BGP speaker to a
>    potential attack whereby a distant attacker can generate a malformed
>    optional transitive attribute that is not recognized by intervening
>    routers. Since the intervening routers do not recognize the
>    attribute, they propagate it without checking it. When the malformed
>    attribute arrives at a router that does recognize the given attribute
>    type, that router resets the session over which it arrived. Since
>    significant fan-out can occur between the attacker and the routers
>    that do recognize the attribute type, this attack could potentially
>    be particularly harmful.
>

That's much easier to read, thank you!

>
> – John




-- 

Best regards,
Kathleen