[Idr] FW: New Version Notification for draft-sriram-idr-route-leak-detection-mitigation-00.txt
"Sriram, Kotikalapudi" <kotikalapudi.sriram@nist.gov> Mon, 09 March 2015 22:17 UTC
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From: "Sriram, Kotikalapudi" <kotikalapudi.sriram@nist.gov>
To: "idr@ietf.org" <idr@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: New Version Notification for draft-sriram-idr-route-leak-detection-mitigation-00.txt
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Date: Mon, 09 Mar 2015 22:16:54 +0000
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Subject: [Idr] FW: New Version Notification for draft-sriram-idr-route-leak-detection-mitigation-00.txt
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Route leaks problem definition is already work in progress in the GROW WG. http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-grow-route-leak-problem-definition-01 This related new draft addresses techniques for detection and mitigation of route leaks. The IDR chairs have agreed to include this draft in the agenda for Dallas. So we (the authors) look forward to presenting this work and receiving your comments. Comments are welcome on the mailing list as well. Sriram ---------------------------------------- A new version of I-D, draft-sriram-idr-route-leak-detection-mitigation-00.txt has been successfully submitted by Kotikalapudi Sriram and posted to the IETF repository. Name: draft-sriram-idr-route-leak-detection-mitigation Revision: 00 Title: Methods for Detection and Mitigation of BGP Route Leaks Document date: 2015-03-09 Group: Individual Submission Pages: 14 URL: http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-sriram-idr-route-leak-detection-mitigation-00.txt Status: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-sriram-idr-route-leak-detection-mitigation/ Htmlized: http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-sriram-idr-route-leak-detection-mitigation-00 Abstract: In [I-D.ietf-grow-route-leak-problem-definition], the authors have provided a definition of the route leak problem, and also enumerated several types of route leaks. In this document, we first examine which of those route-leak types are detected and mitigated by the existing origin validation [RFC 6811] and BGPSEC path validation [I- D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-protocol]. Where the current BGPSEC protocol doesn't offer a solution, this document suggests an enhancement that would extend the route-leak detection and mitigation capability of BGPSEC. The solution can be implemented in BGP without necessarily tying it to BGPSEC. Incorporating the solution in BGPSEC is one way of implementing it in a secure way. We do not claim to have provided a solution for all possible types of route leaks, but the solution covers several, especially considering some significant route-leak attacks or occurrences that have been observed in recent years. The document also includes a stopgap method for detection and mitigation of route leaks for the phase when BGPSEC (path validation) is not yet deployed but only origin validation is deployed.
- [Idr] FW: New Version Notification for draft-srir… Sriram, Kotikalapudi