< draft-ietf-idr-bgp-open-policy-15.txt		draft-ietf-idr-bgp-open-policy.txt >
	Network Working Group A. Azimov		Network Working Group A. Azimov
	Internet-Draft Qrator Labs & Yandex		Internet-Draft Qrator Labs & Yandex
	Intended status: Standards Track E. Bogomazov		Intended status: Standards Track E. Bogomazov
	Expires: July 20, 2021 Qrator Labs		Expires: December 11, 2021 Qrator Labs
	R. Bush		R. Bush
	Internet Initiative Japan & Arrcus, Inc.		Internet Initiative Japan & Arrcus, Inc.
	K. Patel		K. Patel
	Arrcus		Arrcus
	K. Sriram		K. Sriram
	USA NIST		USA NIST
	January 16, 2021		June 9, 2021
	Route Leak Prevention using Roles in Update and Open messages		Route Leak Prevention using Roles in Update and Open messages
	draft-ietf-idr-bgp-open-policy-15		draft-ietf-idr-bgp-open-policy-16
	Abstract		Abstract
	Route leaks are the propagation of BGP prefixes which violate		Route leaks are the propagation of BGP prefixes which violate
	assumptions of BGP topology relationships; e.g. passing a route		assumptions of BGP topology relationships; e.g. passing a route
	learned from one lateral peer to another lateral peer or a transit		learned from one lateral peer to another lateral peer or a transit
	provider, passing a route learned from one transit provider to		provider, passing a route learned from one transit provider to
	another transit provider or a lateral peer. Existing approaches to		another transit provider or a lateral peer. Existing approaches to
	leak prevention rely on marking routes by operator configuration,		leak prevention rely on marking routes by operator configuration,
	with no check that the configuration corresponds to that of the eBGP		with no check that the configuration corresponds to that of the eBGP
	skipping to change at page 2, line 12 ¶		skipping to change at page 2, line 12 ¶
	Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering		Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
	Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute		Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
	working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-		working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
	Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.		Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
	Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months		Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
	and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any		and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
	time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference		time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
	material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."		material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
	This Internet-Draft will expire on July 20, 2021.		This Internet-Draft will expire on December 11, 2021.
	Copyright Notice		Copyright Notice
	Copyright (c) 2021 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the		Copyright (c) 2021 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
	document authors. All rights reserved.		document authors. All rights reserved.
	This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal		This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
	Provisions Relating to IETF Documents		Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
	(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of		(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
	publication of this document. Please review these documents		publication of this document. Please review these documents
	skipping to change at page 2, line 36 ¶		skipping to change at page 2, line 36 ¶
	the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as		the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
	described in the Simplified BSD License.		described in the Simplified BSD License.
	Table of Contents		Table of Contents
	1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3		1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
	2. Peering Relationships . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3		2. Peering Relationships . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
	3. BGP Role . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4		3. BGP Role . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
	4. BGP Role Capability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5		4. BGP Role Capability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
	5. Role correctness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5		5. Role correctness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
	5.1. Strict mode . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6		5.1. Strict and Non-strict Modes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
	6. BGP Only to Customer (OTC) Attribute . . . . . . . . . . . . 6		6. BGP Only to Customer (OTC) Attribute . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
	7. Enforcement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7		7. Enforcement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
	8. Additional Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7		8. Additional Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
	9. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8		9. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
	10. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8		10. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
	11. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9		11. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
	11.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9		11.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
	11.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9		11.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
	Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10		Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
	Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10		Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
	Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10		Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
	1. Introduction		1. Introduction
	A BGP route leak occurs when a route is learned from a transit		A BGP route leak occurs when a route is learned from a transit
	provider or lateral peer and then announced to another provider or		provider or lateral peer and then announced to another provider or
	lateral peer. See [RFC7908]. These are usually the result of		lateral peer. See [RFC7908]. These are usually the result of
	misconfigured or absent BGP route filtering or lack of coordination		misconfigured or absent BGP route filtering or lack of coordination
	between two eBGP speakers.		between two eBGP speakers.
	The mechanism proposed in		The mechanism proposed in
	skipping to change at page 3, line 47 ¶		skipping to change at page 3, line 47 ¶
	Despite the use of terms such as "customer", "peer", etc. in this		Despite the use of terms such as "customer", "peer", etc. in this
	document, these are not necessarily business relationships based on		document, these are not necessarily business relationships based on
	payment agreements. These terms are used to represent restrictions		payment agreements. These terms are used to represent restrictions
	on BGP route propagation, sometimes known as the Gao-Rexford model		on BGP route propagation, sometimes known as the Gao-Rexford model
	[Gao]. The following is a list of various roles in eBGP peering and		[Gao]. The following is a list of various roles in eBGP peering and
	the corresponding rules for route propagation:		the corresponding rules for route propagation:
	Provider: MAY send to a customer all available prefixes.		Provider: MAY send to a customer all available prefixes.
	Customer: MAY send to a provider prefixes which the sender		Customer: MAY send to a provider prefixes which the sender
	originates and prefixes learned from any of their customers. A		originates and prefixes learned from any of its customers. A
	customer MUST NOT send to a provider prefixes learned from its		customer MUST NOT send to a provider prefixes learned from its
	peers, from other providers, or from Route Servers.		peers, from other providers, or from Route Servers.
	Route Server (RS): MAY send to an Route Server client (RS-client)		Route Server (RS): MAY send to a Route Server client (RS-client) all
	all available prefixes.		available prefixes.
	RS-client: MAY send to an RS prefixes which the sender originates		RS-client: MAY send to an RS prefixes which the sender originates
	and prefixes learned from its customers. An RS-client MUST NOT		and prefixes learned from its customers. An RS-client MUST NOT
	send to an RS prefixes learned from its peers or providers, or		send to an RS prefixes learned from its peers or providers, or
	from another RS.		from another RS.
	Peer: MAY send to a peer prefixes which the sender originates and		Peer: MAY send to a peer prefixes which the sender originates and
	prefixes learned from its customers. A peer MUST NOT send to a		prefixes learned from its customers. A peer MUST NOT send to a
	peer prefixes learned from other peers, from its providers, or		peer prefixes learned from other peers, from its providers, or
	from RS(s).		from RS(s).
	Of course, any BGP speaker may apply policy to reduce what is		Of course, any BGP speaker may apply policy to reduce what is
	announced, and a recipient may apply policy to reduce the set of		announced, and a recipient may apply policy to reduce the set of
	routes they accept. Violation of the above rules may result in route		routes they accept. Violation of the above rules may result in route
	leaks and MUST NOT be allowed. Automatic enforcement of these rules		leaks and MUST NOT be allowed. Automatic enforcement of these rules
	should significantly reduce route leaks that may otherwise occur due		should significantly reduce route leaks that may otherwise occur due
	to manual configuration mistakes. While enforcing the above rules		to manual configuration mistakes. While enforcing the above rules
	will address most BGP peering scenarios, their configuration is not		will address most BGP peering scenarios, their configuration is not
	part of BGP itself; therefore, configuration of ingress and egress		part of BGP itself; therefore, the configuration of ingress and
	prefix filters is still strongly advised.		egress prefix filters is still strongly advised.
	3. BGP Role		3. BGP Role
	BGP Role is a new configuration option that is configured on a per-		BGP Role is a new configuration option that is configured on a per-
	session basis. BGP Roles reflect the agreement between two BGP		session basis. BGP Roles reflect the agreement between two BGP
	speakers about their relationship. One of the Roles described below		speakers about their relationship. One of the Roles described below
	SHOULD be configured on each eBGP session between ISPs that carry		SHOULD be configured on each eBGP session between ISPs that carry
	IPv4 and(or) IPv6 unicast prefixes.		IPv4 and(or) IPv6 unicast prefixes.
	Allowed Role values for eBGP sessions between ISPs are:		Allowed Roles for eBGP sessions between ISPs are:
	o Provider - sender is a transit provider to neighbor;		o Provider - sender is a transit provider to neighbor;
	o Customer - sender is a transit customer of neighbor;		o Customer - sender is a transit customer of neighbor;
	o RS - sender is a Route Server, usually at an Internet exchange		o RS - sender is a Route Server, usually at an Internet exchange
	point (IX);		point (IX);
	o RS-client - sender is client of an RS;		o RS-client - sender is client of an RS;
	skipping to change at page 5, line 23 ¶		skipping to change at page 5, line 23 ¶
	o Value - integer corresponding to speaker's BGP Role (see Table 1).		o Value - integer corresponding to speaker's BGP Role (see Table 1).
	+-------+---------------------+		+-------+---------------------+
	| Value | Role name |		| Value | Role name |
	+-------+---------------------+		+-------+---------------------+
	| 0 | Sender is Provider |		| 0 | Sender is Provider |
	| 1 | Sender is RS |		| 1 | Sender is RS |
	| 2 | Sender is RS-client |		| 2 | Sender is RS-client |
	| 3 | Sender is Customer |		| 3 | Sender is Customer |
	| 4 | Sender is Peer |		| 4 | Sender is Peer |
			| 5-255 | Reserved |
	+-------+---------------------+		+-------+---------------------+
	Table 1: Predefined BGP Role Values		Table 1: Predefined BGP Role Values
	5. Role correctness		5. Role correctness
	Section 3 described how BGP Role encodes the relationship between two		Section 3 described how BGP Role encodes the relationship between two
	eBGP speakers. But the mere presence of BGP Role doesn't		eBGP speakers. But the mere presence of BGP Role doesn't
	automatically guarantee role agreement between two BGP peers.		automatically guarantee role agreement between two BGP peers.
	skipping to change at page 6, line 5 ¶		skipping to change at page 6, line 17 ¶
	+---------------+-----------------+		+---------------+-----------------+
	| Provider | Customer |		| Provider | Customer |
	| Customer | Provider |		| Customer | Provider |
	| RS | RS-client |		| RS | RS-client |
	| RS-client | RS |		| RS-client | RS |
	| Peer | Peer |		| Peer | Peer |
	+---------------+-----------------+		+---------------+-----------------+
	Table 2: Allowed Pairs of Role Capabilities		Table 2: Allowed Pairs of Role Capabilities
	If the role of the receiving speaker for the eBGP session in		If the observed Role pair is not in the above table, then the
	consideration is included in Table 1 and the observed Role pair is		receiving speaker MUST reject the eBGP connection, send a Role
	not in the above table, then the receiving speaker MUST reject the		Mismatch Notification (code 2, subcode <TBD2>), and also send a
	eBGP connection, send a Role Mismatch Notification (code 2, subcode		Connection Rejected Notification [RFC4486] (Notification with error
	<TBD2>), and also send a Connection Rejected Notification [RFC4486]		code 6, subcode 5).
	(Notification with error code 6, subcode 5).
	5.1. Strict mode		5.1. Strict and Non-strict Modes
	A new BGP configuration option "strict mode" is defined with values		A new BGP configuration option "strict mode" is defined with values
	of true or false. If set to true, then the speaker MUST refuse to		of true or false. If set to true, then the speaker MUST refuse to
	establish a BGP session with a neighbor which does not announce the		establish a BGP session with a neighbor which does not announce the
	BGP Role capability in the OPEN message. If a speaker rejects a		BGP Role capability in the OPEN message. If a speaker rejects a
	connection, it MUST send a send a Role Mismatch Notification (code 2,		connection, it MUST send a Role Mismatch Notification (code 2,
	subcode <TBD2>), and also send a Connection Rejected Notification		subcode <TBD2>), and also send a Connection Rejected Notification
	[RFC4486] (Notification with error code 6, subcode 5). By default,		[RFC4486] (Notification with error code 6, subcode 5). By default,
	strict mode SHOULD be set to false for backward compatibility with		strict mode SHOULD be set to false (i.e. non-strict mode is used) for
	BGP speakers that do not yet support this mechanism.		backward compatibility with BGP speakers that do not yet support this
			mechanism.
			In the case of a neighbor who doesn't participate, the BGP Role is
			configured unilaterally based on local knowledge of the peering
			relationship. (Note: This applies only to the default non-strict
			mode; remember that in strict mode, the BGP connection is rejected
			for any non-participating neighbor.) The only thing lacking would be
			a mutual confirmation with the neighbor about BGP Role (this is
			permissible for backward compatibility in partial deployment). The
			OTC attribute processing (Section 6) remains unaffected.
	6. BGP Only to Customer (OTC) Attribute		6. BGP Only to Customer (OTC) Attribute
	Newly defined here, the Only to Customer (OTC) is an optional, 4		Newly defined here, the Only to Customer (OTC) is an optional, 4
	bytes long, transitive BGP Path attribute with the Type Code <TBD3>.		bytes long, transitive BGP Path attribute with the Type Code <TBD3>.
	The purpose of this attribute is to guarantee that once a route is		The purpose of this attribute is to guarantee that once a route is
	sent to customer, peer, or RS-client, it will subsequently go only to		sent to customer, peer, or RS-client, it will subsequently go only to
	customers. The value of OTC is an AS number determined by policy as		customers. The value of OTC is an AS number determined by policy as
	described below. The semantics and usage of the OTC attribute are		described below. The semantics and usage of the OTC attribute are
	made clear by the ingress and egress policies described below.		made clear by the ingress and egress policies described below.
	skipping to change at page 7, line 5 ¶		skipping to change at page 7, line 25 ¶
	3. If a route is received from a Provider, Peer, or RS and the OTC		3. If a route is received from a Provider, Peer, or RS and the OTC
	attribute is not present, then it MUST be added with value equal		attribute is not present, then it MUST be added with value equal
	to the sending neighbor's AS number.		to the sending neighbor's AS number.
	The egress policy MUST be:		The egress policy MUST be:
	1. A route with the OTC attribute set MUST NOT be sent to Providers,		1. A route with the OTC attribute set MUST NOT be sent to Providers,
	Peers, or RS(s).		Peers, or RS(s).
	2. If route is sent to a Customer or Peer, or an RS-client (when the		2. If a route is sent to a Customer or Peer, or an RS-client (when
	sender is an RS) and the OTC attribute is not present, then it		the sender is an RS) and the OTC attribute is not present, then
	MUST be added with value equal to AS number of the sender.		it MUST be added with a value equal to AS number of the sender.
	Once the OTC attribute has been set, it MUST be preserved unchanged.		Once the OTC attribute has been set, it MUST be preserved unchanged.
	7. Enforcement		7. Enforcement
	Having the relationship unequivocally agreed between the two peers in		Having the relationship unequivocally agreed between the two peers in
	BGP OPEN is critical; BGP implementations MUST enforce the		BGP OPEN is critical; BGP implementations MUST enforce the
	relationship/role establishment rules (see Section 5) in order to		relationship/role establishment rules (see Section 5) in order to
	ameliorate operator policy configuration errors (if any).		ameliorate operator policy configuration errors (if any).
	skipping to change at page 7, line 38 ¶		skipping to change at page 8, line 10 ¶
	There are peering relationships that are 'complex', i.e., both		There are peering relationships that are 'complex', i.e., both
	parties are intentionally sending prefixes received from each other		parties are intentionally sending prefixes received from each other
	to their non-transit peers and/or transit providers. If multiple BGP		to their non-transit peers and/or transit providers. If multiple BGP
	peerings can segregate the 'complex' parts of the relationship, the		peerings can segregate the 'complex' parts of the relationship, the
	complex peering roles can be segregated into different normal BGP		complex peering roles can be segregated into different normal BGP
	sessions, and BGP Roles MUST be used on each of the resulting normal		sessions, and BGP Roles MUST be used on each of the resulting normal
	(non-complex) BGP sessions.		(non-complex) BGP sessions.
	No Roles SHOULD be configured on a 'complex' BGP session (assuming it		No Roles SHOULD be configured on a 'complex' BGP session (assuming it
	is not segregated) and in that case, OTC MUST be set by configuration		is not segregated) and in that case, the OTC attribute processing
	on a per-prefix basis. However, there are no built-in measures to		MUST be done relying on configuration on a per-prefix basis. (Note:
	check correctness of OTC use if BGP Role is not configured.		The per-prefix configuration of peering relationship is currently
			done to handle 'complex' BGP sessions.) However, there are no built-
			in measures to check the correctness of OTC use if BGP Role is not
			configured.
	The incorrect setting of BGP Roles and/or OTC attributes may affect		The incorrect setting of BGP Roles and/or OTC attributes may affect
	prefix propagation. Further, this document doesn't specify any		prefix propagation. Further, this document doesn't specify any
	special handling of incorrect/private ASNs in OTC attribute; such		special handling of incorrect/private ASNs in the OTC attribute; such
	errors should not happen with proper configuration.		errors should not happen with proper configuration.
	As the BGP Role reflects the peering relationship between neighbors,		As the BGP Role reflects the peering relationship between neighbors,
	it might have other uses beyond the route leak solution discussed so		it might have other uses beyond the route leak solution discussed so
	far. For example, BGP Role might affect route priority, or be used		far. For example, BGP Role might affect route priority, or be used
	to distinguish borders of a network if a network consists of multiple		to distinguish borders of a network if a network consists of multiple
	ASs. Though such uses may be worthwhile, they are not the goal of		ASs. Though such uses may be worthwhile, they are not the goal of
	this document. Note that such uses would require local policy		this document. Note that such uses would require local policy
	control.		control.
	The use of BGP Roles are specified for unicast IPv4 and IPv6 address		The use of BGP Roles is specified for unicast IPv4 and IPv6 address
	families. While BGP roles can be configured on other address		families. While BGP roles can be configured on other address
	families its applicability for these cases is out of scope of this		families its applicability for these cases is out of the scope of
	document.		this document.
	As BGP role configuration results in automatic creation of inbound/		As BGP role configuration results in the automatic creation of
	outbound filters, existence of roles should be treated as existence		inbound/outbound filters, the existence of roles should be treated as
	of Import and Export policy [RFC8212].		the existence of Import and Export policy [RFC8212].
	9. IANA Considerations		9. IANA Considerations
	This document defines a new Capability Codes option [to be removed		This document defines a new Capability Codes option [to be removed
	upon publication: https://www.iana.org/assignments/capability-codes/		upon publication: https://www.iana.org/assignments/capability-codes/
	capability-codes.xhtml ] [RFC5492], named "BGP Role" with an assigned		capability-codes.xhtml ] [RFC5492], named "BGP Role" with an assigned
	value <TBD1>. The length of this capability is 1.		value <TBD1>. The length of this capability is 1.
	The BGP Role capability includes a Value field, for which IANA is		The BGP Role capability includes a Value field, for which IANA is
	requested to create and maintain a new sub-registry called "BGP Role		requested to create and maintain a new sub-registry called "BGP Role
	Value". Assignments consist of Value and corresponding Role name.		Value". Assignments consist of Value and corresponding Role name.
	Initially this registry is to be populated with the data contained in		Initially, this registry is to be populated with the data contained
	Table 1 found in Section 4. Future assignments may be made by a		in Table 1 found in Section 4. Future assignments may be made by a
	Standard Action procedure [RFC8126]. The allocation policy for new		Standard Action procedure [RFC8126]. The allocation policy for new
	entries up to and including value 127 is "Expert Review" [RFC8126].		entries up to and including value 127 is "Expert Review" [RFC8126].
	The allocation policy for values 128 through 251 is "First Come First		The allocation policy for values 128 through 251 is "First Come First
	Served". The values from 252 through 255 are for "Experimental Use".		Served". The values from 252 through 255 are for "Experimental Use".
	This document defines a new subcode, "Role Mismatch" with an assigned		This document defines a new subcode, "Role Mismatch" with an assigned
	value <TBD2> in the OPEN Message Error subcodes registry [to be		value <TBD2> in the OPEN Message Error subcodes registry [to be
	removed upon publication: http://www.iana.org/assignments/bgp-		removed upon publication: http://www.iana.org/assignments/bgp-
	parameters/bgp-parameters.xhtml#bgp-parameters-6] [RFC4271].		parameters/bgp-parameters.xhtml#bgp-parameters-6] [RFC4271].
	This document defines a new optional, transitive BGP Path Attributes		This document defines a new optional, transitive BGP Path Attributes
	option, named "Only to Customer (OTC)" with an assigned value <TBD3>		option, named "Only to Customer (OTC)" with an assigned value <TBD3>
	[To be removed upon publication: http://www.iana.org/assignments/bgp-		[To be removed upon publication: http://www.iana.org/assignments/bgp-
	parameters/bgp-parameters.xhtml#bgp-parameters-2] [RFC4271]. The		parameters/bgp-parameters.xhtml#bgp-parameters-2] [RFC4271]. The
	length of this attribute is four bytes.		length of this attribute is four bytes.
	10. Security Considerations		10. Security Considerations
	This document proposes a mechanism for prevention of route leaks that		This document proposes a mechanism for the prevention of route leaks
	are the result of BGP policy misconfiguration.		that are the result of BGP policy misconfiguration.
	A misconfiguration in OTC setup may affect prefix propagation. But		A misconfiguration in the OTC setup may affect prefix propagation.
	the automation that is provided by BGP roles should make such		But the automation that is provided by BGP roles should make such
	misconfiguration unlikely.		misconfiguration unlikely.
	11. References		11. References
	11.1. Normative References		11.1. Normative References
	[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate		[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
	Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,		Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
	DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,		DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
	<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.		<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
	skipping to change at page 9, line 42 ¶		skipping to change at page 10, line 20 ¶
	[Gao] Gao, L. and J. Rexford, "Stable Internet routing without		[Gao] Gao, L. and J. Rexford, "Stable Internet routing without
	global coordination", IEEE/ACM Transactions on		global coordination", IEEE/ACM Transactions on
	Networking, Volume 9, Issue 6, pp 689-692, DOI		Networking, Volume 9, Issue 6, pp 689-692, DOI
	10.1109/90.974523, December 2001,		10.1109/90.974523, December 2001,
	<https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/974523>.		<https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/974523>.
	[I-D.ietf-grow-route-leak-detection-mitigation]		[I-D.ietf-grow-route-leak-detection-mitigation]
	Sriram, K. and A. Azimov, "Methods for Detection and		Sriram, K. and A. Azimov, "Methods for Detection and
	Mitigation of BGP Route Leaks", draft-ietf-grow-route-		Mitigation of BGP Route Leaks", draft-ietf-grow-route-
	leak-detection-mitigation-04 (work in progress), October		leak-detection-mitigation-05 (work in progress), April
	2020.		2021.
	[RFC7908] Sriram, K., Montgomery, D., McPherson, D., Osterweil, E.,		[RFC7908] Sriram, K., Montgomery, D., McPherson, D., Osterweil, E.,
	and B. Dickson, "Problem Definition and Classification of		and B. Dickson, "Problem Definition and Classification of
	BGP Route Leaks", RFC 7908, DOI 10.17487/RFC7908, June		BGP Route Leaks", RFC 7908, DOI 10.17487/RFC7908, June
	2016, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7908>.		2016, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7908>.
	[RFC8126] Cotton, M., Leiba, B., and T. Narten, "Guidelines for		[RFC8126] Cotton, M., Leiba, B., and T. Narten, "Guidelines for
	Writing an IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26,		Writing an IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26,
	RFC 8126, DOI 10.17487/RFC8126, June 2017,		RFC 8126, DOI 10.17487/RFC8126, June 2017,
	<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8126>.		<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8126>.
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